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ABSTRACT 
A process control computer has been used to detect malfunction in 
the instrumentation of control loops. A flol; control loop is examined and 
a malfunction detection algorithm is developed which is based upon a 
comparison of the control valve position and flow. The technique 
assumes a relatively constant flow-pressure drop characteristic. It 
is postulated that a flow control loop has inherent measurement redun-
dancy and a simple "static" or "tracking" state estimator is used to 
obtain an estimate of the flow from the valve position (or control 
demand) and flowmeter measurements. The check is based upon monitor-
ing changes in the residuals generated by the estimator. The check 
technique doeS not require additional process instrumentation, uses 
little computer time or storage and can be performed while the control 
loop is operating under direct digital control. The method has been 
tested by extensive laboratory trials and some limited industrial 
application. 
This malfunction detection method based Upon state estimation is 
generalised to encompass all control loops uSing a Kalman filter state· 
estimator. The control loops are modelled by linear time invariant 
transfer functions and it is assumed that the load disturbance is 
relatively constant or measured. The Kalman filter is deSigned to 
yield optimal state estimates by uSing Hehra IS innovation correlation 
method to account for uncertainty in the system model and statistical 
properties. The malfunction detection methods·are based upon examin-
ing changes· in the estimator innovation sequence and/or directly 
estimating loop security parameters associated with control loop mal-
function. The loop security parameter estimator is de coupled from 
the primary Kalman· filter using Friedlandls method and its implementa-
ii 
-tion becomes trivial when it is comb~led with the results genel~ted 
from Mehra's adaptive estimator. 
lhe checks can be perfOl~ed on line to monitor conventional 
analogue and direct digital control loops. 
The proposed algorithms have been tested on an experimental 
laboratory level control apparatus. The results show that the methods 
,detect malfunction and provide some diagnostic information. 
Experiments also show that Mehra's adaptive estimator fails if the 
process measurement noise covariance matrix is small. 
The merits of malfunction detection and equipment condition moni-
toring are considered in termS of reliability theory. Reliability is 
considered in terms of the state of knowledge of the system and is 
treated from the view point of the plant designer and operator. The 
reliability is categorised into four regimes depending upon whether or 
not monitoring is performed and upon the information received from the 
monitor. Expressions are derived for these four reliability functions 
for a single equillllent. The information needed to calculate these 
estimates is the conventional reliability function together with the 
probability density functions for the time to failure and for the 
monitor signal from the time of initial malfunction. 
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CHAPI'ER 1. 
INTROruCTION 
1 
The progress of the chemical process mduStry over the last 
decade or so has generally been towards larger, more efficient auto-
ma ted plants emp10ymg smg1e streams instead of several parallel 
ones. 1hi.B trend has resulted from the commercial pressure for 
lower unit costs and for better products. 
Associated with this phenomenon has been the growth of process 
computer control systems (1). 
As plants have become larger and more complex, some processes have 
been required to operate at higher temperatures and pressures with much 
higher concentrations of reactive chemicals than previously. This 
obviously results m the possibility of greater plant damage under 
fault conditions. This damage not only cauSes economic loss, but 
also human life is endangered. As well as these catastrophic plant 
failures, it has become evident m recent years that many of the 
expected economies of large plants can disappear if a plant cannot be 
operated contmuous1y with unmterrupted production (2). 
The realisation of these problems has resulted m an mcreasmg 
mterest in reliability engineering (3). . Reliability engineering is 
essential for safety, and is concerned with predicting, estimating or 
optimising the probability of Survival, mean life, or more generally 
life probability distributions of components or systemS. Other proI>-'-
lems considered are those involving the probability of the proper 
functioning of the system at either a specified or· an arbitrary time, 
or the proportion of the time that the system is functioning properly. 
Often mamtenance such as repair, replaCelllent, or mspection, may be 
perfonned so that the solution of . the reliability problem may influence 
deciSions concerning mamtenance policies to. be followed. 
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The interest in reliability engineering has required probabilis-
tic infoI1llation on equipnent failure rates and modes and has led to 
the establishment of a central data bank at the U.K. A.E.A. More 
recently several papers have appeared in the open literature summaris-
ing equipment malfunction surveyS (4), (5), (6), (7), (8) •. 
The development of process reliability has relied upon the 
diagnosis of equipnent faults. However, there is a growing recogni-
tion that future progress cannot rely upon diagnosis alone (1), (9), 
(10). It is becoming increasingly important to monitor the· state of 
process equipments on either an intermittent or continuous basis. 
At the present time a high plant operating efficiency is achieved 
by introducing maintenance schedules which impose shut-downs at inter-
vals of time. However, despite this preventive maintenance, malfunc-
tion can occur in both process equipment and instrumentation. The 
consequences of such faults depend upon the importance of the ma~ 
functioning equipment to the overall process security and upon the 
degree of warning. The most baSic form of maintenance may be termed 
"emergency maintenance", where the equipment is allowed to operate 
until it fails before it is repaired or replaced. This results in 
maintenance work being done on an emergency basis, which is inefficient 
in the utilisation of manpower and may lead to excessive process down-
time. Thus, it is desirable to be able to detect process anomalies 
at an early stage, thereby preventing catastroIidc failures, improving 
the operational efficiency of equipnent and facilities, reducing 
maintenance cost and allOwing the process to run closer to its intended 
conditions. The introduction of suitable malfunction detection 
policies would help to rationalise the approach to plant maintenance 
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and at the same time provide valuable infonnation on the development 
of failures in different equipment and instrumentation. 
Most of the malfunction detection on chemical plant is currently 
performed by the process operator. '!he problems raised and some 
methods of detection have been reviewed by Edwards and Lees (1), 
Anyakora (9), IJoWSon (11) and Trotter (12). However, as proceSs 
computer control systems have developed it has become apparent that 
the computer has the capacity to contribute to the improvement of the 
overall process reliability (13), (14), (15), (16), (17). There are 
several areas of process reliability to which the proceSs computer may 
be applied; however, in this thesis the application to malfunction 
detection is conSidered. 
The success and role of the process operator in detecting process 
malfunctions has· been examined by Edwards and Lees (1) • However, even 
recognising the competence and dedication of process operators and 
maintenance personnel, human perfonnance is dependent on outside and 
often indeterminable pressures. Frequently conducted procedures become 
routine and· human frailty of increased indifference to routine proce-
dures :LS well known. Routine operations· and repetitive ··functions 
requiring little imagination and offering little· satisfaction .are best 
left to a machine, thereby releasing the operator for more rewarding 
tasks. However, the decision of manual, automatic, or man-machine 
malfunction detection is not particularly well defined (1). The 
choice of system should be based upon the comparative strengths and 
weaknesses of each. 
If a process computer is used for automatic malfUnction detection, 
then the experience, judgement, insight and instinct of the human 
opera tor are lost. However, balanced against this are the 
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characteristics of the process computer. These include the ability 
of the machine to perfonn more frequent tests without a higher 
probability of error. Other important features are: the collection 
of large amounts of process data, the detennination of accurate 
process time transients, the facility of conditioning process data to 
a more amenable fonn, the long tenn memory for immediate comparison 
and the ability of operational self interrogation (18). 
The application of a process computer to malfunction detection, 
either as an autonomous device, or as an aid to the process operator, 
is relatively undeveloped (1). The computer's contribution is mainly 
restricted-to monitoring process alarms, to checks made during sequen-
tial operations and to some limited instrument tests. 
Damon (17), Hoyte (19); Fraade (20) and Thompson (21) have 
deScribed methodS where the computer performs, with the aid of isolation 
valves, the type of testS normally performed manually by a process 
operator or maintenance engineer. 
More extensive checks on process equipment and instrumentation, 
which utilise the computation capacity of the computer, have been 
suggested by Edwards and Lees (1), Lees (4) and Damon (17), and prac-
tical applications of these ideas are beginning to appear _(22), (23), 
(24). 
A method of detecting instrumentation malfunction by analySing 
the statiStical properties of an instrument signal time series was 
proposed by Anyakora (9). A similar technique has been developed to 
monitor the state of an on-line nuclear reactor (25). _In this scheme 
many of the computer characteristics are-exploited. -For example, the 
computer calculates a power spectral density of the instrument signal 
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and displays the resulting characteristic, as well as a standard 
characteristic recalled froni memory, on a colour visual display unit 
(V.D.U.). 
An important part of any modern chemical plant is the control 
system, which can of course malfunction. The ordinary process control 
loop is liable to malfunction and faults can develop in any of its 
constituent parts such as the measurement, controlling or regulating 
elements. 
1he seriOUSness of a control loop failure or malfunction depends 
upon the application, but types of failure which may have particularly 
serious consequences include misleading measurement, incorrect control 
action or valve seizure resulting in wrong control action. The mal-
function of instrumentation appears to contribute Significantly to 
serious procesS incidents. For example, Whitman (14) has reported 
that failures of instrumentation in ammonia chemical plants account 
for 10% of major incidents. Some consequences of instrument failure 
in chemical plant han been given by Lees (4). 
However, even if the individual instrument malfunctions do not 
seriously affect the process, their sum total can result in a degrada-
tion of the control system performance as well as a decrease in process 
efficiency. 
The failure rates of instruments in chemical plant are quite high 
(4), (8) and since modern plants contain large numbers of them the 
probability of failed instruments at any particular time is high. 
Skala (8) has suggested that there may be as many as 1% of the process 
instruments in a failed state at any time. 
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The detectior. of instrument and/or control loop malfunction is 
usually perfonned by the process operator using an instincti;ve. 
approach based upon his mental model of the expected process response 
and measurement time histories (26). This thesis examines the feaSi-
bility of using a process computer to detect malfunction in both 
conventional analogue setpoint and direct digital control loops. 
Chapter 2 develops a particular method for the detection of 
malfunction in a flow control loop based upor: a "simple" state estima-
tor. This check exploits many of the computer1s capabilities, such 
as the memory, the display and the calculation capacity. The technique 
is illustrated by extensive laboratory experiments and some industrial 
trials •. 
The application of state estimation to control loop malfunction 
is generalised in Chapter 3 where a method is presented which is based 
upor: Kalman filtering. 
In addition to deriving computer aided methods of malfunction 
detection, the impact of the knowledge that an instrument or equipment 
is malfunctioning on the process management1s assessment of reliability 
is considered. Chapter 4 examines this problem and derives a mathe-
matical model whereby a process operator can predict equiIinent reli-
ability using his current state of knowledge of the equipment condition 
indicated by a malfunction detection monitor. 
Many of the ideas presented in this thesis involve the concepts 
of linear algebra and probability theory, and the notation and 
mathematical quantities used are given in Appendix I (27), (28). 
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CHAPl'ER 2. 
THE DETECTION OF MALFUNCTION IN A 
FLOW CONTROL LOOP 
8 
2.1 List of symbols 
aij 
Cv 
D 
E{ ) 
eQ 
es 
ex 
F 
f ij 
f{lf ) 
G(s) 
gi 
H 
Ho 
Hji 
h <!) 
h. 
-~ 
J 
k 
cross-sectional area of control 
valve. 
coefficient in constraint equation. 
control valve sizing factor 
pipe diameter. 
expectation • 
error in flow 
error in flowmeter signal. 
. error in control valve stem position. 
Jacobian matrix (mxn). F distribution 
i,jth element of F 
non-linear vector function of ~ 
transfer function 
weighting coefficient 
measurement matrix (mxn) 
null hypothesis 
enthalpy coefficient 
non-linear measurement vector function 
of x. 
non-linear measurement vector function 
with i th equation eliminated. 
i th row measurement vector. 
cost function. 
process gain/discrete time counter. 
constants in flowmeter and control valve 
equations. 
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various 
U.S.gall 
. ( . )! m.lll p.s.J.. 
m 
various 
various 
chu/ 
lb.mole 
various 
various 
k
ml ,km2 
k
v1 ,kv2 ) 
k
v3 ,kv4 
) 
) 
I 
m 
m 
mi 
N 
n 
Q 
q 
R 
r 
r 
constants in flOllllDeter equations. 
constants in control 
valve equations. 
number of constraint equations. 
vector of process measurementS. 
number of measurements. 
i th element of vector .!!! 
normalised test function. 
number of samples; number of system states; 
iteration number. 
pressure drop. 
pressure drop across flowmeter 
orifice plate 
pressure drop across control valve 
flow 
flow through flowmeter 
maximum flow 
flow through control valve 
number of process disturbances 
measurement noise covariAnce matrix; 
weighting matrix. 
ijth element of R 
vector of residuals 
number of' control variables 
residual of measureDllnt i 
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various 
various 
various 
k.N/m2 
(p.s.i.g.) 
kN/m2 
(p.s .i.g.) 
kN/m2 
(P.s.i.g. ) 
m3/s 
m3/s 
m3/s 
m3/s 
various 
various 
r .. l.,J 
s 
s 
-2 s 
t 
f,t 
.!! 
v 
w 
x 
x 
~ (k) 
z 
sample mean of i tit residual fran j th 
ensemble. 
weight:ing matrix 
flowmeter signal; l.aplace operator 
pooled sample variance 
sample variance of j th ensemble 
sample .variance ofi th residual from 
j th ensemble 
student's t distribution; time 
sampl:ing interval 
control vector 
measurement noise vector 
vector of process disturbances 
valve position; controller signal 
max:iJnum valve position; max:iJnum. 
controller signal 
state vector 
linearised state vector 
initial iterative value of ;!; 
state vector at iteration n. 
state vector at time' k 
th . . 
i element of ;!; 
vector of measurements 
linearised measurement vector 
i th element of l 
statistical test function 
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various 
various 
various 
various 
various 
-; s 
s 
an; V 
cm; V 
-
various 
Greek letters 
alpha a. 
beta 13 
zeta ~ 
lambda b, 
mu Il 
rho Pij 
sigma 0 
tau td 
phi (/) 
psi ~ 
omega W n 
Subscripts 
i 
m 
n 
o 
s 
v 
x 
z 
confidence limit 
probability 
damping factor 
vector of lagrange multipliers 
population mean 
corre1a tion coefficient between 
measurement i and j 
population standard deviation; 
measurement noise standard deviation. 
time delay 
sum of squares cost function 
vector of constraint 
natural frequency 
variable i 
flowmeter 
iteration n 
equations 
initial value; malfunction free value 
flowmeter signal 
control valve 
valve position 
statistical test function 
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-
various 
various: 
various 
s 
SUperscripts 
i 
T 
-1 
i th row vector 
transpose 
inverse 
mean 
estimate 
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2.2 Introduction 
Modern processes rely extensiveJ.y upon the correct distribution 
. and control of flowing liquids or gases. 
The usual proceSS flow control loop is illustrated scitematically 
in Figure 2.1. The object of this system is to regulate a fluid flow 
according to some desired requirement. The operation of the control 
loop depends upon the controller receiving from the measuring instru-
ment a measurement of the controlled variable. The controller com-
pares this with a desired value or setpoint to obtain an error, 
performs a mathematical operation on the error and sends an output 
signal to the control valve, Which then adjusts the' manipulated .vari-
able. 
The control valve operates as a variable orifice and the: rate of 
flow through the valve depends upon the UPStream and downstream fluid 
pressures and the opening of the valve. the heart of the control 
valve is the valve trim; its main parts are the Seat and the valve 
plug. The plug usually consists of a seating surface and a charac-
terised portion. 
The characterised portion of the valve plug is of special impor-
tance, since it is used to vary the flow area between the plug and the 
valve seat at a controlled rate. This rate of flow change with valve 
lift or controller signal is called the inherenti.Low characteristic 
of the·valve. 
Control valve manufacturers produce a diverse range of inherent 
valve flow. characteristics. However, the COllllDOllest types are the 
linear and equal percentage characteristics. 
A linear inherent characteristic produces a change iD. flow, under 
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constant pressure drop, that is linear with valve position or control-
ler signal. For example, at 50% signal, 50% of the flow capacity 
will pass through the valve. 
The equal percentage valve characteristic produces a change of 
flow, for a given increment of valve poSition, that is a percentage of 
the quantity of flow just before the change was made. 
The flow control loop can be based upon a conventional analogue 
controller or a process computer using direct digital control (d.d.c.). 
The signals around the loop can be pneumatic, electrical or a mixture 
of the two. 
Typical control loops are shown in Figure 2.2. F~ure 2.2.a is 
a conventional analogue loop in which the flowmeter is an orifice 
plate and differential pressure transmitter,· and in which all the 
instruments are pneumatic. Figure 2.2.b shows a loop under d.d.c. 
in which the flowmeter is similar to Figure 2.2.a, but the pneumatic 
output from the differential pressure transmitter is converted into an 
electrical signal by a pressure/current (pi!) transducer before enter-
ing the process computer. The output from the computer is converted 
from an electrical to a pneumatic signal in .a current/pressure (I/p) 
transducer and then passed to the control valve. ~e 2.2.c is' 
similar to Figure 2.2.b except the flolGeter is an instrument giving 
an electrical output, such as a magnetic flowmeter. 
The reliability of a flow control loop depends upon the state of 
its components. The precise definition of control loop failure or 
reliability is not straightforward, but for practical purposes some 
workers (4) have suggested that failure is defined when an instrument 
is not operating to the satisfaction of the process operator. 
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FIGURE 2.2a Analogue flow control loop with orifice/differential 
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FIGURE 2.2c D:i.rect digital flow control loop with magnetic flowmeter. 
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The failures detected in this way vary considerably in type and 
degree. Most failures are determined by inadequate performance of 
some kind but the acceptability of a given performance depends upon 
the application. For example, the reliability of a flow control 
loop may be considered from two points of view: 
i) The reproducibility of the system. 
11) The absolute accuracy of the system. 
Both of these aspects are interrelated. For normal plant con-
trol purposes employing feedback control loops, the pr:ima.ry interest 
is i) since usually a setpoint is established at which the given 
system is controlled and the absolute level of this setpoint is only 
of secondary importance. However, for process performance evaluation 
such as material and energy balances, optimisation, model building, 
etc., when a flow has to be compared directly with another, then all 
the measurements must refer to the same datUm level. Absolute 
accuracy is then required as well as a good standard of reproducibility. 
The important point is that what constitutes a failure for one 
application may be acceptable in another. 
LeeS (4) and Skala (8) have presented data on process .instrumenta-
tion reliability. In particular, Table 2.1 details the overall 
failure rates of the process instrumentation associated with flow 
control loops. 
The overall instrument failure rate gives only lUnited information 
and often knowledge of the instnunent failure modes are required. 
Lees has classified failure modes as: 
Condition, 
Performance, 
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Safety, 
Detection. 
Some data on failure modes for various instruments have been 
analysed by Lees (29), while the results of three independent surveys 
of data describing malfunctions of valves used in nuclear power plants 
are given in reference (30). Stiles (31) has investigated the effect 
of cavitation in control valves and presented several photographs of 
damaged valve trims caused by operating the ,system in this way. 
Environmental effects of temperature and pressure on the failure 
characteristics of pressure transducers have been examined by 
DlvidSon (32). 
The problem of detecting malfunction in now control loops has 
been examined by several researchers. 
A major area of work has been concerned with the problem of data 
Instrument 
Control'Valve (p) 
Controller (p) 
Flow measurement (fluidS) 
Differential pressure transducer (now) 
(neglecting impulse lines) 
Magnetic flowmeter 
Current/pressure transducer 
Impulse lines 
Observed failure 
rate-faults/year 
0.25 - 0.60 
0.29,- 0.38 
1.14 
,1.73 
2.18 
0.49 
0.77 
TABLE 2.1. Flow control loop instrumentation failure rate, data (4). 
p denotes pneumatic. 
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consistency reflecting the definition of flow control loop failure as 
having occUlTed when the material and energy balance acceptance 
criterion is not satisfied. 
A set of material and energy balance data from a chemical plant 
does not usually satisfy the steady state material and energy balance 
equations. 'Drl.s inconsistency may be accolDlted for in several ways 
such as random errors on the measurements, lDlSteady state process 
operation, gross measurement errors, and procesS disturbances. 
Kuehn and Davidson (33) and C1ementson (34) have proposed methods 
of obtaining consistent data sets from process measurements containing 
only small random errors obtained at steady state plant operation. 
They introduced the least squares criterion to predict a consis-
tent set of data:l. from a set of measured data m: 
m 
Ih = L 
'I' i=1 (2.1.1) 
where 0. 2 is the . . th .th t' gl.ven error varance on e l. measuremen, m. l.S l. l. 
the ith observed measurement, . th .th wh d y i J.5 e l. measurement. en correcte 
and m is the nUlllber of measurements. 
In the analysis the elements of y: are assUllled to be linearly 
related to one another by equations such as material and heat balances, 
i.e. 
4J.= J 
m 
2:: 
i=1 j = 1,2.. . . , 1 (2.1.2) 
where a ji is the coefficient of the ith measurement in the jth 
. balance equation, and 1 is the total nUlllber of constraints. 
The problem in mathematical fOI1ll. is to minimise $, ~ubject to the 
constraints ':!! 
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Notice that with this fonnulation the m.IS are not the primary 
~ 
measurements such as the fj, P across an orifice plate, bUt are mass 
flows computed from the pr:imary measurements. 
Ripps (35) considered the problem of the process measurements 
containing small errors as well as very large errors introduced by 
complete malfunctioning of an instrument, or very strong instrument 
bias. He expanded Kuehn and Davidson's procedure by discarding 
measurements, which were suspected of containing a gross error, in 
the basic least squares criterion of equation (2.1.1). The method 
takes advantage of the redundancy present in the material and energy 
balance equations to est:imate the discarded data. By examining the 
.resultant minimum least squares function <!l when measurements are 
discarded, Ripps demonstrates that this indicates which measurement 
has the gross error. He states that the minimum <!l often coincides 
with the most correct data adjustment, but this need not be the case. 
Although Ripps' technique is attractive it requires some knowledge 
about the procesS in selecting suspect measurements. Also there is 
no criterion proposed to detennine the number of measurements contain-
ing gross errors. This makeS the result uncertain and alternative 
results occasionally may be assumed. 
Nogita (36) and Nogita and Uchiyama (37) have solved some of 
these problems by assuming there might be a few systematic errors in 
the experimental data, and that each of the other measurements is a 
random sample from a Normal population with unknown correct value 
(mean). \l i' known variance 0 i 2 and known correlation coefficient P ij • 
The least squares fonnulation of the previous workers was USed to 
detennine a set of consistent data Z. Nogita then defined a test 
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function for the measured data m as 
The scalar variable z is shown to be a Normal random variable 
with a mean I I and variance 0 2 of : 
..... z . RI 
m 
.2:=1 p.. g. g. J- 1J 1 J O· O· 1 J 
where the elements ~ are derived as a function of the problem 
formulation matrices. 
z is normalised according to: 
z N =-
Oz 
so that N has a Normal distribution with zero mean and unit variance. 
Now by referring to a cumulative Normal distribution table the proba-
bilitY,13, of N being in an interval :t a can be determined. The 
test for data consistency is performed by calculating and testing if 
1Nl > a • If this criterion is satisfied, then it is possible 
to ·say that there exists a grosS measurement error, or an unsteady 
state in the system with 13 probability of being incorrect in making 
such a statement. 
Nogita useS the serial eUmination algorithm of Ripps' technique 
and the test criterion defined above to determine the suspect measure-
mentS. 
, ' 
These techniques of malfunction detection are appealing but suffer 
fran two major disadvantages • Primarily the method aSsumes the 
. measurements under investi&ation may be related by linear equations as 
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shown in equation (2.1.2). Secondly, the fonnulation assumes the 
coefficients of the constraint equations, a .. , are detenninis tic. 
J~ 
While this is true in the case of material balances, for energy 
balances this will not be valid. For example, a process heat 
balance yields constraint equations of the fonn: 
m 
L H .. y. = 0 
.",. J~ ~ ~~ .. 
j = 1,2 ••• 1 
where H .• (c: a .. ) is the enthalpy associated with the flowrate y<. J~ Jl. • 
Now the entbalpy H .. is calculated from temperature and pressure 
J~ 
which are themselves process measurements subject to both small random 
errors and gross errors. However, to USe the techniques described 
it is necessary to assume H.. is known perfectly, which is clearly 
J~ 
untrue. 
It is therefore concluded that the implementation of these data 
adjustment techniques requires a detenninistic knowledge of the 
constraint equation coefficients aij • If there is an element of 
uncertainty in these coefficients it is suggested that a sensitivity 
analysis should be perfonned to detennine the feasibility of using 
these techniques as a malfunction detection algorithm in the partiCular 
application considered. 
To demonstrate the potential shortccm:i.ngs of these techniques 
the method was investigated on an industrial distillation column 
situated at Works A. Works A was a·large tonnage process producing 
an intennedia te organic chemical. Aprocesil cOntrol computer was 
used to monitor process performance and perfonn d.d.c. on sane control 
loops. The problem fonnulation andsensiti'vity analysis is given. in 
Appendix n. 
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The above techniques are concerned with detecting malfunction in 
particular now control loops by examining the consistency of groups 
of measurements. Fraade (20), Flum and Fraade (39) and Garden (40) 
considered the problem of detecting and correcting malfunctions in 
individual flow control loops. Fraade has suggested that a procesS 
computer may be used to perfonn an on-line calibration of the flow 
control loop. He represents the control loop by a characteristic 
which relates the process nowrate to the control voltage from a 
procesS computer. This characteristic changes as the instrumentation 
in the control loop malfunctions, and so Fraade detennines the charac-
teristic on-line by using a calibration tank. At the time of calibra-
tion the process computer isolates the main process flow, opens, the 
outlet of the calibration tank and measures the true flow in the line 
by detennining the time for the tank height to change by a specified 
amount. Now knowing this true flow, which is independent' of the 
system, and the computer control voltage, a neW loop characteristic is 
obtained. This may then be compared with the old characteristic and 
inferences on loop security drawn. This method was, used by Barton et 
al. (41) to check the feed flow to a cement kiln. However, the 
applicability of this idea is limited by the need for additional 
process equipment. 
Garden developed similar ideas for updating a flow control loop 
characteristic, but his method does not USe additional process equip-
ment. Instead, Garden uses a learning technique based upon a fee&-
back signal of the control valve position. '!he technique is applic-
able to control valve actuators that are operated by discontinuous 
Signals such as an electric drive unit ,or a solenoid operated'pneumatic 
actuator. Garden suggests that the method provides continuous on-
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line adaptation to the chang:ing characteristics of the valve actllators 
which results in better control than conventional analogue control or 
its digital equivalent. He also states that his technique may detect 
deteriorating parts of the loop, although he does not present experi-
mental or theoretical confirmation of this. 
A method of detect:ing malf\mction from the "noisiness" of an 
instrument signal has been developed by Anyakora and Lees (9), (42). 
They applied their technique to incipient failures of several instru-
ments such as thermocouples and differential pressure transmitters as 
well as to the incipient stickiness in control valves. 
In this thesis a method is developed of detecting malfunction in 
a complete control loop. It is postulated that a flow control loop 
has inherent measurement redundancy and the process flowrate can be 
calculated from the flowmeter or the control nlTe position measurement 
(or the control valve demand signal).· It will be demonstrated that a 
state estimator may be used to estimate the flowrate uSing the flow-
meter measurement and the "pseudo" measurement of control valve stem 
pOSition, and that this provides a data base from which control loop 
security may be determined. The check is based upon monitoring 
changes in the residuals generated. by the estimator. 
The proposed technique doeS not require additional process 
instrumentation, uses little computer time and storage· and may be 
perfonned while the control loop is operating underd.d.c. 
The malfunction detection technique is tested by extenSive 
laboratory experimentation and some industrial tests performed on 
operating d.d.c. loops at Works A. 
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2.3 A valve Position-flow check 
Q 
In flow control loops in which the preSsure drop acroSs the valve 
is either constant or varies reproducibly with flow, there is a 
constant relation between the valve position and the flow, as given 
by the valve characteristic. Thus the valve position or controller 
signal can be used to provide an indication of flow which is addi-
tional to the measurement given by the flowmeter. As a result of 
this it is possible to consider a flow control loop as a redundant 
system since there exist two measurements of the same variable flow. 
During normal process operation the control valve stem position 
(or controller demand signal) may be. calibrated against the flowmeter 
measurement, under the assumption of no malfunction. A divergence 
between the measured flow and that calculated from this characteristic 
curve may then be taken to indicate that a loop malfunction has 
occurred. 
This principle is shown schema tically in Figure 2.3. 
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a. Healthy loop. b. Unhealthy loop. 
Fiplre 2.3. 
- - - - - - - - flow measured by flowmeter 
_____ flow measured by valve position. 
Re.lat.ion between .. valve.1X'sition and, ,flow. 
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'the flow Q is pl.otted against the valve position x. Figure 
2.3a shows the graph for a healthy loop. Figure 2.3b shows an 
unhealthy loop. There is now a divergence betwen the curves of flow 
as measured by the flowmeter and as est.i.mated from the valve position • 
. This idea is presented as the first technique for malfimction 
detection in flow control loops. It is env:i.saged that a check on 
loop security could be developed based on this divergence, either by 
calculating an error or by displaying the plot on a process computer 
V .D.U. 
2.4 Valve poSition - flow characteristics (43). (44) 
In the majority of flow control loops the flowmeter may be classi-
fied by two main types; the linear flowmeter and the· square root 
flowmeter. 
The equation of a linear flowmeter, such as a magnetic flow-
meter or turbine meter may be written as: 
~= km! s 
Alternatively, a square root flowmeter, Such as an orifice plate 
and differential pressure transmitter may be .used. 'the equation of 
flow of an incompressible fluid through a constant cross sectional 
area orifice is: 
The relation for the transmitter is: 
6. Pm CC s 
Then the equation describing a square root flowmeter is: 
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The equa tion govenUng incompressible fluid flow through a 
restriction such as a control valve may be derived from the laws of 
fluid mechanics and is of the form: 
The cross sectional area for flow A.V depends upon the valve stem 
position x 
Ay = f (x) 
When this relation is linear equation (2.4.5) may be written as: 
Combining equations (2.4.4) and (2.4.6)resuJ.ts in: 
This relation shows the flowrate through the control valve is 
directly proportional to the valve stem position provided the control 
valve pressure drop t,. P
v 
is constant, and all the other parameters 
are constant. 
Under this condition equation (2.4.7) may be written as: 
o = k x 
-V VI 
Equation (2.4.8) represents the model for a linear control valve 
characteristic, although in practice some valves are better modelled 
as: 
o = k + k x 
-v VI v2 
Another commonly used control valve characteristic is the equal 
percentage valve whose equation may be derived in an analogous manner 
to be (43), (44) 
C1y = '1.y max e.xp(-:- kV4 (xmax - x) ) 
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Alterna tively, a more convenient form is often: 
If a control loop is' characterised by these models and there are 
no elTors in the system or in the models themselves, then a material 
balance must constrain the measured flow ~ and the flow obtained 
from the valve position '\r to be equal to the true flow Q 
~ = ~ = Q (2.4.11) 
However, if such an error or malfunction is present in the system 
then the above equations are no longer valid and in particular 
let es and ex be the errors in the flowmeter signal s and 
valve pOSition x, then if a control loop is Characterised by a linear 
flowmeter and a linear control valve, the models of equations (2.4.1) 
p. 
and (2.4.8) may be modified as: 
~ = km1 (s + es ) 
o =k (x+e) 
-V v1 x 
The effect of these errors on the relation between Q and x may 
be investigated by Simulation. 
In this section two types of flowmeter and two control valve 
characteristics have been described and so there are four types of 
loop: 
i) Type 1: Linear flowmeter, linear control valve. 
ii) Type 2: Square root flowmeter, linear control valve. 
ill) Type 3: Linear flowmeter," equal percentage control valve. 
iv) Type 4: Square root flowmeter, equal percentage control 
valve. 
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1he errors investigated are: 
i) Flowmeter zero error, 
il) Flowmeter range error, 
ill) Valve position zero error, 
iv) Valve position range error. 
The control valve errors are best Imderstood by regarding the valve 
as an alternative measuring device in which the signal x is equivalent 
to the signal s in the flowmeter. 
The equations, parameters and errors used :in the smulation are 
given :in Table 2.2. The results are shown in Figures 2.4 - 2.7. 
Figures 2.4 - 2.7 show the type of valve characteristic deviation 
Imder conditions of control loop malflmction. It can be seen from 
. these Figures for each particular type of loop that there are SaBe 
errors which are :indistinguishable; this is particularly true of 
flowmeter and valve pOSition range errors. HOWever, some errors 
give rather distinctive deviations of valve characteristic. For 
example, the curve for a flowmeter zero error :in a Type 4 flow control 
loop, as shown in Figure 2.7a, is particularly recognisable. 
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o 
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Llstrument 
Flowmeter 
control 
valve 
Characteristic 
Linear 
Square root 
Linear 
Equal 
Percentage 
Equation Parameters 
k ~ ml . 
.. 
0.281 m3 2.81 m3 
~=k (s+es ) ~ . x 10-3 S'!l x 10-3"'s 
0.8886 m3 2.81 m3 ~ = km/S + es -1. -x 10-3 s.V:1. x. 10-3 s 
k . ~.' V1 
'Iv = k (x + e ) VI x 
73.86 m3 m3 2.81 
x 10-3 s.m x 10-3 s 
'" = ~ max 52.2 2.81 m3 
x 10-3 s 
exp( -k
v4 (~- (r+ex))) 
. S:iJD.ple models. of flow control.:looRB. 
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FIGURE 2.4 Type 1 control loop (linear flowmeter, linear control valve). 
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FIGURE 2.5 Type 2 control loop (square root flowmeter, linear control valve). 
32 
Flow 
-- - ---------
___ Flow estimated from valve position 
1 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ , 
I 
/ 
/ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Valve position x 
x 
max 
1 
- Flow measured by flowmeter 
1 
Flow 
o \J 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Valve' position 
/ 
I 
/ 
I 
x 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
x 
max 
1 
a. Flowmeter zero error b. Flowmeter range error 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 1 
Flow I 
I 
I Flow 
o 
/' 
/ , 
, 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
Valve position 
I 
I 
/ 
x 
x 
max 
1 
c. Valve position zero error 
--
O+-______ ~ ________ ~ 
o 
Valve position x 
x 
max 
1 
d. Valve position range error 
FIGURE 2.6 TYPe 3 control loop (linear flowmeter, equal percentage 
control valve). 
33 
Flow 
Flow 
1 
--- Flow estimated from valve position 
- - - - Flow measured by flowmeter 
, 
, 
, 
, 
, 
I 1 
Flow , 
/ 
I 
, 
, 
, 
I 
o+-------~--------~ O~-------J--------~ 
1 
o 
Valve position x 
x 
max 
1 
a. Flowmeter zero error 
/ , 
_ ...... ,... .... " 
, 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
, / 
, 
, 
/ 
, 
, 
, 
, 
o+-------~------__ ~ 
o 
Valve position x 
Xmax 
1 
1 
Flow 
o 
Valve position x 
x 
max 
1 
b. Flowmeter range error 
o 
, 
, 
.... - .. ,,' 
--
/ , 
/ 
, 
, 
/ 
Valve position 
/ 
I 
/ 
x 
I 
I , 
/ 
/ . 
x 
max 
I 
I 
I 
1 
c. Valve position zero error d •. Valve position range error 
FIGURE 2.7 Type 4 control loop (square root flowmeter, equal percentage 
control valve) •. 
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2.5 Inadequacies of the valve position - flow check 
The initial postulation for detennining flow control loop security 
has been based upon the generation of .the types of curves shown in 
Figures 2.4 - 2.7. It is envisaged that these curves could be obtained 
during nomal control loop operation or by "stroking" the valve. between 
the fully open and fully closed position. 
However, in practical applications there are several difficulties: 
i) Limited valve travel. 
Althougn the stroking of the valve is acceptable in many cases, 
in others it is not. In these problems the amotmt of valve 
travel may also be constrained. 
ii) Lags between valve poSition and flow measurement. 
ill) The measurements of valve poSition and flowmeter signal are not 
perfect, but depend upon the accuracy of the instrumentation 
provided. This creates a "noiSy" .signal. Other sources of 
noise in the loop may be due to fluctuations in pressure. 
These comments are illustrated in Figure 2.8 which shows the valve 
position and flowmeter measurements logged on a d.d.c •. process computer 
at Works A. The actual control loop was the inner loop of a cascade 
control system as shown. in Figure 2.9. 
---- .. , 
I 
Fi8ure 2.9~ A,n industrial cascade level control· .. system. 
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FIGURE 2.8 Relation between valve position and flowmeter signal in an industrial control loop. 
The master or outer loop controls level and tended to oscillate 
so that the setpoint of the flow loop was oscillating. The extent 
of the lag between. valve position and flowmeter signal is derived 
from Figure 2.8 and may be seen to be of the order of 1 minute. 
The philosophy of the valve position-flow check for flow control 
loop security monitoring is based upon the creation of a model for 
the system, deviations from which indicate possible system errors. 
The problems encountered above arise, in part, because of the simpli-
city of the assumed model. These may be overcome by defining a more 
flexible model; and to this end the concepts of state estimation are 
intro·duced, although the baSic philosophy of detecting malfunctions 
as a result of monitoring system deviations from the assumed mathema-
tical model is the same. 
2.6 Least squares estimation theory 
A state estimator is a data processing algorithm which computes 
the state of the system uSing the follOwing information: 
i) Measurements of the system variables. 
ii) A mathematical model of the system and its associated· 
instrumentation. 
ill) Prior knowle~e of some system variables - often called 
pseudomeasurements. 
The output of the state estimator is an assessment of the true 
system state. nilIcrepancies between the true system state and 
estimator output can arise from: 
i) Noise in instruments and telemetry cbamiels. 
.. . .' . 
11) Incomplete instrumentation, in the sense that many variables 
are unmea.sured. 
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iii) Incorrect mathematical and/or incorrect model parameters. 
iT) Delayed measurements reflecting some prior state. 
There are many approaches to state estimator fonnulation (45). 
It is usual to define a scalar "cost" function which increases with 
estimation error. An estimator which mjnimises this cost function 
is optimal in tIie Sense that it generates the best estimate of the 
state based on the measurements and pseudomeasurements received. 
The optimal estimator not only generates a state estimate but 
also a covariance or error associated with it. The covariance 
matrix predicts the magnitude of the estimation error, and hence 
proTides a measure of the confidence for the estimated state. The 
predicted and the actual estimation errors should be of the same 
order of magnitude. 
the basis for modern estimation theory is the method presented 
~ Kalman (46). His solution to the recursiTe estimation problem 
has become known as the Kalman filter, which will be discussed in 
Chapter 3. Estima tion theory is heayiJ.y dependent upon the concept 
of state variables and the Widely used dynamic state variable model 
(46) 
x = f~,~,~) 
Z = !! (~) +! 
(2.6.1) 
(2.6.2) 
In this Chapter no attempt is made to model the time behaviour 
of the flow control loop and steady state operation is assumed, i.e. 
x = 0 (2.6.3) 
(2.6.4) 
Equation (2.6.4) describes how the quantities which can be 
measured are related to the state ..-ariables. Each measured Tariable 
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is contaminated with noise. This set of measurement noise is denoted 
1:, the statistics of which are assumed known. 
Specifically 
E~) = 0 
E <!: l) = R 
If the measurements are assumed to be :independent, then R is a 
diagonal matrix with diagonal terms:· 
and 0 i is the standard deviation on the i th measurement. These 
values characterise the accuracy of the :individual measurements and 
may be calculated from a knowledge of the· :instrumentation and teleme-
try systems. 
In least squares estimation theory the optimal state estimate ~ 
is def:ined as the estimate which m:inimises theperformance.criterion: 
(2.6.5) 
The cost function J is a quadratic function of the difference between· 
the actual and estimated measurements, which is weighted according to 
the expected accuracy of the correspond:ing measurements. 1hus the 
estimate fits the measurement made ~ an accurate :instrument better 
than the measurement by an·inaccurate :instrument. 
If the state variables are 1:inear functions of the measured vari-
abIes then equations (2.6.4) and (2.6.5) become 
1: = H!+:! 
J = (;r -H!l R-1 (;r - H!) 
(2.6.6) 
(z.6.7) 
The minimisation of equation (Z.6.7) may be performed analytically ~ 
differentiating with resPect to! and equating to zero. The resulting 
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minimisation yieldS the well known Best Linear unbiased Estimator 
(BLUE) (47), (48), (49), 
! = (HT R-1 H)-l HT R-1 1. (2.6.8) 
Equation (2.6.8) is attractive since it solves for the state estimate 
directly. 
If the measured variables are non-linear functions of the state 
then equation (2.6.5) cannot be minimised analytically. However, a 
standard approach is to linearise ~~) about Some initial value x 
-0 
using a Taylor expansion which yields: 
(2.6.9) 
when higher order termS are neglected. F~) is a Jacobian matrix 
whose elements are: 
f(i, j) = 
and 6x = x-x 
-0 
x =x 
-0 
(2.6.10) 
(2.6.11) 
Equation (2.6.4) may now be rewritten, using equation (2.6.9) as: 
1. = ~ ~) + F~) 6 x +.! 
or tu. = 1. - ~ ~o) = F~) 6 x + .! (2.6.11) 
Equation (2.6.11) represents a linear estimation problem with a cost 
function: 
(2.6.12) 
Thus in a similar manner to the derivation of equation (2.6.8) the 
least squares estimate may be written as: 
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(2.6.13) 
where: 
(2.6.14) 
If the .initial guess 2fo is sufficiently close to the true 
state ~ and if the linearisation perfonned in equation (2.6.9) is a 
sufficiently accurate representation of equation (2.6.4) then equation 
(2.6.13) gives the desired state estimate ~. In practice it is 
necessary to define an iteration sequence !n' n = 1, 2 •• which 
is given by: 
(2.6.15) 
This iteration procedure starts with !n = ~ and proceeds until 
J (:n) approaches a minimum. Stopping rules are to iterate IDltil 
I J(:n+1) - J ~) I or until the magnitude of all compcnents of 
I !n+1 - !n I are less than some predetemined value. 
It is of course possible for J~) to have local minima and thus 
!n may converge but not to x. It ·is also possible for!n never to 
converge. 
This completes this brief introduction to least squares estimation 
theory. The least squares performance criterion has a long history 
of providing good state estimates in a wide variety of problems 
(economics, biology, aerospace trajectories) and in particular. is 
finding current applications in the modelling of electrical networks. 
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2.6.1 Tracking state estimation 
The previous review of least squares estimation theory applies 
only to systems that can be described by steady state measurement 
relationships modelled by equation (2.6.4). Such estimators may be 
denoted "static" state estimators in the sense that the information 
received at any time is processed without regard to past information. 
For example, consider two measurement vectors I(k) and I (k + 1) 
at time k and k + 1 where k + 1 = k +!!, t. I(k) contains informa-
tion about !:(k) and !:(k + 1), however the static estimator ignores 
this information when calculating j(k + 1) and only uses measurements 
- , 
Z(k + 1). 
This problem is overcome by dynamic state estimation. The model 
formulation for dynamic state estimation was given in equations (2.6.1) 
and (2.6.2) and the solution due to Kalman Was mentioned. One of the 
main disadvantages of dynamic state estimation is that modelling of 
the time behaviour of the system state is necessary. This usually is 
tedioUS, time conSuming, costly and at ,best full of uncertainties. 
The objective of introducing state estimation to aid malfunction 
detection was to create a flexible mathematical model to overcane the 
constraints discussed in section 2.5. The purpose of the estimator, 
is not necessarily to calculate extremely accurate' state ~stimates 
A ' !: but solely to process the measurements to a more amenable' form, 
fran which system security may be determ.ined. With these aims in 
mind, it is suggested that dynamic state modelling' is unnecessary and 
the philosophy adopted here is that the "best" malfunction detection 
te,chnique is the simplest one that works. 
In a flow control loop operating at a particular setpoint, the 
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valve will operate over a limited range of positions and there will 
be sane dynamic lag between the valve stem position and fiowmeter 
signal measurements. 
Under these conditions it is suggested that a "tracking" state 
estimator yields an adequate assessment of the state. The tracking 
state estimator (SO) is derived from the static state estimator of 
equation (2.6.15), i.e. 
(2.6.1.1) 
Suppose a series of measurements have been taken at the discrete time 
k, Le • .r(k) yielding '!(k). Equation (2.6.1.1) revealB that the 
iteration sequence can be started from any arbitrary value x. 
-0 
However, if the iteration is to be done at time k + 1 the logical 
initial guess is the estimate '!(k) made from .r(k). 
Now if the state has not moved exceSSively (Le. ! (leH) is 
close to x(k» and if the observation noise is not "too large", it 
- . , 
may be expected that only one iteration will be needed and a reasonable 
estimator would be the recursion: 
%(leH) =%(k) + S~(k» FT ~(k»R-l (.r(ktl) - !!~(k») (2.6.1.2) 
with S~(k» =.; ~(k» R-1 F~(k» (2.6.1.3) 
Equation (2.6.1.2) defines the "tracking" state est:i.mlitor. used in this 
study. 
Notice that in equation (2.6.1.1) n refers to an iteration 
sequence number whil.e in equation (2.6.1.2) k refers to 'the discrete 
time interval. 
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2.6.2 Use of estimator to detect malfunction 
, 
'lhis section discusses some of the teclmiques avawble for 
monitoring system security when a state estimator is used. 
1he state estimation algorithm fonnulated is based on the 
assumption that the model !!~) and R is correct. However, 
assumed models are often inaccurate or may change due to system mal-
fmotion and it is necessary to be able to detect such errors. 
The notation '1 denotes the value of the optimal cost fmction 
evaluated at i, i.e. 
'1 = (z - !! ~»T R-1 (z - !!(!» (2.6.2.1 ) 
One approach to detection is that if the model is correct, then 
J is a random variable whose probability density fmction can.be 
calculated. If the measurement errors ~ are assumed Ge.ussian 
'" then reference (49) shows J is a Chi-squared randan variable with 
(m - n) degrees of freedom. Thus, if a valUe of J is obtained 
which lies on the tai.1s of thiS probability distribution, then it 
can be assumed that the model is incorrect and ail error in !!~) or 
R has been detected. 
Another technique which does not require probability distributions 
requires more calculation. To illustrate this idea suppOse there are 
m measurement equations, and one in particular is known to be inaccu-
ra te • ut h (0 ) ~) be the model containing all m equations, and 
- . .' 
let !!(i)~) denote the model with one of the measurement equations 
removed, i = 1, •••• ,. m. Thus there are m + 1 possible models 
for the measurements given by: 
Z = !!(i)~) + ~ i = 0, • • • ,'m 
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Corresponding to these modelB there· are m+l possible state 
estimates ii) and optimal cost functions ]<i). 1(i) can be 
regarded as a measure of how good a fit the model stru.cture b(i)(~) 
provides to the measurement l:. If it happened that for some j 
that 'j<j) < 1(i) for all i t j, it would be reasonable to assume 
that the measurement l: was made on a model with the measurement 
equation j in error. 
A different approach to the problem is to examine the residual 
process (47), (48), (49), (51). The residual is defined as: 
r. = y. - h. ~» (2.6.2.2) 1 1 -1 -
which represents the observed error of the i th measurement if the 
model is assumed correct. Under normal conditions (i.e. no modelJ.ing 
errors or system malfunction), the properties of r should resemble 
those of the assumed measurement noise!. There are several methods 
of inspecting the residual proceSS. 
i) Overall residual plot. 
This should confiIm the assumed probability distribution 
function of !. 
ii) T:ime sequence plot. 
Again thiS should confirm the initial assumptions concerning !. 
Ih"aper and Smith (51) suggest that t:ime trendS can often be used to 
locate model deficiences. 
iii) Residual against independent variable plot. 
iV) Residual against dependent variable plot. 
45 
2.6.3 Residual analySis via hypothesis testing 
The problem of malflDlction detection may be fonnulated as a 
problem in hypothesis testing (52), (53). The normal operation of 
the system and hence the "nornal" residual time Sequence is regarded 
as the null hypothesis. '!he actual residual process from the current 
system operation is tested against this hypothesis at a certain level 
of significance. Different types of malfunction can develop in the 
system. Some of these are: 
i) BiaS errors in instruments, 
ii) Excessively "noisy" instruments, 
iii) Change in model parameters.' 
All. of these faults cause the residual r i to depart from its 
"normal", malflmction free characteristics. . It is therefore proposed 
to use the following statistical tests to observe the residual process. 
A comparison is made between an ensemble of residual values taken 
IDlder the initialisation conditions which are assumed to be free of 
malfunction (ensemble 0) and an ensemble taken during a later check 
(ensemble 1). 
i) Test of mean (52): 
The null bypothesis to be tested is whether the means of two 
different ensembles could have CClllle franthe same probability distri~ 
bution or from distributions with the same means, i.e. 
A Student's t test enables the difference between two means to be 
tested as: 
t= 
1
- . - I r. - r. 1,0 1,1 (2.6.3.1 ) 
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where the sample variances are assumed unknown but equal and I 
(no - 1) si~O+ (n1 - 1) si~l S 2(r.) .. . -
. 1 (no + n1 - 2) 
nj 
1 
=- r r .. (k) k=l 1,J i = 1:, " . • mi j = 0, 1 
2 
si . 
,J i :::::; 1, • . . m 
j .. 0, 1 
(2.6.3.2) 
The value of t is calculated and compared with values tabulated 
for the number of degrees of freedom (no + n1 - 2). If the calculated 
value of t is larger than the tabulated t at the preselected signi-
ficance level and then the hypothesis is rejected and the ensemble mean 
estimated by ri 0 is significantly different from that estimated by , . 
r. l' with a. chance of being incorrect in rejecting the hypothesis. 
1, 
At the Sf. s~ificance level the tabulated value of t for 
infinite degrees of freedom is 1.96. 
ii) Test of variance (52) 
The null hypothesis, like that for c\1llparing means is: 
H 0 2 "0 2 o : 0 1 
The F test defined as: 
s 2 
i,o 
2 
si,1 
F = 
measures the difference, in the fOI1ll of a ratio, of the two estimates 
of the same var:iAnce that can be expected to occur, depending upon 
the number of degrees of freedcm available for each estimate. 
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Tabulated values of the F probability distribution with 
(no- 1) and (ne 1) degrees of freedcm indicate whether one estimated 
variance is larger than another. At the SI> significance level, with 
100 degrees of freedom for each calculation of s~ "' the tabulated ~,J 
value of F is 1.39. Thus, if the calculated value of F is 
greater than 1.39, the hypothesis of equal ensemble variance is 
rejected. 
2.7 Experimental apparatus and objectives 
Section 2.3 presented·a technique for detecting malfunction in a 
flow control loop. This idea was discussed and criticised and the 
concepts of state estimation were introduced to solve the inherent 
difficulties. 
In order to test these ideas an experimental test apparatus was 
designed and constructed. 
The objective of the experimental apparatus was to provide a 
flow contro11oop using industrial control equipment. 
The laboratory flow control rig is shown in Figure 2.10.. The 
rig was 9.4 m high and extended through three levels of the buildjng. 
The fluid used vas water. 
'Ble main components of the test equipment are summarised as 
follows : 
i) Pipework. 
The pipevork vas a m:ixture of 5.08 cm (2 inch) I.D. mild steel 
and rigid P.V.C. All the pipework near the P1.m1P, control valve and 
orifice was mild steel. 
Tank 1 
~~------ --- ------ -- - - - - - --- -- - - - - - --
8 
Tank 2 
7 
~-I-------~~~------~~ 
r-1----@ 
1---7-1---r---I L\ p 21-----{ 
~--- --------------@ 
1 2 5 
FIGURE 2.10 Experimental flow control rig. 
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ii) Control val'Ye. 
'lhe flow control valve was a characterised pneumatic valve and 
was manufactured by the Glocon Company Limited. 
are given in Table 2.3. 
Details of the valve 
Type 
Body size 
Trim size 
C (imperial Wlits) 
v . 
Body material 
Trim form 
Trim material 
Actuator type 
Positioner 
Signal pressure 
. 
Globe 
3.81 cm (I! inch) 
1.905 cm (i inch) 
20 
carbon steel 
i) Linear 
ii) Equal percentage 
316 Stainless steel 
. Numotor B 40 
Standard 
2 . 
20.68 - 103.42 kN/m (3-15 p.s.i.g.) 
TABLE 2.3. Details of th~ control valve. us~d in .the eXll.erimental flow 
control rig. 
ill) ·Pwnp. 
A single stage centrifugal pump, supplied by Ingersoll-Rand (Type 
N - I! - 120) was used. 
iv) Pwnp d-ive. 
An electric motor drive was installed which incorporated a starter 
with overload protection to prevent motor damage if the pump had to 
deal with impurities or the monanetric head was lower than expected. 
v) Flow measurement. 
'lhe flowmeter was a sharp edged D - D/2 orifice plate designed 
according to B.5.-1042 (54). 
so 
vi) Isolation valves. 
1he details of the isolation valves are slDDDl&rised in 'lBble 2.4. 
Valve nwnber Valve type 
1 Gate 
2 Gate 
3 Gate 
4 Globe 
5 Gate 
6 Globe 
7 Gate 
8 Gate 
TABLE 2.4. Experimental flow: ."ontrol r;i& 
~~ola~ion val~es. 
vii) Instrwnentation. 
The location of the measurement instl'Ulllents are shown :in 
Figure 2.10, and Table 2.5 details their functions. 
InstI'Ullient Instrwnent Maker Input OUtput 
code tYJ)e 
. b. P1 b. pip trans- Taylor o - 4.98 kN/m
2 2 20.7-103 .4 kN/m 
mitter Instrwnents (0 - 20 in. W.G.) (3 - 15 p.s.i.g.) 
b. P2 b. pip tranS- 4.98-62.3 kN/m2 
2 20.7-103.4 kN/m 
mitter (20-250 in.W.G.) (3 - 15 p.s .i.g.) 
P transmitter 69-689.5 kN/m2 2 P1 20.7-103.4 kN/m (10-100 p.s.i.g.) (3 - 15 p.s.i.g.) 
Cl p/! transmitter 3 - 15 p.s .i.g. 5 - 10 V 
C2 p/! transmitter 3 - 15 p.s.i.g. . 0 - 10 V 
C3 pi! transmitter 3 - 15 p.s.i.g. 0- 10 V 2 C4 !/p transmitter 0- 10 V 20.7-103.4 kN/m (3 - 15 p.s.i.g.) 
~ Linear Penny and 0- 3.81 cm. 3 - 9 V potentiometer Giles 
TABLE 2. 5. Instr")Jlllentation t)f~~ra.tory. flow contr~ .r~. 
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The pressure drop across the· orifice and that aCJ:l)Ss the cmtrol 
valve were measured by differential pressure transmitters and the 
pressure between the pump and the control valve by an absolute 
presSure transmitter. These three transmitters were all pneumatic 
and pressure/cUITent converters were used to convert their output into 
electrical signals suitable for process ccmputer inputs. The valve 
stem position was measured by a linear potentiaueter whose output 
varied linearly with position. 
The experimental rig was controlled by a PDP 11-20 process control 
computer, which was used for logging, s:i&n&l generation and direct 
digital control. 
A system with pressure drop across the valve approximately constant 
was obtained with valves 1, 3, 5,6 and. 8 open and valves 2,4 and 7 
closed. Under these conditions the water flowed from tank 2 to tank 1 
due to the head difference. A constant head system was achieved by 
pumping Water from tank 1 to tank 2 where an overflow device maintained 
a constant level. 'Dle rig was designed so that under these conditions 
approximately 7fY!, of the pressure drop occurred at the control valve. 
1he variation of pressure drop across the control valve with flow 
for an equal percentage valve trim is shown in Figure 2.11. 
With valves' 2, 4, 6 and ,7 open and valves 1, 3, 5 arid 8 closed, a 
system with variable presSure drop acrOSs the valve was obtained. The 
water flowed from tank 2 through the pump and control 'valve and back to 
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.ow 
s 
3 . 
2. 
04---------------~------------~----------~--~ 
30 40 so 60 
Pressure drop ~ P kN/m2 
FIGURE 2.11 Variation of pressure drop with flow across equal percentage 
control valve. 
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tank 2. Addit:l ona] changes in system pressure drop could be obtained 
by throttling valve 4. 
2.7.2. System dynamic characteristics 
The dynamic characteristics of the control valve and flowmeter 
were iilvestigated by imposing a step input on to the valve demand 
si8nal fran the computer. The dynamic responses of the valve and 
nowmeter are shown in FigureS 2.12, 2.13. 
Both the control valve and flowmeter can be approJdmated as 
second order systemS with a transfer function. 
-1 d 
k e 
G(s) = 
s2 
+-
W 2 
n 
The transfer function parameters were calculated to be (55): 
i) Control valve k= 0.356 cm/v 
s= 0.8 
w = n . 0.25 Hz 
1: d = 0.2 s 
ii) Flowmeter k = 3.22 x 10- 3 m3/s. V 
S = 0.4 
w = 
n 0.13 Kz 
1: = d 2.6 s 
54 
" 
::;"J 
3::0 
- ...... 
>-: .-
c._ 
LLi 
.-
-.J 
er ,:,::. 
"..> L-' 
~~ ,_~·-i-I -----,r----'I-----,----,-
If) 
CJ 
n:. t.!J 
I':::) r:" 
>< 
O.OOG 0.333 0.657 1.GOa 1.333 
... I io1f:: "~:f:('IIIIr,c 1. X J. ~']-1 I ".. . .... ~ .~L..·'l _ 
FIGURE 2.12 Ex:perimental rig control valve step response. 
FIGURE 2.13 Ex:perimental rig flowmeter step reSponse. 
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2.0GO 
2.7.3 Estimator design and determination of model parameters 
The model describing steady state flow control loop operation 
was derived in section 2.4. For a Type 1 control loop equations 
(2.4.1) and (2.4.8) yield: 
~ = kml s 
o = k x 
-V v1 
The general equation for static state estimation is: 
l = !! ~) +:! (2.7.3.3) 
and so equations (2.7.3.1) and (2.7.3.2) may be rewritten in this 
form by defining the state vector ~ "" Q, then (2.7.3.3) becomes: 
x Q + 
= 
s 
This measurement vector applies for the Type 1 and 3 control loop 
while the Type 2 and 4 loops are characterised by: 
y =[fi-J 
The Jacobian matrix F is defined by: 
F = 
with fll = ~ 3Q 
f21 = .Q.! 3Q Type 1 and 3 control loop 
-= M Type 2 and 4 control loop 3 Q 
The final parameter needed to completely define equation (2.7.3.3) 
is the matrix· R. If the system model is perfect R is the measurement 
noise covariance matrix of the fonn: 
R = 
[r:1 
with rU = 
2 
° x 
r 22 -
2 
a s TYPe 1 and 3 control loop 
= 
2 0ji Type 2 and 4 control loop 
The equations of the control loop and the parameters defining 
the measurement equation (2.7.3.3) are summarised in Table 2.6. 
Having defined the structure of the System measurement and 
estimator equations it is necessary to detennine the actual parameter 
values. In an industrial application it is envisaged that these 
parameters may be detennined from plant design manuals or may be 
obtained experimentally. It is usually less satisfactory to obtain 
valve parameters from design data. This point will be diScussed 
more fully in section 2.10 when the industrial applications of this 
technique are presented. 
In the laboratory experiments the appropriate parameters were 
detennined by direct calibration on the experimental rig. 
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Control Flowmeter Control Measurement equations Measurement noise Jacobian matrix F 
loop equations valve (neglecting noise) covariance matrix R 
type equation 1= h<.!) . rU r 22 fU f21 
x= Q/k 
vl 2 0 2 l/k' l/kml 1 ~ '" kml s ~ '" k x o x vl s = Q/kml s vl 
x'" Q/k 
0 2 2 l/k l/k vl 2 ~ '" k~/S ~=-k x Q/km2 o ,fa vl .jS= x vl m2 
_InQ Ink 
x - /kv4-. v3/k 
0 2 2 1/k Q l/k 3 ~ '" km! s ~ '" kv3exp(kv,c) . v4 s =- Q/~ x Os· v4 ml 
x = JnQ/k - In k / 
v4 v3 k. 
0 2 2 1/k Q l/k 4 ~ '" km2/S ~ '" kv3exp(kv4x) v4 IS=- ~k x Oji v4 m2 m2 
TABLE. 2.6. Equations and parameters. defining the flow control loop,estimator. 
The control valve characteristic and orifice plate constant were 
dete:nnined by "stroking" the valve; noting the valve pOSition and 
fiowmeter signal and manually measuring the system fiowrate. Figure 
2.14 shows the resultant characteristic for a control valve with a 
linear trim. In fact three curves are shown. Curve 1 repreSents 
the experimental results obtained from valve stroking. Curve2is 
the model curve obtained by estimating the valve parameters (in this 
case a model of the form ~ = kvl + kV2 x was used) fran the experi-
mental curve. The curve is actually fitted by two straight lines to 
be conSistent with the formulation of a linear control valve. There 
are different parameters for each line. CUrve 3 is the result of 
using the state estimator of equation (2.6.15). The state estimator 
of equation (2.6.15) used the experimentally dete:nnined parameters 
kv1 ' kV2 and km2 and the matrix R. 
In this formulation the matrix· R plays the role of a we~ting 
matrix which caUSes the state estimate :! to· fit the "good" measure-
ments closer than the "bad" measurements. If the system model is 
accurate it has been pointed out that R is the covariance matrix of 
the measurement noise. However, if the system model is imperfect, 
then· R is more properly regarded 'as a we~ting matrix which takes 
into account not only measurement noise but inaccuracies in the 
system model. The larger the noise and model inaccuracies, the 
larger the elements of R. • .C 
In the present work R was dete:nnined by optimising directly on 
" 
the process. It was assumed that R was a dia,goDa1 matrix. An 
initial guess of R was made an,d using the model parameters described 
above the static state estimator of equation (2.6.15) was USed to 
'" est:iJDate !. 
. A· 
Now section 2.6.2 has discussed how J may be regarded 
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Flow 
Q 
m3/s 
x 10-3 
3 
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• 
• 
• 
e 
• • 
x Experimental - curve 
- Valve model -
0 Estimator -
1 
o 1. 2. 3. 
Valve position x cm 
FIGURE 2.14 Linear control valve characteristic,1 experimental, model and 
estimator curves. 
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curve 
curve 
1 
2 
3 
as a measurement of estimator performance. The matrix R was thus 
" 
.chosen to minimiSe J. 
The system model <!!~) and R) are now fully defined and the 
relevant parameters are summarised in Table 2.7 for all four types 
of control loop. 
Figure 2.15 presents the corresponding curves for an equal 
percentage control valve trim. 
2.8 Malfunction· detection experiments 
The main experiments consisted of three series of runs: open-
loop checks with fUll valve travel and open and closed-loop checks 
with limited valve travel. All the experiments were performed with 
the experimental rig in the "constant ll system pressure drop charac-
teristic mode, i.e. with isolation valves 1, 3, 5. 6, 8 open and 2, 
4, 7 closed. this resulted in an approximately constant control 
valve pressure drop characteristic as shown in Figure 2.11. 
All four types of control loop were investigated. The control 
valve characteristics were obtained by using linear and equal percen-
tage valve trims. The flowmeter characteristics were obtained by 
using an orifice plate and differential pressure transmitter through-
out the experiments but linearising the signal in the canputer to 
simulate· the linear flowmeter case. 
The valve position. was obtained in two different ways. In sane 
experiments the Valve stem poSition was measured by a linear poten-
tiometer. In other experiments the valve position was taken as the 
valve demand signal from the canputer. In the case where the valve 
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a-
N 
Control Fl 
loop .~ 
type km! iiV 
. 
1 Simulated 
2 
-
3 Simulated 
.. 
4 
-
. -
TABLE 2.7. 
Control valve constants 
.. ·m.)· 
Valve stem position . Valve demand signal km2 -. 1. . 
SV2 measured measured 
k mJ k mJ mJ · mJ k - kV2 s V vl .s v2 s cm vl s 
-
0.515 x 10-3 1.092 x 10-3 0.663 x 10-3 0.39 x 10-3 
1.705 x 10-3 0.465 x 10-3 1.8 x 10-3 0.158 x 10-3 
1.393 x 10-3 
" " " " 
.' 
m3 -1 
. 3 
kV3 S k 4 cm k !!!... k V-1 
·v v3 s 
v4 
-
6 -3 0.4 3 x 10 0.522 0.463 x 10-3 0·522 
1.393 x 10-3 It n n 
" 
NUmerical values of parameters in flow control loop estimator. 
R .matrix 
Valve stem Valve demand 
position 
measured 
signal 
measured 
rU r 22 rU r 22 
0.0645 0.01 0.25 0.01 
" 
It 
" " 
rU r 22 rU r 22 
0.0645 0.01 0.25 0.01 
" " " " I , 
3. 
Flow 
1. 
o 
o 
FIGURE 2.15 
1. 2. 
Valve position x cm 
Equal percentage control valve characteristic: 
model and estimator curves. 
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, 
.- __ - ___ Experiment 
--....:..- Model 
- - 4) - - Estimator 
3. 
experimental, 
stem position measurement was taken, errors in this measurement were 
investigated. ]he method for the detection of malfunction in the 
Nst of the loop does not depend, however, on a valve stem position 
measurement. 
The form of the estimator, the algebraic parameters and their 
numerical values have been given in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. 
The malflmctions introduced into. the system are summarised in 
Table 2.8 where they are designated by a code letter A-G. The 
malflmctionS were mostly obtained by making appropriate adjustments 
of the instrument although sane experiments involved the introduction 
of simulated errors by the computer, marked with an asterisk. 
One of the malfunctions investigated was that of a damaged valve 
trim (malfunction G). Figure 2.16 shows the standard equal percen-
tage valve trim while Figure 2.17 shows the damaged trim used in the 
experiments. 
The actual experimental procedure for each particular series of 
runS is now presented. 
2.8.1 Open loop experiments with full valve travel 
'!he first series of runs consisted of open-loop experiments with 
full valve travel and are designated by the code letter FT. In 
these experiments the· valve was moved by a canputer based randan num-
ber generator to 100 openings over its whole range of travel. At 
each particular opening the valve was held steady for 25 seconds, the 
Dleasurement vector '1 recorded and the state estimate 'St obtained 
from the static state estimator of equation ( 2.6.15). 
Experiments were perfonued on all four tJPeS of control loop. 
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Loop malflmction Source Code 
, 
, 
Flowmeter Flowmeter differential A 
zero error pressure transducer 
Flowmeter Flowmeter pressure/current B 
range error converter 
Control valve CUrrent/pressure converter C 
zero error 
Control valve Current/pressure converter D 
range error 
Control valve Valve stem linear . E 
zero error potentiometer 
Control valve Valve stem linear F* 
range error potentiometer 
Damaged control Valve trim plug G 
valve 
. 
TABLE 2.8. Malflmctions introduced into laboratory flow control rig. 
* denotes computer s:imulated error. 
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FmuRE 2.16 Equal percentage valve trim. 
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FIGURE 2.17 Dlmaged equal percentage valve trim. 
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2.8.~ Open loop experiments with limited valve travel 
In this series of experiments the strOking of the valve was not 
allowed. 
The experimental runs were per:fi'ormed on Type 2 and 4 corttrol 
loops and are coded OL. During the experiments the valve was held 
at a particular opening. In order to make the system rather more 
noiSy and more realistic, a small pseudo-randan binary sequence 
(PRBS) as shown in Fi8ure 2.l8a was imposed m the valve demand in 
the computer. ~s 2.18 band c show some typical recorded time 
series of the valve stem pOSition and flowmeter signal. 
The state estimate x was obtained frail the tracking state 
estimator of equation (2.6.1.2). 
2.8.3 Closed loop experiments with direct djgi.tal contr6l 
The third series of experiments consisted of closed-loop checks 
with limited valve travel on a: Type 4 control loop, denoted CL. In 
these experiments the control loop was closed under direct d.i&ital 
control from the computer, as shown in Figure 2.2b. The flow was 
controlled at a particular setpoint and the valve moved over a 
limited range. The control loop si,gnals obtained are shown in 
Figures 2.19& 'and b, which in fact shows a low amplitude oscillation. 
Th:iB arises because of the slight oscillation in the orifice differ-
ential'pressure transducer output. 
The d.d.c. flow control loop employed a proportional plus integral 
controller with a 3 Second sampJ.e time. At selected setpoints the 
state estimate & ws obtained from the tracking state estimator of 
equation (2.6.1.2). 
The canplete experimental prograDlllO is summarised in Table 2.9. 
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6.3 
Valve 
Dema.nd6. 
Signal 
V 
C 
- -
10 
- -
r- - r- r- -
20 30 kfl t 
'-- '- '-
FIGURE 2.18a. Pseudo random binary sequence used in open loop limited travel 
experiments. 
2.5 
Valve 
position 
2.4 
x 
cm 2.3 
2.2 
2.1 
2. ~ __________________ ~ ________ L-________ ~ ____ L-____________ ~ __ ~ __ 
30 kLl t o 10 20 
FIGURE 2.18b Typical valve stem position measurement in open loop limited travel 
1.2 experiments. 
owmeter 
igna.l 
s 
1 1.1 
V2 
1.0 
O'~ ______ ~ ________ J-________________ ~ ________________ ~ ____ __ 
o 10 
oSamplinginterval Ll t = 0.5 s 
20 
FIGURE 2.18c Typical flowmeter signal measurement in open loop limited travel 
exp~riments • 
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,lve 
,mand 
6.3 
~l6.2+-~~--~------~~~~==~~~--~------~----~~~~r--10 20 30 k t 
V 
6.1 
FIGURE 2.l9a 
2.0 
Lowmeter 
lignal 
Typical valve demand signal in closed loop direct digital control 
experiments. 
1'~--~~--------~~----~--------~2~0~~----~~--~±-~~+ 
t 
FIGURE 2.l9b 
Sampling interval 11 t = 3 s . 
Typical flowmeter signal measurement in closed loop direct digital 
control experiments. 
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Control Valve stem Experiment Run number 'Malfunction loop position type 
type measured 
I Yes FT FT/lA * A + 10% 
" 
n FT/IB * B - 10% 
2 Yes FT FT/2A a A + 10% 
n 
" 
FT/2A b A - 10% 
No 
" 
FT/2B B - 20% 
n 
" FT/2C a C + 10% 
n n FT/2C b C - 10% 
" 
n FT/2D D+20% 
Yes 
" 
FT/2E E+5% 
n 
" FT/2F * F + 15% 
n OL Ol/2A A + 10% 
No n 0l/2B ,B - 15% 
" " 
01/2C C + 10% 
, 3 Yes FT FT/3A: A+IO% 
" 
n FT/3A b "A - 10% 
" " 
FT/3B a - B + 10% 
" " 
FT/3B b B - 10% 
4 Yes FT FT/4A a A + 5% 
" 
n FT/4A b A - 5% 
No 
" FT/4B B - 10% 
" 
n FT/4C a C + 15% 
n 
" 
FT/4C b C -15% 
" " FT/4D a* D + 10% 
" " 
FT/4n b D - 10% 
Yes " FT/4E E + 8% 
" " 
FT/4F * 'F + 10% 
" " 
FT/4G . 
-n OL 0L/4A a A +10% 
" " 
0L/4A b A - 10% 
" " 
01/4B B - 10% 
No n 0L/4C a C + 10% 
n n OL/4C b c- 6% 
" 
n 01/4D D + 10% 
Yes n 01/4E E+ 10% 
n n 0L/4F * F'" 5% 
n n 0L/4G 
-
No CL CI/4A A + 17% 
" 
n CI/4C a C + 20% 
n n cI/4C b C+ 13% 
n n CL/4G 
-
* Experiments involving computer simulation. 
,TABLE 2.9. Experiments performed on laboratory flow control ri&. 
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2.9 Malfunction detection eXperimental results 
2.9.1· Open loop eXperiments with full valve travel 
In these experiments two types of check which indicate loop mal-
function are possible. Since the valve was 'stroked'· over its entire 
range of travel the estimator valve characteristic could be obtained. 
This may be then compared with the original malfunction free 
characteristic. 
An example of this check for a Type 1 control loop without mal-
function and with a + 10% flowmeter zero error (run FT/1A~ is shown in 
Figure 2.20. With this type of check a visual display of the mal-
function is possible as originally postulated in section 2.4. 
An alternative method for security monitoring is based upon the 
information obtained from the estimator. 
The estimator reSidual process was defined in equation (2.6.2.2). 
As the valve was ~troked', the residual time series could be generated, 
which also corresponded to different valve openings. This may then 
be compared to' an original malfunction-free residual time series and 
the changes in the individual residuals monitored. 
Various techniques for examining the residual process were discussed 
in sections 2.6.2 and 2.6.3. In these experiments it was found that it 
is necessary only to monitor the reSidual mean. Since a'malflDlction 
causes both the valve pOSition and flowmeter signal to deviate from 
their nominal malfunction free characteristics it is sufficient to 
monitor only one of the reSidual sequences and this was 'arbitrarily 
chosen as the valve pOSition residual.' 
In each experjment the means of the valve position reSidual without 
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FIGURE 2.20 FUll travel check on Type 1 control loop - NIl FT/lA!" 
73 
and with ma1function were determined. The modul.us of the change in 
the means of the residua1s were cal.cu1ated and compared with the 
significant change at the 95% confidence 1imit according to Student's 
t test. 
Figures 2.21 a and b illustrate the va1ve position and -f1ollmeter 
signa1 residual time series for a Type 1 control loop without ma1func-
tion. In fact, these Figures show normalised residua1s defined as: 
A + 10% flowmeter zero error in a Type 1 contro1 loop yie1ds residua1 
sequences as shown in Figures 2.22 a and b. 
The statistical characteristics of the norma1ised va1ve position 
residual sequence for these runs are given in Tab1e 2.10. 
Run 
Norma1ised position Modul.us of change in mean 
residual statistics of normalised va1ve Figure 
number position residua1 
Mean Variance Actual. Significant change change at -95% 1imit 
-
- 0.46 0.093 - - 2.21 a 
FT/1A* - 1.37 0.076 0.91 0.18 2.22 a 
TABlE 2.10. Behaviour of valve position residua1 for + 10% fiowmeter 
zero error in Type 1 c(llltro1 loop. 
The resul.ts of the experimenta1 programme for the open loop tests 
with ful.1 valve trave1, detailed in- Tab1e 2.8, are given in Figures 2.20 
to 2.45. The modul.us of the change in va1ve position residua1 means are 
sUmmarised in Tab1e 2.11. 
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Control Run Modulus of change in mean of Figure 
loop number normalised valve DOsition reSidual 
type Actual S~ificant 
chan"e e 
* 1 FT/lA * 0.91 0.18 2.20 
FT/1B 0.88 0.14 2.23 
2 FT/2A a 1.64 0.11 2.24 
FT/2A b· 0.98 0.08 2.25 
FT/2B 1.45 0.15 2.26 
FT/2C a 0.65 0.16 2.27 
FT/2C b 0.83 0.17 2.28 
FT/2D 0.36 0.20 2.29 
FT/2E * 0.43 0.06 2.30 
FT/2F 1.05 0.40 2.31 
FT/3A a * 0.86 0.14 3 2.32 
FT/3A b 0.84 0.16 2.33 
FT/3B a 0.42 0.16 2.34 
FT/3B b 0.59 . 0.15 2.35 
4 FT/4A a 1.39 0.17 2.36 
FT/4A b 0.94 0.23 2.37 
FT/4B . 0.74 0.19 2.38 
FT/4C a 1.36 0.23 2.39 
FT/4C b 1.28 0.21 2.40 
FT/4D a* 0.72 0.21 2.41 
FT/4D b 0.58 0.19 2.42 
FT/4E 0.42 0.15 2.43 
FT/4F* 0.79 0.15 2.44 
FT/4G 0.11 0.22 2.45 
TABLE 2.11. Behaviour of valve pOSition residual for open loop 
full travel experiments. 
The exper:imental results of Figures 2.20 - 2.45 confirm the :initial 
method' of control loop malfunction detection by the valve position -
, 
flow check, proposed in section 2.3. The deviations in estimator valve 
characteristics from the nominal malfunction free characteristics agree 
with the simulated results of F;i&ures 2.4 - 2.7. 
The valve characteristics for a Type 1 and T,ype 2 control loop 
. shown in Figures 2.20 - 2.31 all show a discontinuity in the'deviation 
due to the system malfunction for x> 1.9 cm or x> 5 volt (depending 
upon the process measurement of valve.·position used in the experiment). 
79 
cC) 
:~ 
:~ 
., 
'-;l 
without 
malfunction 
/
:< 
~ 
:- with 
., 
.. 
., malfWlction 
" 
.". 
:'" 
C) -1-------------r------------, __ ~--------~~~------~~~~------~~-~~----~~~ Cl 
Cl 7'" :3 . . J~::_: 
.-. CL;'-' :3 . .i .J ' "7n ",I .~1~5 ~ ~.~,~ n ~~~ l,~ ,~ ~ 
[;" GGG -'" "'YRL VC POS I r I GI>\ ;<, UiS 
FIGURE 2.23 
Full travel check on Type 1 control loop _ run FT/1B.* 
80 
--, 
l , 
,,-, 
, " 
'" 
( :-. 
l' 
',n 
.. 
c 
c 
c 
c 
r; ,-,"'l"' 
1..'. '.'VU 
FIGURE 2.24 
'. 
,. 
'., 
/ 
'. 
with 
malfWlctioll' 
• 
without 
malfWlction 
/ 
':, L (,",: 
(.. • o..J '1 ... , 
" 
• 
Full travel check on Type 2 control. loop - nm FT/Uta. 
81 
I 
3.~j~8 
,', 
/' 
// . 
i'"; ////:/:~ . ~ 
, " 
" :< 
~. ~ 
" , 
( .:' 
xi~ 
c-
--1 C) 
LL'," 
~.) 
( j 
,", 
,i"; 
( " 
, ) 
o 
/ 
/ 
.' 
/' :"" 
without /", 
malfunc tioJl/ ){ " 
,/
/I"./w<'th' J( 
• malfunction 
" 
.• 
• 
() .-------, 
- --------,--. " I ·---·---'----r-------, 
() . ~,I ",.",'. . LL'"l ~:.:,j~~C :":.Ij.,.J 1.27[; l"';(~S ;;: . ..].:.... 
VALVE POSIrIO~ X.eMS 
FIGURE 2.25 Full travel check on Type 2 control loop - run FT/2Ab. 
82 
'. ' , , 
~:. 
~., 
>< ~-J 
~ .-~ 
'-, 
'_. 
t..7· 
cO 
.. 
:. 
/ • 
• 
without 
malfWlction 
with ,. 
... 
" 
malfWlction 
: . 
.• 
, 
• 
• 
r-·------,---· ---r------.~--------.--------. 
D. jG7 G.J}:" 
VRLVE POS! rlU~ X,VOLTS 
G. Sf"":'7 
XlO-l 
o. v'}) 
FIGURE 2.26 Full travel check on Type 2 control loop - run FT/2B. 
83 
1. (iCe 
r-, 
'-' 
.... } 
0.' 
." 
.... ; 
'- , 
C· Cl 
.' .' 
with ",/ 
malfunctiqp 
'" 
without 
malfunction 
• 
.. 
• 
" 
C~ --i-\ -----rl----,-- ---, ·---T.-----r-----,I 
l.' r L-(";(" [ ~R7 •. ~~~) 1 t.r- 1 , G.ClOG (;.157 O.::;JJ J.,Ju,; L)\. 'J.V.I.J .\-.Id-.) 
VRLVE POSITION X,VOLTS XlO-l 
FIGURE 2.27 FUll travel check on Type 2 control loop - run FT/2Ca. 
'C) 
o 
L" 
.......... (.~I 
XC'"') 
Cl 
~~ 
0') 
""'. L~ (.) ~-< 
::>_ .. 
-
-o 
(.:"1 
" 
" 
.. 
II 
without 
malfWlction 
,. with 
11 
malfWlction 
li 
" 
" 
.. 
L~_L-__________ r-________ ~~ ________ -' __________ -r __ ~ ______ ~~~ ______ ~ ~~ I 
() jI (J. c'h'7 co. q ..... -i~J' 1. ClOG 
D. GGO O. i~~L VE ~C/JI r 101\) eX ~cVOLTS 'X 10-1 ~ ~ 
FIGURE 2.28 Full travel check on Type 2 control loop _ nm FT/2Cb. 
85 
, " 
c:: 
l ") 
co 
r.J 
3: 
c....~: 
--i("'l 
LL(;? 
Co' 
(-, 
(:) 
• 
• 
" 
.. 
with 
malfunction '" 
.• , 
" 
" " 
" 
.« 
without 
malfunction 
,. 
~ ~. 
'. 
• 
.• 
• 
t..:' 
~---------rl---------'r---------~--------'Ir---------~~------, 
r r:nr, 
.J. Vv ...... 
FIGURE 2.29 
[i, iS7 Ci,333 c" 'jGG (J,SS7· G.'38.3 1. GGC 
VALVE POSlrIO~ X,VOLTS XIO-l 
FUll travel check on TYPe 2 control loop - run FT/2D. 
86 
(0': 
C) 
o 
C) 
o 
;;25 
c 
o 
:3: 
C) 
.....Jo 
LL o o 
o 
o 
o 
" 
" 
" 
" 
,. 
without 
malfunction " 
II 
.. 
1I 
" with 
" malfunction 
" 
" )I 
)I 
)I 
" 
~-----'-------r--~--r------.------~~--~ t..., . 
0.000 0.1';35 i. 2'70 1. '305 L.'AO 3. j 75 
VRLVE POSIfION X.eMS 
FIGURE 2.30 Full travel check on Type 2 control loop - nUl Fr/2E. 
87 
o 
o 
u' 
, " 
~ o Xo 
c 
o 
:3: 
,-, 
,~ 
---1 c: LL8 
" 
)I 
" 
" 
without 
malfWlction 
]I 
" 
" 
,. 
" 
,. 
" with ]I 
malfWlction 
• 
• 
o 
o 
.:=> o-+----------.----------,----------~----------r---------~~------~ 
0.000 0.635 1. 270 1. '305 L.5~0 g. j 75 :3 .. SiO 
VALVE POSITION X.eMS 
FlDURE 2.31 FUll travel check on Type 2 control loop - nm FT/2F: 
88 
o 
o 
,,~ 
~D 
X.a 
c 
o 
3: 
c: 
---10 
lL.9 
.J 
.. " 
o .------a 
l1' 
o 
,. 
II 
'" :I II 
" 
" 
.with 
malfunctio'"n 
" 
!I 
" without 
malfunction 
" 
" 
II 
,. 
o 
o 
o 4-______ -r ______ -. ______ ~--------r-------~------~ 
3. i 75 J.5iO C) 0.000 O. fiJS i. 270 1. 9[15 . 2. S'lO VRLVE POSlrION X,CMS 
FIGURE 2.32 Full travel check on Type 3 control loop - run FT/3AB.*. 
89 
Cl 
'" o 
c:) 
Cl 
i.f' 
o 
co 
LI' 
Cl 
Cl 
.0 
a 
" " 
" " 
" 
)11 " 
I 
0.000 0.6% 
VALVE 
without 
malfunction " 
" with 
" 
" 
" malfunction 
• 
1I 
" 
" 
" .. 
" ,. 
I 
i .270 1. ~n5 
POS IT ION X, CMS 
" 
" 
I 
2.510 
I 
3. ]75 
FIGURE 2.33 Full travel check on Type 3 control loop - nm FT/3Ab. 
90 
I 
3. '310 
CJ 
o 
c..:r 
Lt) 
o 
(.";'I 
o 
c· 
CO 
,.;-> 
'-<0 
XD 
o 
'. 
Cl 
:..3: 
C 
~C) 
!..Le;] 
<..j 
C) 
o 
LI' 
o 
o 
" 
" 
" 
" 
" 
)iI 
with 
" 
malfWlction 
,. 
" 
" 
" 
without 
malfWlction 
O~ ____ .-__ -, ____ -, ____ ~ ____ ~ __ ~ 
c.: I 
D.OOD O. (;35 i, 270 1. ')(15 2.540 3. i75 3. SiC 
VRLVE POSlrION X.eMS 
FIGURE 2.34 Full travel check on Type 3 control loop - rW1 FT/3Ba. 
91 
o 
'" c~ 
o 
3: 
o 
.-Jo LLg 
'-~ 
co 
" 
" 
'" )I 
• 
" 
without 
malfuncti 
"with 
1I 
II malfunction 
" 
.< 
o D·~---------r---------r---------.---------.---------.---------' 
O.OGO O. fi35 i. 270 1. 905 2.510 8. ; 7S 8.3W 
VRLVE POSlrION X,eMS 
FIGURE 2.35 Full travel.check on Type 3 control loop - nm FT/3Bb. 
92 
Of!: 
Cl 
0:--+ c.-' 
'><6 
w 
(j) 
,-0 
r.0~ 
';i_- • 
o 
::3: 
o 
~,,-:, 
LLt; 
',""'" 
o 
o 
" 
" 
" 
]I 
" 
)I " 
" 
" 
II 
with 
malfunction 
.. 
" 
• 
)I 
" 
without 
malfunction 
)I 
)I 
)I 
w -.-----------r---------~----------~--------_,----------0:.., ... ____ h_ I 11 1 1 
0; OOG O. f;;JS ). 270 1. ')05 2, S~O T j 75 J. S10 
VRLVE POSITION X.eMS 
FIGURE 2.36 Full travel check on Type 4 control loop - run FT/4Aa. 
93 
~'. 
C· I 
o 
Cl 
Cl 
Cl 
<:7 
1I .. " 
" .. 
" 
)I 
" 
" 
" 
.. 
" 
,. 
" 
"with 
malfunction 
" 
" 
" 
°4--------.--------.-------Jr-------,--~ ____ y_------1 
Cl 
0.000 0.635 i.270 1.~G5 2.510 . 3,j 75 :3.~lD VRLVE POSrrlON x,eMS 
FIGURE 2.37 Full travel check on T,ype 4 control loop - run FT/4Ab. 
94 
'" LO 
X~·~ 
o 
3: 
,~ 
'--' 
\_-. 
......i ..:..') 
ll....Z; 
(.") 
L' 
C~· L' -+------TI---
G. oorj 0, 157 
VRLV[ 
•• 
M " 
:.H 
•• 
" 
." 
•• 
•• 
O.3JS G.SOG 
without 
malfunction 
I.~. 
" 
•• 
with 
•• 
.. 
" malfunction 
•• 
. ' 
Ci,5f,;. 
POSlrIO~ X.VOLTS X 10- j 
G.9S,:'; 
FIGURE 2.38 Full travel check on Type 4 control loop - l'IDl FT/4S. 
95 
1.00G 
'(-I 
(-J 
,:, 
L"'::' 
"-' 
" 
'" 
.. 
with " 
malfunc tio,p. 
.• 
Without 
malfunction 
.. 
0~---------'----------r-~ ______ '-________ -r ________ -' ________ --, 
c...J I I 
Cs.GGG 0.j67 G.3:iJ r..500 D.GS7 
VRLVE POSlfrON X,VOLTS XIO-l 
FIGURE 2.39 Full travel check on Type 4 control loop - nm FT/4Ca. 
1 ("·("'-r-..... .II..J'J 
(I' (::J 
,., 
......--I,., 
X . ..:, 
;:.~: 
er) 
,- (." 
(()t~ 
:;:: .. 
,. 
--.,. 
....... 
__ .; c.) 
, ,~ 
• .1 •• _ 
... .' 
'~:-I 
COl 
"-" 
" .« 
" 
" 
without 
malfUnctio 
" 
• with 
, 
/ 
! 
; 
, 
" 
"malflUlction 
" 
/ 
c~ ~···-·-·-···--II------'------r------r-----,..------, 
0.1j00 0.167 G. :r:;:; O. SGO O. tj~,7 G. S·J.'j 1. [ISG 
VRLVE POSIrlON X,V(ILTS XIO-l 
FIGURE 2·42 FUll travel check on Type 4 control loop - nm FT/4Cb. 
97 
(:;"I 
,-.-... 
J) 
~ .-
X L.' CO 
C, 
(j'"") 
......... ~-:" 
(() ~~ 
2: 
L~ 
C.) 
L-; 
with 
malfuncti~ 
lI! 
" 
·• 
"' 
/ 
without 
malfunction 
" 
.. 
G-r---------. ---------~------.----,_---------_,r_--------~--------~ 
,... ,-·r'r. 
,) ...... ,,J.J 
;. ..,.,~. 
.,). J.)"J 
VRLVE POSlrIO~ X,VOLTS v" ,', . 1 -\ 1 : . .1 
('I p'--, 
,..),J_'J 
FIGURE 2.41 Full travel check on Type 4 control loop - run FT/4Da. 
98 
1 ,,(""·r· . '."")'-' 
.s 
'-~ 
i 
/ , 
I 
'- .. 
Jl 
" (n 
" ~""'~"l 
>< C:'J 
L::' 
without 
malfunction " 
:::<: 
C-.' 
L~I 
o 
.< 
" 
'" ,. 
., with 
" 
* malflUlction 
CO+ ___ -, ___ -, ___ _,---_,-~-_,---_, 
c.-, _ r err r u7 r- .;'I.--~ 1. C.ir:S [i, C1GO O. j67 O.3:i:j l.l, :./1..1.) ..I. ,)Q . -v. ::.J':;.J .... 
VRLV[ POSIiIOIII X,VClLTS XlCI-- 1 
FIGURE 2.42 Full travel check on Type 4 control loop - run FT!4Dbf. 
99 
("\ 
~"-' X,a 
CJ 
3: 
Cl 
_-.le: 
LL C) 
.::0 
Cl 
o 
w-' 
CJ 
" 
" 
" " 
" 
without 
malflUlction 
"with 
" 
,. 
,. 
" malflUlction 
" 
/ 
" 
" 
C) 
co 
c' O-r----------,----------r----------TI----------~---------.----------, 
0.000 0.595 1.270 1.~05 ~'. :;10 
VRLVE POSIrION X.eMS 
FIGURE 2.43 Full travel check on Type 4 control loop.,. run FT/4E. 
100 
:? r' (, 
.J. ") .l,-! 
I" 
o 
o 
<:) 
. 
""" 
" 
,. 
,. 
,. 
,. 
,. 
,. 
,. 
. without 
malfWlction 
" 
,. 
"with 
,. 
,. 
,. malfWlction 
,. 
,. 
1I 
,. 
,. 
o 
'" 
O~ ______ -. ________ .-______ -r ______ -' ________ '-~ ____ ' 
o 
0.000 0.635 1. 270 I. '3D5 VRLVE PosrrION X,CMS 
3. j 75 
FIGURE 2.44 FUll travel check on Type 4 control loop - nm FT/4F!I' 
101 
o 
3: 
0' 
C") 
CJ 
CJ 
C 
~C) 
LLS 
(''J 
c., 
..:> 
'-'" 
•• 
" " 
10I .. 
" 
" 
" 
with 
malfunction 
)l 
" 
• 
. ¥ 
• 
without 
malfunction 
,. 
.. 
,. 
i' 
II 
~-------r-------'-------'--------'-------~------~ 
0,000 0,635 j,270 1,105 L.S10 '3. ;75 
VRLVE POSrrION X.eMS 
FIGURE 2.45 FUll travel check on Type 4 control loop - run Fl'/4G. 
102 
This arises because of the two straight l.ine approximations used 
to represent the linear control valve characteristic as diScussed in 
section 2.7.3. Equation (2.4.14) may be written in the notation of 
section 2.7.3, as: 
then 
and so it can be Seen that the apparent error in the flowrate calculated 
frem the valve characteristic is a function of the slope of this 
characteristic. Since in the experimental work kvl had two values, 
depending upon the. degree of valve opening, the apparent error e~ 
changes as kvl changes, thus giving rise to the observed discontinuity 
in. control valve characteristic deviation. 
It can also be seen frem Table 2.11 that the method of monitoring 
changes in the residual mean is able to detect the malfunction. 
The case of valve trim damage (run FT/4G) is an exception. In 
contrllst to the other malfunctions, which result in a systematic pOSitive 
or negative deviations in the valve characteristic, this malfunction 
produces a deviation which is both positive and negative, depending upon 
the degree of valve opening, as shown in Figure 2.45. In terms of cal-
cula ting the residual mean this has a cancell.ing effect. 
This type of malfunction can be detected but it requires that the 
change in the residual be calculated at each valve opening before being 
averaged; this method was in fact used in the closed loop ..;. limited 
travel experiments described below. 
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2.9.2 Open loop experiments with limited valve travel 
the malfunction detection method for these experiments cannot be 
based upon comparison of the control valve characteristic since valve 
stroking waS not possible. the check method is therefore based, as 
before, on the determination of the valve position residual. The 
time series of the reSidual was obtained at the same valve opening. In 
each experiment the means of the residual sequence without and with 
malfunction were determined and the modulus of the change in the means 
waS calculated and compared with the Significant change at the 9510 
confidence limit • 
. FigUres 2.46 a and 2.46 b show typical residual time series for a 
Type 4 control loop without malfunction when the valve demand signal 
waS used as the valve stem measurement. The residuals obtained when a 
+ 10% current/pressure zero error was present (run OL/40 a) are shown 
in Figures 2.47 a and 2.47 b. 
Table 2.12 summarises the results for this series of experiments 
and it can be seen that the method is able to detect the malfunctions 
shown in Table 2.9. This includes the valve trim damage malfunction. 
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TABLE 2.12. 
Run Modulus of change in mean of 
number normallied valve position residual 
Actual ,..hAn"e S:i,e:nificant "hAn"e 
0L/2A 1.28 0.20 
OL/ZB 1.16 0.53 
0L/2C 0.49 0.21 
0L/4AB. 1.60 0.12 
OL/4Ab 2.56 0.21 
0L/4B 2.68 0.28 
OL/4Ca 1.87 O.lJ . 
0L/4Cb 1.48 0.10 
0L/4D 0.48 0.17 
0L/4E 0.46 0.20 
0L/4F* 0.69 0.20 
0L/4G 1.09 0.06 
Behaviour of valve position residual for open loop 
limited travel experiments. 
2.9.3. Closed loop experiments with direct digital control 
The check method is again based on the determination of the valve 
position residual. At selected setpoints of the control loop the time 
series of the residual without malfunction was obtained. In each 
experiment the means of the residual series without and with.malfunc-
tion were determined at each particular· setpoint, and the modulus of 
the change in the means of the residuals was calculated and compared 
with the significant change at each selected setpoint. 
The method therefore requires that the mean of the residual with-
out malfunction be stored at the selected setpoints. 
The experimental results are summa.riSed in Table 2.lJ. 
Figures 2.48 a and b show the normalised residual time series for 
a control loop without malfunction controlling at a setpoint 1.82 x 10-3 
m3/s.. Figures 2.49& and b show the corresponding residual sequences 
obtained with the loop controlling at the same setpoint when the valve 
trim is damaged (run Cl/4G) as shown in Figure 2.17. 
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Again, it can be seen from Table 2.13 that the method is able to 
detect the malflUlctions shown in Table 2.9, including the valve trim 
damage malflUlction. 
Control Run Set point Modulus of change in mean 
loop number 
m
3/s of nonnalised valve position residua' type Actual. Significant 
chan~e change 
4 C1/4A 8 -3 0.776 0.05 1. 2 x 10_3 C1/4C a 1.82 x 10_3 2·77 0.07 CI/4C b 2.65 x 10_3 2.08 0.08 CL/4G 1.82 x 10 1.44 0.05 
TABLE 2.13. BehaViour of valve position residual for closed loop with 
direct digital control experiments. 
2.10 Industrial experiments 
Some limited industrial trials of the proposed method have been con-
ducted at Works A. 
The process IUlder investigation operated with the aid of a Ferranti 
Argus 500 process computer which performed d.d.c. on several control 
loops. 
Two d. d.c. flow loops were selected for analYSis, and are denoted 
FC/1 and FC/2. The loop FC/1 controlled the reflux rate to a stripping 
column while Fe/2" controlled the column feed flow. The physical arrange-
ment of the column with the control loops is shown in Figure 2.50. 
In these control loops the computer measured the flowmeter signal 
(for baSic d.d.c.) and also a feedback Electrostep valve positioner 
signal thus yielding the control valve stem position (although no direct 
stem position measurement was made). 
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Figure 2. 50 • Arrangement of industrial control loops Fell and Fe/2. 
For these experimentS the process computer at Works A was programmed 
to store the flowmeter and valve position measurements for each loop at 
1 minute intervalB on process operator demand. This stored data was 
then retrieved on to computer punched paper tape and analysed off-line 
on a PDP 11-20 computer at Loughborough using the malfunction 
detection algorithm. 
2.10.1 Determination of model parameters at Works A. 
In order to implement the malfunction detection method via the 
"tracking" state estimator of equation (2.6.1.2) the measurement 
equation (2.6.2) must initially be defined, Le.: 
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The flowmeter equation was obtained from process design manuals for 
both control loops Fc/l and Fc/2 to be: . 
~ = kmi s i = 1,2 
The quantity s is the measurement used by the computer in its d.d.c. 
a4orithm. the constantS k for the loops FC/l and Fc/2 are given 
mi 
in Table 2.14. 
Control Flowmeter k 
loop measurement mi 
equation K Ib 
ii V 
Fc/l ~ - k 
- ml s 107.5 
Fc/2 ~ = k s 
m2 300.8 
TABLE 2.14. Equations and parameters defining the 
industrial flowmeters. 
The information concerning the control valve characteristics was avail-
able in the proceSs design manuals and typically is shown in Table 2.15. 
Flow Nominal Valve Cv Des' l1~ Cv Normal Specific Valve lift control valve type Factor Normal flow gravity at normal loop body size p.s.i. flow Klb/h flow - % 
(in) open 
Fc/l 3 Equal l.4O 10 65 79.5 0;59 80 percentage 
Fc/2 4 " 193 17 125 219 0.7 63 
TABLE 2.15. ProceSS design specification of the industrial control valves. 
To fonnulate a measurement equation relating the valve pOSition 
measurement to the fluid flowrate an equal percentage valve characteristic 
was assumed of the fonn: 
(2.10.1) 
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Now the information presented in Table 2.15 enables the constants 
kVi to be detennined as follows. 
Consider Fe/l, then the flowrate when the valve is fully open, 
i.e. x = 1.0 is: 
140 ~ = Ts x 79.5 Klb/h 
= 171.23 Klb/h 
This results in two "points" on the equal percentage valve characteristic 
corresponding to x = 1 and x = 0.80. Thus the constants of equation 
(2.10.1) may be solved simultaneously. 
This procedure results in the control valve characteristics 
defined in Table 2.16. 
Flow Type of characteristic kVl kV2 
x 
max 
Control Klb/h 10(}% %/100 loop 
FC/l ~ = kv1exp (kv2 x) 3.7 3.84 1 
FC/2 ~ = kv1exp (kV2 x) 104.5 1.17 1 
TABLE 2.16. Equations and parameters defining the industrial control 
valves. 
The final parameter necessary to define the measurement model is the 
matrix R • Initially nothing was known about the process measurement 
. noise or the accuracy and validity of the assumed control valve equations. 
Thus an a priori estimate of R was made by assuming r .. = 0, i'i' j, and 
. 1J 
setting r.. to be 5% of the maximum values of x and s respectively, 
11 . 
giving: 
R= 
117 
I 
I , 
! 
I 
j 
2.10.2 Industrial experiments and objectives 
"nle experiments were designed to investigate several features of 
the malfunction detection method. These were: 
i)' To ~mine the robustness of the estimator,; 
11) To examine the validity of the a priori flow control loop models 
derived in section 2.10.1,; 
11i) To determine the feasibility of estimating the state via the 
"tracking" state estimator in industrial d.d.c. flow loops,; 
iv) To determine the e,stimator residual characteristics over a period 
of't:ime,; 
v) To verify that a control loop malfunction may be' detected by 
examining the estimator residual mean. 
To facilitate these exper:iments the flowmeter and valve poSition 
measurements for loops FC/1 and FC/2 were logged at 1 minute intervals 
over a period of 1 week. Typical measurement time histories are shown 
in Figures 2.51 a, band 2.52 a, b for loops Fe/I and FC/2 respectively. 
There was no indication from the process operators that the loops had 
malfunctioned during this period. 
The logged data was processed off-line on a PDP 11-20 computer. 
"nle data for each loop was decomposed into batches of 250 samples and 
analysed using the "tracking" state estimator of equation (2.6.1.2) to 
yield the state estimate 2, the nonnalised residual t:ime sequences, 
r./ ! (i = 1, 2), and the means of the normalised residual time 
1r11 
Sequence. The data batches are coded IT/1 a~ and IT/2 a~ for 
loops FC/1 and FC/2 respectively. 
, To investigate the change in reSidual mean when loop malfunction 
occurs a -10% zero error in the floWleter signal was s:imulated and is 
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2.10.3 
denoted by run IT/kA, (k = 1, 2). The modulus of the change in 
residual mean was calculated and compared with the changes in the loop 
reSidual observed over the experimental test period. 
Industrial experimental results 
Since these flow control loops operated under d.d.c. from the 
process computer with limited valve travel, and valve stroldng was not 
feaSible, then the malfunction detection technique must be based upon 
examining the characteristics of the residual sequences. 
Table 2.17 shows the normalised reSidual mean for control loops 
FC/l and FC/2 over the logging period when the a priori models of 
section 2.10.2 were used in the estimator. 
Table 2.17 shows that the residual means for both flow control 
loops, assumed without malfunction, are relatively consistent within 
groups. 
* Run IT/2A a which has a -10% zero error in the flowmeter signal s 
results in a shift of valve position residual mean by approximately 1.0 
which clearly demonstrates the presence of a loop malfunction. 
There is, however, one diSturbing feature of the results in Table 
2.17. This is that the loops without malfunction do not yield residual 
meanS close to zero. Although this is not a pre-requisite of mal-
_ function detection since the criterion for a loop malfunction is that 
the modUlus of the residual mean shifts from the malfunction free charac-
teriBtic, it is considered that a nominal zero reSidual mean for the 
loop without malfunction is a desirable feature. This is postulated as 
an aid to result interpretation for the process operator or control 
-engineer, since the information -load from monitoring several loops is 
reduced to the common feature of zero residual mean (1). This deSirable 
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Flow Sample number Run number NomaliBed residual mean 
cOntrol Valve Flowmeter 10<!p 
"position si.lmal 
Fe/l 1 - 250 IT/I a -0.87 0.42 
251 - 492 IT/lb -0.90 0.46 
743 - 1242 IT/I c -0.89 0·44 
2022 - 3211 IT/l d -0.84 0.42 
5132 - 5631 IT/I e -0.89 0.42 
7136 - 7635 IT/I f -0.91 0.46 
8972 - 9221 IT/l g -0.83 0.44 . 
10225 -10421 IT/l h -0.88 0.47 
Fe/2 1 - 250 IT/2 a -0.41 0.65 
251 - 492 IT/2 b -0.53 0.88 
743 - 993 IT/2 c -0.57 0.92 
1494 - 1743 IT/2 d -0.58 0.94 
2272 - 2521 IT/2 e -0.55 0.87 
2772 - 3021 IT/2 f -0.60 0.94 
Sl81 - 5680 IT/2 g -0.38 0.67 
9071 - 9320 IT/2 h -0.40 0.69 
1 - 250 IT/2A*a -+<l.48 -0.81 
TABLE 2.17. Behaviour of residuals in industrial d.d.c. flow loops 
uSing a priori measurement equations. 
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feature may be obtained simply by updating the a priori measurement 
models. This may be done as follows. 
Table 2.18 details typical information generated by the state 
estimator using the a priori models of section 2.10.2. An examination 
of these results shows that there is a large difference in ~ and ~ 
which indicates that the control valve characteristic is in error thus 
producing large residuals in the estimator. 
Now the philosophy adopted in this Chapter has not been the 
achievement of accurate state estimates but simply the creation of a 
mathematical model relating the measured variables in the control loop, 
from which loop malfunction could be detected. 
With these comments in mind and the fact that the control valve 
characteristics derived from the process deSign manual are suspect, it 
was considered justifiable to mOdify the a priori model in order to 
achieve approximately zero residual mean when the loop is malftmction 
free. 
The control loop meaSurement equations were intuitively modified 
and the a posteriori parameters are given in Table 2.19. 
Flow 
control 
loop 
Fcll 
Fc/2 
TABLE 2.19. 
Flowmeter constant Control valve constants R matrix 
k
mi 
Klb 
kVl 
Klb k 100 
1iV iiV v2T rU r 22 
90 3.7 3.84 0.05 0.1 
300.8 104.5 1.45 0.05 0.05 
Parameters defining a posteriori measurement 'models for 
industrial control loops. 
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Flow Valve 
control opening 
loop 
Foil 0.6532 
0.6615 
0.6649 
0.6649 
0.6688 
FC/2 0.3381 
0.34 
0.3312 
0.3205 
0.3351 
TABlE 2.18. 
Flowmeter ~= 'lu.= Optimal Nonnalised Normalised 
signal k
v1exp(kv2 x) k . S 
A A cost valve position flowmeter signal 
IDJ.. 
Q=X 
A residual residual J 
0.5608 45252.6 60288.2 57055.1 1.847 - 1.14 0.74 
0.5559 46717.5 59763.1 57020 1.34001 - 1.04 0.50 
0.5584 47334.3 60025.3 57375.6 1.254 - 0.970 0.56 
0.5545 47334.3 59605.5 57049.9 1.178 - 1.0 0.42 
0.5662 48049.3 60865.9 58220 1.30 - 0.895. 0.71 
0.5696 155453 17134 159874 0.81 - 0.56 0.71 
0.5564 15581 167372 159012 0.44 - 0.44 0.50 
0.5628 154210 169283 158348 0.74 - 0.52 0.7 
0.57 152276 171487 157499 1.21 - 0.67 0.87 
0.5623 154919 169136 158802 0.67 . - 0.28 0·77 
Tracking state estimator information using a priori measurement models for industrial 
control loops. 
., 
Table 2.20 illustrates the information generated by the estimator 
uSing the a posteriori measurement models and Table 2.21 details a 
reSidual mean analysis, which confirms that a loop malfunction is charac-
terisedby a large shift of reSidual mean 
Flow Sample number Run number Normalised residual mean 
control Valve FloWleter loop position S;...., .. 1 
Fe/1 o - 400 IT/1 i - 0.067 0.071 
493 - 1492 IT/1 j - 0.074 0.078 
2022 - 3021 IT/1 k - 0.05 0.0,56 
7136 - 8135 IT/l 1 - 0.096 ,0.11 
8972 - 9971 IT/l i - 0.092 0.10 
9723 - 9822 IT/lA b - 0.63 0.584 
FC/2 0-400 IT/2 i - 0.012 0.018 
593 - 1342 IT/2 j - 0.11 0.145 
1772 - 2521 IT/2 k - 0.13 0.17 
5181 - 5930 IT/2l - 0.067 0.09 
8972 - 9971 IT/2 m* - 0.11 0.16 
5732 - 6731 IT/2A b - 1.05 1.32 
TABLE 2.21. Behaviour of residuals in industrial d.d.c flow loops 
using a posteriori measurement equations. 
2.11 Concluding remarks 
This. Chapter has described a control valve poSition - flow check 
which is intended to be implemented on a d.d.c. computer. The tech-
nique appears promising as a means of detecting ,the existence of 
various types of malfunction in flow control loops, though not of 
'identifying the particular malfunction except in certain specific cases. 
The method does not require additional: process instrumentation, 
but ,exploits the capability of the process computer to condition, store, 
and display information. The computer storage and time requirements 
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Flow Valve Flowmeter A Optimal Normalised Normalised ~ ~ Q control opening signal cost valve flowmeter 
loop A pOSition signal J reSidual residual 
Fc/l 0.6414 0.5476 43262.5 49286.8 46230. 0.41 - 0.64 0.04 
0.6092 0.4978 38229.4 . 44802.1 41081.1 0.48 - 0.68 0.13 
0.6580 0.5501 46108.7 49506.60 47834.8 0.08 - 0.27 0.1 
0.6849 0.5921 51114.6 53287.7 52316.7 0.11 - 0.32 - 0.12 
0.7123 0.5921 :iJ770.2 53287.7 54736.5 0.07 0.13 - 0.23 
Fc/2 0.3449 0.5852 1723:iJ. 176042. 173875. 0.036 - 0.14 0.12 
0.3869 0.5823 183182. 175161. 179664. 0.29 - 0.012 - 0.5 
0.3483 0.5818 173213 • 175014. 1739:iJ . 0.0099 - 0.089 0.0452 
0.3402 0.5745 168732 • 172809. 170374. 0.085 - 0.29 0.032 
0.3376 0.5887 170534· 177071. 173196 • 0.123 - 0.13 0.32 
TABLE 2.20. Tracking state estimator. information using a posteriori measurement models for industrial 
control loops. 
are relatively modest and since most nialfunctions appear not to 
develop very sUddenly the check algorithm can be executed at quite 
infrequent intervals and at low priority. 
The technique does not assume a constant pressure drop across the 
valve but it doeS assume a constant system now - pressure drop charac-
teristic. If this condition is not completely met, the level of 
detectable malfunction will be increased. 
It is envisaged that the technique would be used for the detection 
of relatively gross malfunction Which may affect immediate operation 
of the proceSs rather than the adjustment of fine errors in data sets 
for subsequent management analysis. The level of error Which might 
be detected in practice is probably about 10%. 
Two basic types of check have been described. In the first, a 
valve characteristic is obtained of nowrate vs valve position. This 
requires that the valve be moved over its whole range of travel. It 
is expected that usually this will not be acceptable. However, if 
this is permitted, it is possible to obtain a full comparison of the 
original arid current characteristic, and if desired to give a visual 
display. This full valve characteristic comParison enables the 
source of the malfunction to be determined in scme cases. 
A second check is based upon the comparison of the original and 
current residuals generated from a state estimator. '!hiB is applic-
able to all cases inc1u djng closed loop d.d.c. with limited valve 
travel and it is anticipated that this check would be more useful. 
The method has been tested using a laboratory rig Which demons-
trated the points discussed above. 
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Some limited induStrial trials have also been conducted. These 
revealed that models based upon process design manuals were adequate 
and no serious difficulty was experienced in tracking the operation 
of control loops and calculating values of residuals. 
It is suggested that future work should continue the industrial 
trials of the method in an attempt to correlate actual flow control 
loop malfunction to the change in residual, while theoretical develop-
ment Should invest:i&ate how the method may be adapted to handle 
control loops which do not satisfy the asswnption of constant system 
flow-pressure drop characteristic. 
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CHAPl'ER 3. 
THE DETECTION OF MALFUNCTION IN A GENERAL 
CONTROL LOOP 
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3.1 List of symbols 
" 
A 
A(k + 1, 
Ab(k + 1, 
!. 
a . 
-~ 
B (k) 
B 
B.r 
b 
b 
~(/) 
C(t) 
~ 
(~):ij 
C 
c 
E ( ) 
E (/) 
F(k+1, k) 
F 
G 
H (k) 
1\,- (k) 
H 
k) 
k) 
crosS sectional area 
state transition matrix 
state transition matrix 
vector of unknown parameters 
i th vector of unknown parameters 
control driving matrix. 
measured variable devia tion 
true measured variable deviation 
vector of unknown parameters 
unknown scalar parameter 
conditional expectation of b 
measurement matrix 
innovation autocorrelation matrix 
ij th element of ~ 
controlled variable deviation/instrument 
transmitter 
vector of unknown parameters 
expectation / error 
conditional expectation 
error 
laplace transfonn of error 
error vector / Gaussian white 
noise sequence 
augmented state transition matrix 
continuous time transition matrix 
transfer function 
measurement matrix 
measurement matrix 
tank height deviation 
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2 
m 
various 
various 
v 
various 
cm 
i\n(s) 
h. (k) 
-1 
h 
I 
J 
j 
K(k) 
~(k) 
laplAce transfonn of H 
laplAce transfonn of tank 
height setpoint deviation 
laplAce transfonn of tank height 
deviation measurement 
i th row of measurement matrix H(k) 
tank height 
unit matrix 
cost function 
smoothing interval 
Kalman gain matrix 
Bias filter gain matrix 
controller gain 
K1,KZ,K3,K31,K3Z ~ 
K4, Kf,Km,KL, ) ) constants in level control 
Kv' Ko1 , ) ) loop transfer functions 
KoZ,h' Koz,x ) 
/'::, K incremental change in Kalman gain matrix 
k discrete time courtter 
L covariance matrix/augmented measurement matrix 
1 discrete time counter 
M covariance matrix/control valve demand signal 
weighted swn of residuals 
m nwnber of measurements 
N memory length/counter 
n discrete time counter/nwnber of state variables 
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cm 
various 
various 
various 
p 
p (s) 
p ( ) 
p ( / ) 
!:::. p 
Q (k) 
Q 
Q (s) 
q 
R(k) 
R 
r .. (k) 
l.J 
r (k) 
S (k) 
S 
s .. (k) 
l.J 
s 
t 
!:::'t 
u 
u (k) 
v 
v 
11 (k) 
x 
pressure. 
Laplace transform of controller output 
pressure 
probability 
conditional error covariance ma trix 
presSure drop 
process noise covariance matrix 
flowrate deviation 
Laplace transform of flowrate deviation 
flowrate/number of process disturbances/scalar 
process noise covariance 
measurement noise covariance matrix 
control loop setpoint deviation 
computer generated measurement noise 
covariance matrix 
ijth element of R(k) 
residual 
innovation covariance matrix 
scaling parameter/matrix 
ijth element of S(k) 
scaling parameter/Laplace operator 
time/student's t 
sampling interval 
matrix/load disturbance deviation 
control vector 
matrix 
measurement noise vector 
vector of process disturbances 
control valve stem position deviation 
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l/min 
various 
various 
various 
various 
v 
x' (s) 
x 
x (k) 
~ (/) 
x. (k) 
~ 
Y (k) 
I(k) 
z .. (k) 
~J 
z (k) 
~ ( / ) 
z 
11·11 
Greek letters 
a 
r 
5 
51' 
Laplace transform of valve stem position 
deviation 
control valve stem position 
state vector at time interval k 
conditional expectation of state vector ~ (k) 
i th element of ~(k) 
sequence of measurement vectors Z(I) to Z(k) 
vector of process measurements at time 
interval k 
ith element of I(k) 
estimated innovation covariance matrix at 
time interval k 
ijth element of Z (k) 
augmented state vector 
conditional expectation of ~(k) 
z transform operator 
matrix norm 
scaling factor 
process noise driving matrix 
Kronecker delta 
difference in error covariance matrices 
vector of WlknOwn parameters 
mean 
innovation sequence 
normalised innovation 
autocorrelation matrix 
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v 
various 
ij th eiement of P k 
process time constant min 
controller integral time min 
control loop malfunction gain 
various 
Subscripts 
b parameter vector b 
c parameter vector c 
i inlet flowrate 
opt optimal 
min minimum 
max maximum 
ss steady sta te 
x state vector x 
01 outlet flowrate 1 
02 outlet flowrate 2 
Superscripts 
optimum state estimate 
-1 inverse 
# pseudo inverse 
T transpose 
estimate 
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3 . 2 In troduc tioll 
Chapter 2 has suggested a malfunction detection algorithm which 
may be implemented on a procesS computer to determine faults in a 
flow control loop. 
The method was based upon the knowledge of the steady state 
control valve characteristic relating the process flowrate to the valve 
demand signal, as well as the primary flowmeter measurement relation-
ship. Thus it was postulated that the flow control loop had inherent 
measurement redundancy, which was used to detect malfunction. Two 
techniques were presented which could be applied to open and closed flow 
loop operation respectively. 
The closed loop technique was based upon a simple tracking state 
estimator derived under the assumptions of steady state operation (or 
fast process time constants). .The technique yielded no diagnostic 
information and the calculated state estimates were not constrained to 
be accurate. 
In this Chapter it is assumed that a relationship between the 
process variable and the control valve demand signal exists but is 
initially unknown. A malfunction detection technique based upon a 
dynamic closed loop model is proposed which yields "optimal" state 
estimates when the loop is malfunction free and which also provides 
some diagnostic infonnation on the location of loop malfilnctions when 
they occur. 
The method is based upon Kalman filtering and. may be applied to 
both conventional analogue setpoint and direct digital (d.d.c.)control 
loops. 
To illustrate the proposed algorithm, malfunctions are detected in 
a laboratory level control loop. 
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3.3 The control loop malfWlction check 
3·3·1 
In this Section two types of control loop are distinguished and 
the effects of malfWlction on their performance are examined. 
Conventional analogue set point control 
Although d.d.c. process computers are finding increasing application 
on chemical plant, there are still many control loops which are baSed 
upon conventional analogue controllers. The role of the computer in 
such Situations is dependent upon the system design. However. it is 
not Wlcommon for the computer to access the measured variable in a 
control loop as a primary input to plant performance, optimisation or 
management calculation computer programs.· 
A convenient representation of control loops is the block diagram 
and Figure 3.1 shows a negative feedback loop whOSe task is to maintain 
the process variable C at some deSired setpoint R·in spite of the load 
disturbances U. The computer accesses the measured variable B at 
diScrete time intervals via a p/I transmitter and is denoted Y1 (k). 
Now for a control loop operating at a particular setpoint R, with 
load disturbances about some nominal value U, there exists a Wlique 
relationship between the measured variable B (= R) and the control 
valve demand signal M (controller output signal or the valve stem posi-
tion). If this relationship changes, in the absence of setpoint or 
load changes, then loop malfunction has occurred. 
In the control loop of Figure 3.1 there are two types of malfunc-
tion which can occur. 
The first type of error is a fault in the p/I transmitter. This 
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Block diagram representation of an analogue setpoint 
control loop. 
G 
instrument is external to the control loop and so such a malfunction 
p 
does not affect control loop operation, i.e. B ~R and for the given 
Rand U, M is the expected value. However the computer observation 
Yl will be biased and so the relationship between Yl and M will 
be altered. Subsequent process calculations involving Y1 will be 
in error. This fonn of error will be referred to as a pure measure-
ment error. 
The second type of malfunction is an error occurring within the 
individual blocks of the control loop. This kind of fault does affect 
loop operation - the end result of which is to cause a change in the 
relationship between B and M. As an example, consider a malfunction 
in the meaSurement block G which causes the output B to have a 
m 
positive error. Denoting the true process measurement as BT,. and 
the error E(B), then because of the feedback nature of the loop it is 
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r 
easy to see: 
R = B = BT + E (B) (3.3.1.1 ) 
Now an observer, or the process computer, will still register the proceSS 
measurement as B although the true value is BT. Since the control valve 
is essentially being aSked to handle different process conditions the 
valve demand signal will change to some new nominal value M + E (M). 
This apparent divergence between the expected values of B and M, in the 
absence of setpoint or load changes, is indicative of loop malfunction. 
The precise change in the control valve demand signal E(M) is 
dependent upon the characteristics of the control loop, and may be 
derived using conventional block diagram techniques. 
For example, the measurement error E(B) may be considered as a load 
disturbance entering the· block diagram after the measurement block Gm. 
The transfer function relating the valve demand signal.to this load 
change is (56): 
M (s) = 
E(B)(s) 
- G G c v 
I+GGGG 
c v p m 
Now by applying the final value theorem to this transfer function (56) 
the steady state deviation E(M) of the valve demand signal from the 
nominal value M is: 
E(M) = ~ E(B) 
where ~ depends upon the control loop system gains. 
The parameter ~ characterises the magnitude of the malfunction 
which is detectable in any particular loop. 
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3.3.2 Direct digital control 
nle difference between this type of loop and that detailed in 
Figure 3.1 is that the pi! transmitter becomes part of the feedback 
control loop and the controller becomes the process computer. Hence 
there are no pure measurement errors in this loop and consequently all 
malfunctions affect control loop operation, thereby causing deviations 
in the expected valve demand signal for a given process measurement in 
the abSence of setpoint or load changes. 
The ideas developed in this section have as their basis that, for 
a' given setpoint and load, there is an expected relationship between 
the process measurement and the valve demand signal. The remainder of 
this Chapter is devoted to developing an algorithm which will detect 
malfunction during normal control loop operation. The control. loop is 
represented by a mathematical model which provides a data base from 
which inferences concerning loop malfunction are made'. 
3.4 Review of Kalman filtering 
The baSis for modern estimation theory is the method presented by 
Kalman (46). His solution to the recursive linear estimation problem 
has become known as the Kalman filter. Kalman 's method has been 
described extenSively in the literature and in addition to Kalman's 
original paper derivations may also be found' in (27), (45) and (57). 
A statement of the linear estimation problem and the.resulting filter-
ing equations which form the solution to the problem are presented in 
this section. 
Consider a linear system whose dynamics are modelled by a linear 
vector difference equation: 
x(k+l) = A(k+l,k) x(k) + B(k) u(k) + I {k}w (k) 
- - - -
141 
where :!£(k) = n x 1 vector of state variables 
A(k+1,k) = n x n state transition matrix 
!! (k) = r x 1 vector of control inputs 
B(k) = n x r control driving matrix 
! (k) '" q x 1 vector of dynamic system noise variables 
I (k) = n x q noise driving matrix. 
The noise sequence {! (k) I , is assumed to be white noise with 
statistics given by: 
E <! (k) ) = 0 
E <! (k) ! (jl) = Q (k) 5 (k,j) 
where Q (k) is the covariance matrix of {!(k)} and 6 (k,j) is the 
Kronecker.delta, ie. 
6 (k,j) = k f j 
k = j 
The initial state ~(o), is considered to be a vector of random 
variables with statistics known to be: 
E ~ (0» = ~ (0) 
E <! (k) :!£ (ol) = 0 for all k 
and E( ~(o) - £ (0) ) ~ (0) _ ~ (0) )T) . = P (0/0) 
where p(O/O) is the covariance matrix of :!!: (0). 
At each time instant, k, the available measurements are modelled 
by 
where: 
r(k) = H (k) :!!: (k) + :y (k) 
.l(k) = m x 1 vector of measurement variables 
H(k) = m x n measurement weighting matrix 
:y(k) = m x 1 vector of measurement noise variables. 
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The additive noise sequence, 1 !:(k)} ,is assumed to have the following 
statistics: 
E( !: (k) ) = 0 
E( !: (k) :y (jl) = R(k) 6 (k,j) 
where R(k) is the covariance matrix of I :y(k) } 
The noise covariance matrices, Q(k) and R(k), are assumed to be 
positive semidefinite and positive definite respectively. In addition, 
are assumed to be uncorrelated, i.e., 
E(.!!(k) :y(j )T) = 0 for .all k,j 
and E( ! (0) ! (k)T) = 0 for all k 
The mathematical model has now been defined and so the estimation 
problem will be stated. 
Recursive Linear Estimation Problem 
Given the model described by equations (3.4.1) and (3.4.2), deter-
mine an estimate of the state at time 1<+1 which is a linear combination 
of an estimate at time k and the measurement data ~ (1<+1) such that 
the following criterion is minimised: 
J = E ( ~ (k+1) -! (k+l»T ~ (k+1) -! (k+1) » 
Kalman (46) showed that the optimal estimate is given by: 
! (k/k) = E <! (k) / Y (k) ) 
where Y (k) = ~ (i), .... , ~ (k) ) 
Furthermore, it was shown that the optimal estimate can be generated by 
the folloWing set of recursive equations, which combine to give the 
Kalman filter .. 
~(k/k-1) = A(k,k-1) ~(k-1/k-1) + B(k-1)~(k-1) (3.4.3) 
P(k/k-l) = A(k,k-1) P(k-1/k-l) AT(k,k-l) + r(k-1) Q(k-1) r T(k-1) 
(3.4.4) 
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K{k) = P{k/k-l) HT{k) (H{k) P{k/k-l) HT{k) + R{k) )-1 
(3 .4.6) 
P{k/k) = (I - K{k)H{k) ) p{k/k-l){1 - K{k) H{k»T + K{k) R{k) KT{k) 
, 
(3.4.7) 
or P{k/k) = P{k/k-l) - K{k) H{k) P{k/k-l) 
where 
~ (k/k-l) = E~{k» / Y{k-l» 
K{k) = Kalman gain matrix 
P{k/k-l) = covariance matrix of ~(k) - ~(k/k-l» 
P{k/k) = covariance matrix of ~(k) - !(k/k» 
The feedback structure of the filter is shown in Figure 3.2, and it 
is this structure which makes the Kalman filter a very useful tool since 
it can be realised using a digital computer. 
The quantity: 
I{k) - H ~ (k/k-l) 
which appears in equation (3 .4.6) is used extensively in Kalman filte~ 
ing. Kailath (58) defined this Sequence as the innovation sequence and 
this will be denoted here as ~(k). 
Inspection reveals that ~(k) is the difference between the actual 
process measurements and the predicted measurement, and as such repre-
sents the new infonnation available to the filter at each iteration. 
Kailath has shown that the innovation sequence for a filter using 
correct infonnation (Le. correct system models and noise statistics) 
with Gaussian white noise inputs is a GaUSsian white noise sequence with 
statistics: 
E {y (k» = .Q 
E ( ~(k) ~T(j) )= 0 j f k 
E ( ~(k) ~ T{j) ) = H (k) P (k/k-l) HT{k) + R{k) j = k 
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;r(k) + y. (k) + g(k/k) UHT x(k-l/k-l) 
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B (k-l) 
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FIGURE 3.2 Feedback implementation of the Kalman filter. 
The system model given in equations (3.4.1) and (3.4.2) asswneS 
linearity. Since many problems of practical interest involve non-
linear process dynamics, then a linear model must be derived using 
perturba tion techniques. '!his approach leads to a filter for hand-
ling non-linear problems called the "extended Kalman filter". An 
analysis of this "extended" filter as well as other non-linear appro-
ximation techniques may be fOlUld in Jazwinski (57). 
The results of Kalman are also constrained by the modelling 
asswnption that the noise driving the system and the measurement noise 
are white. The extension of Kalman' s work to problems containing 
correlated or "coloured" noise was treated by Bryson and Johansen (59) 
In their paper, the correlated noise was asswned to be generated by a 
"shaping filter" whOSe input was white noise. The original state 
vector was then augmented· by the correlated noise sequence and was used 
to reformulate the problem so that Kalman filtering could be USed to 
obtain a recursive estimate of the new state vector. However the 
augmentation approach, apart from making the filter more computationally 
burdensome, leads to matrices which are ill-conditioned. 
These problems Were eliminated by Bryson and Henrikson (60) for the 
caSe of correlated measurement noise. The approach USed was to intro-
duce a differencing transformation which yielded a neW measurement 
variable containing IUlcorrelated noise. This method has the advantages 
of not increasing the dimension of the state vector and of eliminating 
the ill-conditioned matrix of the augmented approach. 
Theoretically, the Kalman filter gives the IUlbiased, minimum 
variance estimate of the system state vector of a linear dynamic system 
disturbed by additive white noise when meaSurements of the state vector 
are linear, but corrupted with white noise. In practice such perfonn-
ance is hardly ever realised. A moment's conSideration of equations 
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(3.4.3) to (3.4.7) reveals that in order to implement the Kalman filter 
it is necessary to initially specify P(O/O), ~(O), Q and It (assuming 
sta tionary noise statistics), as well as defining the ata te transition 
and measurement matrices. If a Kalman filter processes data which 
are generated by a data generation mechanism, characterised by a 
structure and/or set of parameter values different fran those used in 
the filter, then suboptimal estimation of the System state vector 
occurs. In fact several authors have reported that filter divergence 
can occur due to incorrect a priori information (61), (62), (63). To 
overcome these problems the Kalman filter should be made adaptive in 
some sense. 
Adaptive Kalman filtering has been the subject of considerable 
research in recent years and the various adaptive estimation techniques 
will be discussed in section 3.6. 
3.5 Applica tions of Kalman filtering in chemical engineering 
Since Kalman published his solution to the recursive linear esti-
ma tion problem (46), there has been an extensive research effort devoted 
to extending his ideas. Although the aerospace industry was not slow 
to recognise the potential of Kalman filtering, it is only recently that 
these techniques have been applied to chemical processes. 
To use the Kalman filter a state variable representation of the 
physical process is required. Rarely in the chemical processing 
industrieS are accurate process models available, and those that are 
are usually characterised by complex, non-linear differential equations, 
involving uncertain parameters subject to drift. Some process models 
may involve pure dead times or be distributed. parameter systems. 
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Another problem arises in describing the statistical nature of the 
random inputs and measurement errors in industrial processes. 
Coggan and Noton1s work (64), was concerned with the feasibility of 
using a non-linear Kalman filter in chemical engineering problems. 
Their work was baSed upon computer s:iJnulation so that a comparison 
between the actual and estimated state variables was possible. They 
reported results for the extended Kalman filter applied to a blending 
process and a thermal system -which were characterised by strong non-
linearities, unmeasured disturbances, inaccurate measurements and 
variable time delay. 1heir results showed that despite these undesir-
able features the state estimator was quite stable and converged 
quickly to within 1 to 2% of the actual state values. This accuracy 
was considerably better than the accuracy with which any state was 
actually measured. However, the results obtained from the thermal 
system indicated that the estimated unknown heat transfer coefficient 
parameter was conSiderably biased. The authors attempted to improve 
this Situation by "experimental" runs with: , 
i) Artificially low or high values of Rand P(O/O), 
ii) Modifications of the filter Kalman gain, 
ill) Various intuitively chosen alterations to the estimation procedure. 
None of these proved successful and the results were not reported. 
In both of Coggan and Noton I s examples, they constrained the values 
of Q and R to be the same for their simulation and estimation, but they 
did consider the effect of incorrect a priori information for !(O) and 
P(O/O) • 
Goldmann and Sargent (65) have perfonned a detailed study of the 
factors affecting Kalman filter behaviour for two Simulated chemical 
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proceSses. 
ment noise. 
In both of their examp1es they considered on1y measure-
Their first process consisted of a steady state mass and heat 
ba1ance around a disti11ation c011.D1U1, and they showed that the filter 
was re1atively insensitive to incorrect a priori information R, :!;{o) 
and p{ojO). 
Their second example concerned a fixed bed cata1ytic reactor. 
The "physical" simulation of the reactor was based upon a detai1ed 
mathematical mode1 consisting of mass and energy ba1ances, kinetic 
equations, mass transfer re1ations and phase equilibrium re1ationships 
applied to a sequence of adiabatic stirred tanks. By assuming parti-
cuhr ca ta1yst decay 1aws and using the described model the authors 
cou1d compute the temperature profile along the reactor and its outlet 
composition, which were subsequent1y contaminated with Normal random 
noise to 'provide process measurements. The filter was used to esti-
mate the cata1yst activity and its rate of decay from these measure-
mentS. The Kalman filter used a Simplified mode1 which ignored all 
maSs transfer effects and assumed a series of, firSt order'reactions 
occurring in an adiabatic p1ug flow reactor. ,The cata1yst dynamics 
for the filter were represented by simp1e fUnctions corresponding to 
three simu1ated decay 1aws, and in particuhr they approximated a dis-
tributed parameter system by a 10w order polynomial., The noise 
statistics used for the filter were those used in the simu1ation. 
The authors found that it was possible to predict model parameters 
and inaccessible variahles such as catalyst activity provided that a 
reasonahly accurate steady state mode1 was used. However they did 
observe that the filter was senSitive, and sometimes divergent, to 
errors in their assumed models. To overcome this problem the authors 
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exam.ined more sophisticated filtering schemes in the form of the 
exponential and limited memory filters (66), (57). 
Joffe and Sargent (67) extended the abOve work on the reactor and 
developed an optimal control strategy which was a function of the 
catalyst activity estimated by the Kalman filter. In their formulation 
they included the effect of input process noise !(k) and its co-
variance matrix Q(k), and by means of simulation demonstrated that the 
filter was insensitive to the statistical assumptions necessary for 
its use. 
The problem of specifying the a priori statistical information 
necessary to implement the Kalman filter has been the subject of several 
studies. This feature was first discussed by Seinfeld et al. (68) and 
Seinfeld (69). They considered the general problem of the control of 
a non-linear lumped parameter dynamical system subject to random inputs 
and measurement errors. A scheme was developed whereby a non-linear 
Kalman filter was included in the control loop and they illustrated 
their ideas by a simulation for the proportional control on the tempera-
ture of a continuous stirred tank reactor. In implementing the filter 
the authors remarked that the performance of the estimator depended 
significantly upon the choices of ~(o), P(ojO), Q(k) and R(k), and 
they selected their values by a trial and error approach involving com-
puter simulation. In passing they also clllllDlented that if Q was 
selected too small filter convergence was not obtained. 
Wells (70) pursued this point further when he examined the feasi-
bility of extended Kalman filtering applied to an adiabatic continuous 
stirred tank reactor. He suggested that modelling errorS can be 
accounted for by considering the process noise ! (k) as a fictitious, 
zero mean, Gaussian white noise vector whose covariance matrix Q(k) 
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reflects the confidence in the assUllled model. '!he importance of the 
a priori filter parameters .!(O), P(O/O), Q(k) and R(k) was discussed 
and WellB pointed out that .! (0) and P(O/O) determine the basic 
speed of response of the filter. He also mentioned the effect of the 
noise covariances Q(k) and R(k) on the Kalman ga3n and suggested that a 
large value of Q(k) should be used if there is uncertainty about the 
process dynamic model. '!his causes a large gain and so the filter 
relies upon current observations to estimate the state vector. '!his 
"loosening" effect of the filter causes the steady state estimation 
error to increase. Increasing the observation noise covariance R(k) 
has the opPosite effect, and consequently the filter tends to disregard 
measurements containing large errors. Although WellB illustrated the 
effectiveness of the extended Kalman filter by selecting values of .!(O), 
P(O/O), Q(k) and R(k) such that the state estimates were comparable 
with the simulated system state responses he did not include a sensiti-
vity analysis to illustrate the performance of the filter to poor a 
priori information. 
Hamilton et al. (71) and Seborg et al. (72) examined the linear 
time invariant form of the Kalman filter by s:imulation studies and 
exper:imenta1 tests on a pilot plant evaporator. They confirmed WellB' 
, 
work concerning the sensitivity of the Kalman filter to a priori. i."l.for-
mation and advocate that Q(k) and R(k) should be considered as design 
parameters which are selected to :improve filter performance. Although 
they provided intuitive guides to these matrix selections, they do not 
present any systematic method for determining them other than by 
simulation. 
Coggan and Wilson (73) realised the problem of information uncertain-
ty in fUtering and suggested that one result of it is to cause bias in 
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the state est:iJDates. They subsequently developed a technique which 
enables the Kalman filter to detect and inhibit this bias on-line. 
Their ideas were demonstrated by computer s:imulations of a concentric 
tubular counterCUITent heat eXchanger and an isothennal gas absorption 
cohmm. 
Other references to Kalman filtering which confiIm the above 
remarks may be found:in (74) and (75). 
The application of Kalman filter:ing to :industrial chemical pro-
cesses appears to be relatively novel although Gustavsson (76) has 
reviewed some papers. 
Choquette et al. (77) have used extended Kalman filter:ing to 
est:iJDate unknown parameters in a reactor system while Wells and Wismer 
(78) and Thl (79) have reported results from a steelmaking proceSS. 
In Sastry and Vetter'S (80) work, they modelled the wet-end 
dynamics of a paper making procesS and used the Kalman filter to 
estimate parameterS :in the result:ing non-linear model. King (81) 
used the Kalman filter for a similar purpose in his mineral notation 
pilot plant. A discrete-cont:inuous Kalman filter (57) was used to 
est:iJDa te IDlknOwn model parameters, and :in particular K:ing imposed two 
restrictions on the algorithm for practical application. These 
restrictions were: 
i) A lower limit was set on the variance of the state est:iJDate. 
ii) In order to enable effective tracking of the parameters after a 
lengthy period when the parameters were stable, the conditional 
density P<!jY
n
; t
n
) was never allowed to be less 'than 10-3 • 
K:ing gives no guidance of the effect of these restrictions or the 
filter sensitivity to them. 
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Applications of Kalman filtering in the nuclear industry may be 
found in the papers of Godbole (82), Venerus and Bullock (83) and 
Shinohara and Oguma (84). 
3 .6 Kalman filtering in uncertain systems 
3.6.1 The effect of uncertainty on Kalman filtering 
The utilization of Kalman filtering presupposes a known linear 
dynamic system disturbed by white state and measurement noises of 
known covarianceS. However, in actual practice, thiB knowledge is 
seldom completely available. The System parameters and noise co-
variances may only be known approximately and although more accurate 
modelling is an obvious solution, it is often impractical and time 
consuming. 
The result of using an incorrect system model or incorrect a 
priori statistics Q(k), R(k) p(ojO) and ~ (0), is to cause large 
estimation errors, biased state estimates or even divergence of the 
filter. 
Probably the first observed evidence of the sensitivity of the 
Kalman filter to uncertainties waS in the application of the Kalman 
filter to orbit determination (61). In this work it was observed that 
modelling errors caused the state estimate to diverge from the true 
system state, leading to eStimation errors much greater than those 
predicted in theory. The application of the Kalman filter to chemical 
engineering problems also highlighted this fundamental deficiency of 
the technique and several suggestions have been presented to overcome 
this problem (69), (70), (71). 
Divergence of the Kalman filter may be explained as follows. For 
systems which contain no plant noise, Le. Q = 0, the Kalman gain and 
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computed error covariance matrix both approach zero as time increases 
(85). This means that after a large number of noise measurements 
of a deterministic process, the estimator has· effectively matched the 
data with the assumed model and therefore computes each new state 
estimate using only the preceding state estimate and the assumed state 
transition matrix, i.e., independent of any new measurements. Since 
the system model may contain inaccurate parameters or correspond to 
the true system only over a limited time period, then divergence of 
the state estimate will occur. 
3.6.2 Analysis of suboptimal filter performance 
The problem of uncertain a priori information in Kalman filtering 
has been highlighted. Before analySing methods of overcoming this 
limitation it is worth considering techniques by which a deSigner may 
determine whether his filter is operating optimally. Such tests may 
be examined before contemplating more complicated estimation schemes, 
which may be time consuming or even degrade estimation performance. 
Berkovec (86), Mehra (87) and Tompretini (88) have proposed tests 
of the complete system mechanisation using actual system data. 
These tests are based upon examining the innovation sequence. 
The innovation sequence was defined in section 3.4 to be: 
V (k) = 1. (k) - H (k)! (k/k-1) (3.6.2.1) 
If the filter useS the correct model and noise statistics, then the 
innovation Sequence is a Gaussian white noise sequence with statistics: 
E (y (k» = 2 (3.6.2.2) 
E ~ (k)l(j» = 0 j l' k (3.6.2.3) 
= H(k) P(k/k-1) HT(k) + R (k) j = k (3.6.2.4) 
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The authors of (86), (87) and (88) process the actual data to determine 
the statistical properties of the actual innovation sequence. Statis-
tical tests may be performed on the actual innovations and if the 
results differ significantly from those given in equations (3.6.2.2) 
to (3.6.2.4), the system model is invalid and the Kalman filter is 
operating suboptimally. 
3.7 'Ihe design of Kalman filters for uncertain syStems 
If the tests of the previous section reveal suboptimal (or even 
divergent) Kalman filter performance, then the deSigner may seek 
methods to overcome the problem of uncertain a priori information. 
Mehra (89), Pearson (90) and Weiss (91) have reviewed the litera-
ture on Kalman filtering in uncertain systems. Techniques for imprcv-
ing filter performance may be broadly classed as bounding techniques 
and adaptive estimation. 
Bounding techniques 
'Ihe bounding techniques of improving filter perfonnance tend to be 
based upon intuition and are usually characterised by a trial and error 
approach involving considerable computer Simulation. 
Schlee et al. (61) have discussed several simple methodS of elimi-
nating filter divergence. The techniques are based upon trying to 
limit the decrease in the Kalman gain in order to avoid the filter 
becoming decoupled from the measurements. 
One approach is to artificially increase the plant noise covariance 
matrix Q. This causes an increase in the error covariancematrices 
P (k/k-l) and P (k/k), and hence causes the gain matrix to increase. 
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However in adopting this procedure the amount of noise to be added has 
to be determined, and this usually becomes a trial and error solution. 
The filter performance is examined for various values of Q until an 
acceptable solution is obtained. This technique has been successfully 
implemented by fitzgerald (62), Seinfeld (68), Wells (70) and Hamilton 
et al. (71). 
Another commonly used technique is to directly increase the gain 
matrix K(k) by adding a fixed quantity to it, which again is determined 
by simulation studies (92). 
Tarn and Zaborsky's (66) method of bounding .the Kalman gain matrix 
is based upon increasing the prediction error covariance matrix 
P(k/k-1) indirectly by exponentially increasing the measurement noise 
covariance matrix of old observations. If k is the current iteration 
and n is the iteration at which the measurement noise occurred, then the 
authors set the noise covariance matrix to be: 
where s (:: 1) is an a priori parameter chosen by the designer. This 
technique has the effect of escalating exponentially with time the co-
variance matrix of each past observation, thus making past observations 
have less effect upon current state estimates and the prediction error 
covariance matrix becomes: 
P(lt!k-1) = s A (k,k-1) P(k-1/k-1) AT(k,k_l) + I(k-l) Q(k-1)IT(k_1) 
This filter has become known as the exponential Kalman filter. Although 
this idea is computationally simple and attractive, examples have shown 
that the performance of the modified filter may be quite senSitive to 
the choice of s, and may even be unstable (65). 
using the same philosophy as Tarn and zaborsky, Jazwinski (57) 
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developed limited memory filtering which is based upon the fact that 
if the assumed system model correSponds to the true system only over a 
limited period of time, the processing of observations older than the 
recent past by the Kalman filter will lead to unacceptable state esti-
mation errors. Thus limited memory filtering means discarding the 
conditioning of the estimate on the distant past. Jazwinski approached 
the problem from a probabilistic viewpoint and derived a limited memory 
filter which requires two Kalman filters and a predictor for its imple-
mentation. However the resulting estimator is not necessarily stable 
and requireS excessive computer storage, and so Jazwinski proposed that 
the conditioning of the state estimate on old data should be discarded 
in batches of N. The resulting limited memory filter produces esti-
mates with memory varying between Nand 2N. Simula tions (57) have 
shown that this filter is stable and produces less estimation error 
than the extended Kalman filter when the latter diverges. However 
there appears to be no general rule for selecting the memory length N, 
and there is no reported work on the sensitivity of·the limited memory 
filter to the choice of N. 
Crump (93) has also developed a limited memory filter which he 
terms an augmented memory estimator. However, the same problem of memory 
length selection is exhibited. 
Several researchers have attempted to limit Kalman filter divergence 
by analySing the innovation sequence. . In general the basic idea behind 
the developed techniques is to make the innovations generated from the 
actual filter consistent with their theoretical covariances. The 
innovation sequence was defined in section 3.4 and has a theoretical co-
variance matrix of: 
E(Y. (k) y'T(k» = S(k) = H(k) P(k/k-1) HT(k) + R(k) 
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Using actual data Coggan and Wilson (73) estimated this matrix On-
line by uSing a first order exponential filter: 
Z(k+1) = aZ(k) + (1 -a) l! (k+1) Y. T(k+1) 
They compared this estimated covariance matrix Z(k+1) with the theore-
tieal matrix S (k41) genera ted from the Kalman filter and replaced s .. 
~~ 
(k+1) by z .. (k+1) if z.fk+1) > s .. (k+1). Having made this substi-
II il II 
tution they modified P(k+1/k) to achieve consistency. This has the 
effect of increasing the Kalman gain K(k+l) and bringing the actual 
covariance of y'(k) closer to the theoretical. Although Coggan and 
Wilson illustrated their technique by a series of simulations there are 
no results regarding the sensitivity of the method to the choice of a 
Quigley (94) suggested that the quality of the Kalman filter may 
be assessed by examining a scalar figure of merit given by: 
J(k) ='l(k) (H(k) P(k/k-1) HT (k»-l y'(k) 
If this performance criterion does not lie within a predetermined inter-
val J min< J < Jmax' the filter is deemed unsatisfactory and the plant 
noise matrix Q is increased by a fixed amount Q*, thereby increasing 
the Kalman gain. To use this technique the designer must specify 
* Jmin , J max and Q, which are determined by simulation studies, 
although Quigley suggested that J
min = 1 and Jmax = 5 are adequate. 
Another technique which attempts to prevent filter divergence by 
examining the innovation sequence has been proposed by Sriyananda (95). 
He suggested calculating the scalar quantity y'T(k) ~ (k) and determin-
ing if this is less than three times the trace of the matrix 
(H(k) P(k/k-1) HT(k) + R (k». If this test is not satisfied, then 
filter divergence is suspected and the Kalman gain is frozen at its 
/ current value, while the updating of P(k/k-1) is limited to incrementing 
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, it by Q after each new measurement. This procedure causes P{k/k-1} 
to increase and continues until the performance criterion is satisfied. 
At this stage P(k/k-1) is large and so the Kalman gain would increase, 
thus exhibiting some features of limited memory filtering. 
In concluSion, it may be said that these boWlding techniques for 
improving Kalman filter performance rely upon extenSive canputer simu-
lations. Each of the proposed techniques incorporates one or more 
"tuning" parameters which are chosen by the designer, and thus in prac-
tice, the improvement of filter performance becomes a compromise 
between the time available for filter "optimisation" and the acceptable 
accuracy of the state estimate ~(k/k). However, to date, it is these 
bounding techniques which have found application in the chemical 
engineering state estimation problems reviewed (65), (68), (70), (71), 
(81). 
3.7.2 'Adaptive estimation 
Adaptive estimation schemes attempt to improve Kalman filter per-
formance (or prevent divergence) by obtaining recurSive state estimates 
in the preSence of unknown or inexactly known system information in 
real time, thereby eliminating the need for an after the fact assessment 
of filter performance as in the bounding techniques. &lch estimation 
schemes invariably produce a non-linear filter which requireS extensive 
computations, and so in order to implement the schemes in real time 
suboptimal estimators have been developed. 
Magill (96) investigated the optimal estimation problem when 
certain of the system parameters are unknown. He represented the 
unknown parameters as a vector ~ and assumed that possible values of 
a form a finite set of possible stochastic processes fa., i=l. •••• N}, 
- \!!.~ 
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with a known a priori probability of each process occurring p<!.). 
By using a Bayesian approach to condition the probability of a. 
-1 
occurring on the measurements Y(k) , Magill obtained the optimal state 
estimate !(k/k) as the weighted sum of N Kalman filters, one for 
each process a .• 
--:L 
Sims et a1. (97) have presented computational algorithms for 
solving Magill's problem, while Smith (98) has obtained a suboptimal 
estimator for the method. However in practice it seems doubtful that 
this Bayesian approach would be useful, due to the inordinate computa-
tional burden as well as the difficulty of specifying a suitable a 
priori probability density function for the vector ~. 
If the probability density functions for the system uncertainties 
are unknown, then adaptive estimation can be accOOlplished using a 
maximum likelihood teChnique, which is based upon the philosophy that 
the most likely valum of the unknown paraJ1!eters are those which make 
the probability of their occurrence the greatest, given the measure-
ments Y(k). 
Abramson (99) obtained an optimal state estimator when the statis-
tics of the measurement and plant noise are diagonal and time invariant. 
When no a priori infonnation is available for the noise covariance 
values, a reaximum likelihood approach was used, but when an a priori 
density function is available a maximum a posteriori teChnique was used. 
the resulting likelihood equations are non-linear and there is no 
general closed form of solution. To overcome this problem. a sub-
optimal estimation procedure was introduced by Abramson. However, 
numericalsimulations have shown that if the a priori values of Q and 
R are Significantly in error, biased state estimates will result. 
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Abramson alBo suggested methods by which hiB work may be extended to 
cover non-diagonal, time varying covariance matrices. 
Shellenbarger (1.00) also used a marimum likelihood approach to 
ottain a suboptimal filter for the case of unknown measurement noiBe 
statiBtics. However, for the case of unknown Q his technique is 
limited by the fact that H(k) iB constrained to have more rows than. 
columns. 
Another approach using the maximum likelihood method has been 
given by Sage and Wakefield (101). They simultaneously estimated the 
system state (including augmented unknown system parameters) and the 
Kalman gain for a system characterised by a scalar measurement y(k) and 
random time varying plant noise covariance matrix Q(k). To overcome 
the problem of specifying a probability density function for the 
unknown parameter vector ~ (k) the authors assumed that !i(k) was 
the vector ~ (k) to be estimated and that !i(k) evolved from a Markov 
process according to: 
!i (K+1) = U(k) !i(k) + ~(k) 
where U(k) is an nxn transition matrix and \l(k) iB a Gau.Ssian white 
noise sequence with a known nxn covariance matrix V . 
e 
This formulation 
with the maximum likelihood approach leads to a non-linear two point 
boundary value problem which is solved to yield an algorithm for estima-
ting the Kalman gain and the system state. The resulting adaptive 
estimator requires only one Kalman filter and iB sequential and therefore 
may be used in real time applications. However the method assumes 
that the matrices U(k) and Ve are known or, more likely, are chosen by . 
simulation. The authors do comment that the perfonnance of the method 
iB not critically dependent upon the preciBe values of these matrices 
although no indication of the solution sensitivity is given. 
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The properties of the innovation sequence have been uSed to derive 
ar. adaptive Kalman filter. jazwinski (102) has derived an algorithm 
which may be used for simultan.eous state ar.d plant noise covariance 
matrix estimation of a linear system. His approach is to approximate 
modelling errors by a Gaussian white noise input, whose covariance Q, 
a diagonal matrix, is determined to satisfy a requirement that the 
filter residuals be consistent with their statistics. Short sequences 
of residuals are used in t.lte estimation of Q, thus the estimator never 
learns Q. 
Assuming a scalar measurement system and Q = qI, the predicted 
residual is defined as: 
r(k+l) = y(k+l) - E (y(k+l)/Y(k» 
Using the constraint: 
r 2(k+l) = E (r2(k+l» 
1> 0 
1=1,2 ••. n 
which makes the residual value most probable, jazwinski derived the 
single reSidual, i.e. 1 = 1, or innovation estimate of Q(k). 
To overcome the problem of the estimate of Q(k) having little 
statistical significance, jazwinski proposed replacing the one pre-
dicted residual by N predicted residuals 
N 1 
M = -NI L r(k+l)/R2(k+l) 
r 1=1 
The estimate of Q(k) becomes: 
" M2 _ E(M2 /Q(k) = 0) QN(k) = r r 
S 
if positive 
= 0 ; otherwise 
where S is a nonnalising parameter derived in the algorithm. 
To improve the convergence of QN(k) jazwinski used a smoothed 
estimate of the form: 
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k 
L ; if positive ! j i=k-j+1 
= 0 ; otherwise 
The more general problem when Q is a q x q diagonal matrix has 
also been examined by Jazwi.nski while Tompretini (88) extended the method 
to include the situation when the System is characterised by a vector 
of observations. In his paper Jazwi.nski presented several simulations 
to illustrate his technique however the procedure for selecting the 
averaging interval N and the smoothing interval j has not been developed 
for the general case. 
Another approach to adaptive est:iJDation which relies upon an analy-
sis of the innovation sequence has been formulated by Mehra (87). This 
author considered a completely controllable and observable system 
described by linear time invariant models to which steady state Kalman 
filtering was applied. The time domain properties of a white noise 
sequence are used to generate a test of opt:iJDality of the filter, and 
this test also serves as a baSis for obtaining a solution to the adap-
tive filtering problem. Although the primary objective of Mehra's 
work was to identify Q and R, he Showed that it was possible to achieve 
filter adaptation without formally evaluating these matrices by directly 
est:iJDating the optimal steady state Kalman gain. 
Mehra's technique was based upon the correlation properties of the 
innovation sequence and his method is discussed in detail in Appendix lll. 
Since Mehra published his work on the innovation correlation tech-
nique of filter adaptation several authors have extended his ideas. 
Car ew and Belanger (103) and Neethling and Young (104) used Mehra' s 
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basic technique but have proposed alternative algorithms for the direct 
estimation of the op:timal Kalman gain. 
Belanger (105) has also presented an innovation correlation method 
which extends Mehra's work to the general t:ime varying stochastic 
process. 
Godbole (106), (107) addressed the problem where the noise sequences 
are correlated and have unknown non-zero mean, i.e. 
E~(k» = t!w 
E~(k» = I:!:.v 
E<.!!(k) !.T (j» = S 5 (k,j) 
Godbole showed that Mehra's method can be used to handle this situation 
if the innovation sequence is defined as: 
~(k) 
and h!: 
-V 
= V(k) - I,! 
- --V 
1 N 
= N [ y... (i) 
i=1 
This idea was demonstrated by Godbole (82) with the appllcation of the 
Kalman filter for estimating the non-measurable variables of a nuclear 
pool-type reactor uSing noisy measurements of a few variables. He 
aSSumed that the noise sequences had zero mean but were correlated. 
using Mehra' s modified technique Godbole estimated Q, R, and Sand 
found that these were conSistent for different initial a priori guesses. 
The innovation sequence white noise test of optimality corresponding to 
"A I'. Q, Rand;) revealed 28% violations of the 9S% confidence limits indica-
ting the resulting filter was not optimal. Godbole suggested that 
this non-optimality may be due to process model errors or to w(k) and 
v(k) being non-stationary or non-white as assumed. 
- . 
However, other 
sources of error may be due to the fact that Godbole does not refine 
his estimates of Q, ft and S by further data processing as originally 
recommended by Mehra and also the sample interval for the example is 
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0.2 second, which is rather large compared to the process time constants 
of 0.354 and 0.686 second. 
3.8 An overview of Kalman filtering in uncertain systems 
A nwnber of methods have been presented leading to adaptive correc-
tion of Kalman filters, which because of inexact knowledge <if the system 
characteristics, are not ope·ra ting in an optimal manner. 
The bOWlding techniques of filter adaptation provide intuitively 
appealing methods of improving filter perfonnance. In general these 
techniques are easy to Wlderstand, are applicable to both linear and non-
linear problems, are simple to implement and do not involve the designer 
in extensive computer programming. 
Balanced against these features are the facts that in general each 
bOWlding technique incorporates a "tWling" parameter which adapts the 
filter and which must be selected by the deSigner. This parameter is 
usually chosen by a trial and error search procedure which terminates 
when acceptable Kalman filter perfonnance is achieved. Nonnally this 
search technique will involve the deSigner in extensive time conSuming 
computer simula tions • 
Despite these apparent disadvantageS of the bOWlding techniques, 
to date, es~ecially in chemical engineering applications of Kalman 
, 
filtering, the methods have been USed with considerable success in many 
cases to achieve improved filter performance. However the reported 
applications of the techniques give no indication of the time taken to 
determine the "optimal" tWling parameters or the criterion USed to 
aSSeSS the quality of the Kalman filter. Most probably slich decisions 
tend to be subjective. 
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To overcome the disadvantages of the bounding techniques the con-
cept of adaptive estimation was introduced. The objectives of the 
adaptive estimators are to estimate the system state _in real time, 
rather than rely on an after the fact analysis of filter performance. 
In general the adaptive estimators are characterised by non-linear 
filtering solutions which require extensive computer storage and compu-
ta tion time. 
Both the Bayes:ian and maximwn likelihood adaptive estimators 
suffer because of the inordinate effort needed to implement them on a 
computer, and it is doubtful whether they are practical propositions for 
solving the uncertainty problem. 
Two adaptive estimators have been reviewed which rely upon infonna-
tion contained in the sequence of residuals. In each method the resi-
duals are first tested to detennine if the Kalman filter operation is 
satisfactory. If it is found that the filter performance is inadequate, 
the filter is adapted uSing estimates of the statistics of the residuals. 
In Jazwfnski's approach, N-step predicted residuals (N> 1) -are used 
whereas one step predicted residuals (i.e. the innovation sequence) are 
used in Mehra's method. 
The modelling asswned in each method dictates the problem class for 
which each method is applicable. Mehra's technique is restricted to 
problems where the system is completely controllable and observable and 
is described by linear time-invar:ian t models. In addition, -the testing 
scheme and subsequent parameter identification are intended for steady 
state Kalman filtering. This may limit the application of the method 
to a great many on-line control problems where a time varying filter is 
required. The formulation considered by Jazwinski allows for time vary-
ing dynamics and measurementS. The differences in the two methodS are 
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reflected in the residual testing schemes. Only Jazwinski's tech-
nique can be used for testing based on one residual. The more resi-
duals that are tested, the longer the time delay in the filter and to 
a certain extent the application will dictate the number of residuals 
tested. In Mehra' s method, a large sample size is required to 
estimate the statistics of the residuals. The large sample size is 
necessitated by the confidence limit nature of the test criterion. 
In conclUSion, the literature to date provides numerous techniques 
for handling the Kalman filtering with uncertainty problem. However, 
at this point there is little reported work of practical application 
of these techniques and the relative advantages and disadvantages of 
the various methods are not well known. It would appear that the time 
is right for a comparative study to be perfonned so that some light may 
be shed on this matter. 
3.9 The detection of malfunction using a Kalman filter 
Mehra and Peschon (108) have presented a general approach to mal-
function detection. They represent the system by linear time invariant 
models with zero mean GaUSsian white noise plant and measurement 
sequences, as given in section 3.4. The matrices A, B, r, H, Q and R 
are assumed to be known or are identified (87) and a Kalman filter is 
used to process the system measurements to yield the innovation sequence 
~ (k). Now as discussed in section 3.6.2, a Kallllan filter which uses 
the correct system model and noise statistics generates a zero mean 
Gaussian white noise innovation sequence with a covariance matrix given 
by equation (3.6.2.4). Mehra and Peschon suggest that different mal-
functions in the system cause the innovation sequence to depart from 
its zero mean, known theoretical covariance and whiteness properties, 
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and so the problem of malftmction detection is fonnulated as a problem 
in hypothesis testing. The normal operation of the system (Le. the 
"optjmal" innovation sequence) is regarded as the null hypothesis and 
the actual innovation generated bY, the Kalman filter is tested against 
this hypothesis (Le. zero mean, known theoretical covariAnce, white-
. ness) at a certain level of significance. 
If a particular hypothesis is rejected, then malftmction is sus-
pected. However, there appears to be no systematic method of diagnos-
ing the fault although Mehra and Peschon suggest that special system 
characteristics can often be used to aid diagnostic procedures. 
A technique which has been widely USed to estimate unknown or 
uncertain parameters may be adapted as a malfunction detection method 
(57). 
A system containing uncertain parameters may be modelled as: 
2!:(k+1) = A(k+1,k) 2!:(k) + '\ (k+1,k) .!:! + B (k) ~(k) + r<k) .!!(k) 
(3.9.1) 
;r(k) = H(k) 2!: (k) + ~(k) £ + v(k) 
The statistics of the noise sequences {.!!(k)} and {y(k)} are assumed 
to be known and have been defined in section 3.4, while the a priori 
statistics of the unknown parameters b and £ are specified as: 
E <.!:!) = 2 E (£) = 2 
E (.!:! ~ T) = L E <£ £ T) = M 
It is assumed that .!:!, £ 2!:(O), {.!!(k)} and {y (k)} are uncorrelated. 
Now by regarding the constant parameters as the outputs of the 
dynamic systems: 
.!:!(k+1) = .!:!(k) 
£(k+1) = £(k) 
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then an augmented state variAble model may be defined as: 
and 
;r(k) = [ H(k) o 
l ~ (k)] ~ (k) .£ (k) 
+ v(k) 
!!.(k) 
The linear Kalman filter of section· 3.4 may be applied directly to 
this "new" system and generates state estimates: 
1 (k/k) = [~(k/k)] 
. ~ (k/k) 
e (kjk) 
Although straightforward in theory this method has several dis-
advantages. . Primarily if the system model of equations (3.9.1) and 
(3.9.2) is assumed t:ime invariant and ccmpletely controllable and 
observable then the Kalman filter is guaranteed to be stable and con-
vergent (46). However, by inspection, the augmented system (t:ime 
invariant) of equations (3.9.3) and (3.9.4) is no longer controllable 
and observable, thereby invalidating these filter convergence properties, 
although the controllability constraint may be satisfied by assuming: 
~(kH) = ~(k) + ~b(k) 
.£(k+1) = .£(k) + .!!c (k) 
The vectors ~b(k) and .!!c(k) are assumed to be uncorrelAted zero mean 
Gaussian noise sequences as usual with statistics: 
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E (~b(k) ~bT (j» = Qb(k) 5 (k,j) 
E ~ (k» = Q 
E (w (k) w T (k» = Q (k) 5 (k,j) 
'.::.c -c c 
A paramount drawback of this method arises in the increase in a priori 
information necessary from the designer. In addition to the usual 
information the user has to additionally specify: 
£ (0) 
£(0) 
Pb(ojo) 
Pc(OjO) 
Qb(O) 
Qc(O) 
In view of the camnents made in the previous sections concerning Kalman 
filtering in Wlcertain systems it would seem likely that this method of 
parameter estimation would involve extensive computer s:imulation. 
Another disadvantage of this state augmentation technique" is that 
the addition of unknown parameters to the state vector increases the 
computational load and this is not always desirable. 
To overcome this latter problem Friedland (109)" has furnished a 
ccmputationally attractive algorithm. This technique involved parti-
tioning the computational effort into two essentially diSjoint tasks, 
one part is the standard Kalman filter which oalculates the state 
estimate ~(k/k) while the other part is an algorithm to generate the 
estimate of the unknown parameter vector <!(k/k) '£(k/k»T. This idea 
is presented in scme detail in Appendix IV. 
However, in spite of these apparent difficulties, Goldmann and" 
Sargent (65) successfully used the state augmentation technique to 
detect bias and drift in particular process instruments by considering 
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a steady state mass and heat balance around a binary distillation 
column. 
Their formulation asswned that the plant matrix A(k+l,k) was the 
identity matrix and there were no process disturbances, Le. Q = O. 
using a simulation study they demonstrated that the filter perfonnance 
was relatively insensitive to the a priori information p(ojO) and R. 
However, the results presented to illustrate the detectiOn of instrwnent 
errors are based upon the "optimum" values of P(ojO) and R, i.e. those 
values chosen to give the best filter perfonnance. 
More recently lBvis (112) considered the problem of state estima-
tion in the presence of a fault which occurs randomly. The result of 
the fault is to cause a plant parameter to change from a
o 
to al' By 
applying non-linear filtering he derives a filter which optima11y 
estimates the state and the time of fault occurrence, however the 
resulting equations have no closed fonn. This problem is overcome by 
basing a suboptimal estimation scheme on the Kalman filter. 
3.10 Statement of malfunction detection technique and objectives 
'!he review of Kalman filtering has revealed that the problem of 
uncertain a priori system models and/or statistical infonnation is of 
paramount importance and several studies were examined which attempted 
to solve this problem in a variety of ways. 
The question of malfunction detection has been solved in two ways. 
The first technique of inn ova tion hypothesis testing is limited by the 
fact that little or no diagnostic infonnation is obtained, while the 
state augmentation technique only seems to compound the uncertainty 
problem due to the additional a priori infonnation needed for its 
implementation. 
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However, under the assumption of a linear, time invariant, can-
pletely controllable and observable system, many of these problems may 
be eliminated by combining Mehra I S and Friedland' s algorithms. 
Recall that Friedland decomposed the state augmentation method of 
malfunction detection into two tasks. The first was the solution of 
the basic Kalman filter algoritbm - the innovations from which were 
used in a "bias" estimator to detennine the sys~ unknown parameters 
or malfunction. ThiS secondary or ''bias'' filter needs ,the folloWing 
a priori information: 
R 
Now an examination of Mehra IS algoritbm, which may be used to 
handle the uncertainty in implementing the primary Kalman filter, 
Il AT 
reveals that estimates of I{ and PH are calcuJa ted as a natural 
feature of the technique. 
Thus the only uncertainty remaining in implementing Friedlandls 
algoritbm, is Pb(o/O) which has to be chosen by the designer. 
The canbina tion of algoritbms is shown schema tically in Figure 3.3 
which outlines the malfunction detection algoritbm proposed in this 
study. 
In stage 1 an arbitrary a priori data set is chosen for x(O), 
P(O/O), Q and R and the usual Kalman filter, defined in equations 
(3.4.3) to (3.4.7), is used to analyse the process measurements Z(k). 
When the Kalman gain reaches its steady state value K/B' as guaranteed 
by the constraints that the system model is linear and controllable and 
observable, then a large sample of innovations is stored. 
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~(o), p(%), Q, R 
Stage 1 
Stage 2 
;r(k) 
1\ 
K
opt Kalman filter 
Kalman filter 
Y (k) 
Mehra's innovation 
correlation algorithm 
V (k) 
-
A 
R 
~T Friedland's bias 
Pb(o/ ) estimator 
g(k/k) ~(k/k) 
State adjustment 
K(k/k) 
Stage 3 .. 
FIGURE 3.3 Implementation of malfunction detection algorithm. 
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Stage 2 of the algorithm uses the stored innovation sequence and 
Kss in Mehrals adaptive estimator. Mehra Is method tests the innova-
tion sequence for whiteness. If this criterion is not met, the 
algorithm iterates on Kss 
gain Kopt' as well as ft 
to yield an estimate of the opt1ma1 Kalman 
AT 
and PH (p = P(k/k-l)ss)' At the end of 
stage 2 the Kalman filter has been adapted to· cope with the initial 
uncertainty and thus can be used to generate "opt1maI" state estimates 
i(k/k). 
The adapted Kalman filter is combined with Friedlandls bias esti-
mator in stage 3. The Kalman filter produces state estimates as usual, 
and the innovation sequence is used as an input to FriedJandls filter 
which estimates the bias caused by malfunction or chaD.ging system model 
parameters. Finally, the Kalman state est:imate S;(k/k) and the bias 
estimate. ~(k/k) may be combined to yield a true optimal state est:imate 
~'(k/k). 
This Figure underlines the robustness of the proposed malfunction 
detection algorithm to the selection of a priori infonnation.· 
Section 3.3 discussed how control loop security may be monitored 
by e:xamining the relationShip between the measured process variable and 
the control valve demand signal at a particular setpoint a.nd load, while 
the above development has shown how biaseS in a mathemat~l ·model may 
be est:imated in real time. It only remains therefore to translate the 
suggestions in section 3.3 into an appropriate mathematical formulation 
for use in ,the algorithm developed above. 
llie first stage is to represent the control loop by a. linear time 
invariant state space mOdel, which may be derived using standard tech-
niques to be of the form: . 
x (kl-1) = A x (k) + r.!! (k) 
l (k) = H x (k) + Y (k) . (3.10.1) 
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3.10.1 Malfunction detection model formulation for a conventional 
analogue setpoint control loop 
To implement the ideas discussed in section 3.3 it is assumed that 
the proceSs measurement vector Z(k) is canposed of the control loop 
measured variable B = Yl and the valve stem position measurement Y2• 
Thus 
[
Yl (k)] = 
Y2 (k) 
H x (k) + :! (k) 
Now as mentioned in section 3.3 there are two types of error to 
consider, pure measurement errors and "internal" loop faults. 
The pure measurement errors may be represented by bias teImS b1 (k) 
and b2(k), since each observation is subject to such errors, and so the 
observa tion model becomes 
[Y, (k)] " [H 1 :] .: (k) + v (k) (3.10.1.1) -------Y2 (k) 0 b1 (k) 
b2(k) 
The second type of error is the loop error which caused a dev:iation, 
denoted by b3(k), fran the noodnal valve stan position measurement Y2(k) 
for the same apparent process measurement Y1 (k) and this may be repre-
sented as: 
[ 
Yl (k)] = [ H 
Y2 (k) 
+ :! (k) . (3.10.1.2) 
Since the b:iJlses b2(k) and b3 (k) are indistinguishable, the 
equationS (3.10.1.1) and (3.10.1.2) may be combined to yield; 
1 Z (k) = r o x b1(k) 
b2(k) 
+ :! (k) 
where b1 (k) represents the dev:ia tion of Y1 (k) from its nominal value 
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due to a p/I transmitter error and b2(k) represents a pure valve stem 
position measurement error as well as loop errors. 
Now ~(k) is considered to be constant and is treated as an 
additional state vector to be estimated. The original state space 
mOdel of equation (3.10.1) is therefore allgJllented by ~(k) to give: 
[t~:~;] -[:---i-~--H~;{~j + f-~r (k) 
(3.10.1.3) b2(~1) 0 I I b2(k) 
;r(k) = [H 1 :] x (k) v (k) + 0 b1 (k) 
b2(k) 
This equation (3.10.1.3) is now in the required fonn for use in the 
proposed malfunction detection algorithm. The vector ~(k), in the 
context of malfunction detection, is termed a loop security vector can-
prising two loop security parameters (1.s.p l s.). 
3.10.2 Malfunction detection model formulation for a 
direct digital control loop 
In this control loop there are no pure measurement errors and all 
of the system malfunctions cause a deviation in the valve demand signal 
from the expected value at the given setpoint and load. 
To implement the malfunction check suggested in section 3'.3, the 
process computer requires measurements of the process variable and the 
valve demand signal, but these measurements are basic to the d.d.c. 
algorithm and so nO additional process instrumentation is necessary. 
The deviation in control valve demand signal is represented by 
b(k), which is termed a loop security parameter (l.s.p.). using a 
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similar approach to that adopted above, the state variable representa-
tion of the augmented system is: 
w (k) 
(3.10.2.1) 
;r(k) 0] ~~~~D 
1 tb(k~ 
+ .!(k) 
The proposed malfunction detection algorithm may now be applied directly 
" to this set of equations to estimate b(k) fran the process measurement 
vector ;r(k). 
The ideas developed up to this point have not mentioned any parti-
cular dynamic system or control loop other than the constraint that the 
system be linear, time invariant and completely COritrollable and obser--
vable. To demonstrate that the ideas suggested above may be used to 
detect malfunction in a control loop during normal proceSS operation, • 
laboratory level control rig was built as a vehicle for experimentation. 
The objectives of the experimental work described below were: 
i) TO investigate Kalman filtering on a practical apparatus when the 
a priori information is subject to uncertainty; 
ii) Tb investigate the feasibility and robustness of Mehra's innovation 
correlation method of filter adaptation; 
iii) . To investigate the feasibility of detecting and diagnosing mal-
function in analogue and direct digital control loops using the 
algorithm presented above. 
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3.11 Experimental apparatus 
The laboratory level control rig is shown schematically in 
Figure 3.4. The circulatfug fluid was water and the ma:in components 
are sUJllJllarised below. 
i) Pipework. 
'Dle pipework was fabricated from 1.905 cm (~ inch) I.D. rigid 
P.v.c. 
ii) Control Valves. 
Both control valves were manufactured by the Taylor Instruments 
Company. The valves were direct acting needle types with 0.635 cm 
(i inch) trimS in 1.27 cm (! inch) bodies and had a valve stem 
travel of 1.905 cm (~ inch). 
iii) Level Measurement. 
'Dle primary measurement of level in the hold-up tank was made using 
a pressure difference/pressure transmitter by measuring the differ-
ence in pressure between atmospheric and the tank height plus 
atmospheric. 
iv) Instrumentation. 
The locations of the measurement instruments ·are shown in Figure 
3.4, and Table 3.1 details. their functionS. 
The rig operated by water flOwing frcm the mains supply via an 
orifice plate, control valve and rotameter into a hold-up tank.· The 
outlet flow from this tank split into two streams: one flow passed 
through a fixed restriction to a drain, while the second flow passed 
through a control valve to drain. Although two control loops are 
shown in Figure 3.4, the primary task of the experimental rig was level 
control. The object of this control system was to maintain a constant 
flow through the fixed restriction to drain despite inlet water flowrate 
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Process 
canputer 
-,--------------- ----
Setpoint: 
L 
-------~-------- -,-
• 
• • ~10) : 
· . ~-- C2 -. 
:2 
, 
FIGURE 3.4 Exper:imental level control rig. 
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---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Instrument Instnunent Maker 
; 
Input Output 
fl PI fl pip transmitter Taylor 2 Zo7-103.4 kN/m2 0-7.47 kN/m 
Instruments (0-30 in. W.G.) (3-15 p.s .i.g.) 
fl P2 fl pip transmitter 0-4.98 kN/m2 ~O. 7-103.4 kN/m2 (0-20 in.W.G.) (3-15 p.s.i.g.) 
Cl p/l transmitter ZO.7-103.4 kN/m 
(3-15 p.s.i.g.) 
~ 
5 - 10 V 
C2 lip transmitter o - 10 V ~0.7-103.4 kN/m2 
(3- 15 p.s.i.g. 
C3 lip transmitter 0-10 V 2 . 20.7-103.4 kN/m 
(3-15 p.s.i.g.) 
~} proportional + 2f.z( 2 20.7-103.4 kN/m 0.7-103.4 kN/m integral control- (3 - 15 p.s.i.g.) (3-15 p.s.i.g. 
ler 
Xl Linear Penny and 0- 1.905 cm 4-7V 
potentianeter Giles 
TABLE 3.1 Instrumentation of laboratory level control rig. 
disturbances. This was achieved by adjusting the second flowra te through. 
the control valve so that a conStant height was kept in the tank, thereby 
ensuring a constant flow through the fixed restriction. 
The experimental rig was designed to employ two modes of control. 
With isolation valve 1 open and 2 closed, conventional analogue control 
, using pneumatic hardware was used to control the rig. However~ with 
isolation valve 1 cloSed and 2 open, a PDP 11-20 proces~ canputer could 
be used to control the system. 
In all the experiments perfonned disturbances were introduced into 
the inlet water flowrate by using the process canputer to alter the set-
point of the secondary flow control loop. 
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3 .11.1 Ma thema tical model of experimental level control rig 
The first step inKalman filtering is the determination of a state 
variable system model. Initially a dynamic model representing the 
level control loop will· be derived (56). The nomenclature describing 
the process flowrates is shown in Figure 3.4. An IDlsteady material 
balance for the tank yields. 
A: = <l:i - 'lol- 'lo2 (3.11.1.1 ) 
where h = the he~t of fluid in the tank •. 
A = cross-sectional area of the tank. 
Deviation variables are introduced into the analysis at this point so 
that a linear transfer function may be derived. Initially, the process 
is operating at steady state, and so : = 0, thus equation (3.11.1.1) 
may be written as: 
dh
ss 
. 
A-=O=q a a dt. :iBs - -ol,ss - -o2,ss (3.11.1.2) 
~ere the subscript ss has been used to indicate the steady state 
value of the variable. 
Subtracting equation (3.11.1.2) from (3.11.1.1) gives 
A d(h-hss ) = (<l:i - <l:i ss) - ('lol - 'lol ss) ~ (q02·- q02,SS) (3.11.1.3) 
·dt ' , 
The deviation variables are defined as: 
.. H = h":' hss 
~ = ~ - ~,ss 
~l = 'lol - 'lol,ss . 
Then equation (3.11.1.3) becomes: 
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Now the outlet flow variables 'lo1 and 'lo2 may be expressed in tems 
of the tank height as follows. 
Assume the system is at steady state and the tank height is h
ss
; 
if there is now a change in level, 'lo1 may be expressed by a Taylor 
series.as 
'lo1= 0 1 + ( d 'lol.SS) (h - hs ) + ••. ~ ,ss d h . 
ss 
In tems of the deviation variables defined above this becomes: 
Q = ( d 'lol.SS) H = K H 01 d h
ss
· 01 (3.11.1.5) 
The flowrate 'lo2 is a f\mction of both the tank height h and control 
valve stem position x, and so by similar reasoning a Taylor series may 
be written for 'lo2 as: 
a = a +( ~'lo2.SS) 
. -02 -o2,ss . h x 
ss ss 
or Q . = ( i1 'lo2.SS) H +( i1'lo2.SS\ X 
02 a hss x a xss . /h 
. ss ss 
= (3.11.1.6) 
Equations (3.11.1.5) and (3.11.1.6) may be substituted into (3.11.1.4) . 
to yield: 
Now by taking Laplace transfoms and noting H(O) = 0 . equation (3.11.1.7) 
becomes 
A - \(s) (K + K s + 1) H(s) = ~-----
01 02,h (Ka1 + K02,h) 
The following replacements are made: 
A 
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K 02.x 
x(s) 
(3.11.1.8) 
--- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
KL = 
1 (3.11.1.9) 
(K01 + K~2,h) 
K 
Kv = 
o2 zx (3.11.1.10) 
(Ko1 + K02,h) 
This results :in a process transfer function of the fonn: 
ii(s) = _=-1 __ 
(1 +1p s) 
3.11.2 Process control block diagram and experimental parameter 
determination for level control loop 
A block diagram for the negative feedback level control loop is 
shown :in Figure 3.5. In fonnulating this diagram the control valve 
and measurement transmitter dynamics have been ignored 
\(s) KL 
E(S) lI(s) -(S' 
+ 1 I~ ~ Controller K2 "-- -K 1 +1 s v p 
ii (s) 
m 
Measurement 
transmitter 
Kl 
FIGURE 3.5. Block diagram for level control loop. 
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H(s) 
All of the experiments and system calibrations were perfonned with 
the proceSs operating at the steady state process conditions given in 
Table 3.2 
. Variable Steady state value 
.~ 4.95 l/min 
qo1 1.83 l/min 
~2 3.12 l/min 
h 23.25 an 
TABLE 3.2 Steady state proceSS variables for laboratory level 
control rig. 
i) Controller algorithm and constant detennination 
A proportional plus integral controller was chosen to perform the 
control task. The continuous t:ime relati9nship between the controller 
output and the error input is given by the JAplace transform (56): 
p(s) = K (1 + _1_ ) 
~(s) c lIS 
p(s) = JAplace tranSform of the controller output signal. 
E(S) = JAplace tranSform of the controller input signal 
KC = controller gain 
't I = integral t:ime 
(3.11.2.1) 
At the steady state process conditions given in Table 3.2 the 
controller constants were chosen using the method detailed in the 
Taylor !nstruments i ' pneumatic controller operation manual (113). 
184 
ii) Ko1 ; K02 •h 
The tank hei&ht was controlled automatjcally at the given steady 
state and it was noted that the controller output s~l was 51 kN/m2 
(7.4 p.s.i.g.). The controller was switched to manual control but 
the same output signal was maintained, thereby ensuring the control 
valve position Was \Dlllltered. Now by altering the tank inlet flowrate 
~ , the steady state tank hei&ht hss varied and the corresponding 
steady state flowrates <101 and <102 were measured. 
Graphs of <101 and <102 versus the tank hei&ht are shown in 
Figures 3.6 and 3.7. The constants Ko1 and K02,h are detennined by 
measuring the slopes of these graphs respectively • 
... ) K 
l.J.1 02.x 
"nle flow <101 was set to zero by closing the manual hand valve in 
the outlet pipe. The level was then controlled at the steady state 
hei&ht given in Table 3.2. The inlet flowrate q. was adjusted, and 
, 1 
the process allowed to achieve steady state so that ~ = <102. Now 
by recording the control valve stem position a calibration of <102 
versus stem position was achieved at the specified steady state. 
This control valve characteristic is shown in Figure 3.8 and K 2 
, 0 ,x 
is detennined from the slope when <102 = 3.12 l/min corresponding to 
the selected steady state process conditions. 
iv) ! . 
The hold-up 'tank cross-sectional area was measured directly. 
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'lo1 
l/udn 
'lo2 
l/udn 
1.9 
• 
1.85 
• 
1.8 • 
15 20 
FIGURE 3.6 Exper:iJnental deteI'llli.n&tion of Ko1 
3.4 
3.0 
15 
FIGURE 3.7 
• 
• 
20 
Experimental determination of K 
o2,h 
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• 
• 
• 
25 30 
h cm 
• 
• 
• 
25 30 
hem 
'lo2 
l/min 
5.0 
3.0 
2.0 
1.0 
.0 
, 
• 
5.0 6.0 
valve stem position 
x,V 
FIGURE 3.8 Level control valve characteristic. 
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• 
• 
lhe constants derived above may be substituted into equations 
(3.11.1.8) - (3.11.1.10) to yield the process transfer coefficients. 
The constant ~ describes the gain of the tank height measur&-
ment transmitter Il Pl in Figure 3.4, and is detennined by direct 
calibration on the process. 
To ensure consistency of the process variables aroWld the loop in 
Figure 3.5, a gain tenn, KZ' relating the controller output in kN/mZ 
(p. s.i.g.) to the control valve stem positiOn in volts is required. 
This characteristic is shown in Figure 3.9. 
The coefficient KJ describes the gain of pll transmitter, Cl, in 
Figure. 3 .4. Actually in the experimental rig an amplifier was used to 
magnify the pll transmitter output signal and so K3 is composed of 
two terms K31 and K3Z (K3 = K31 x K3Z)' which were found by direct 
calibration on the experimental rig .. 
K4 characterises the gain of the lip transmitter. Cz in Figure 
3.4, which was determined by direct calibration. 
The numerical values of these parameters are summarised in Table 
3.3. 
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Valve 
stem 
position 
x 
V 
7 
6 
5 
4 
ZO.7 
3 
controller output 
FIGURE 3.9 Experimental determination of KZ' 
189 
103'.4 kN/mZ, 
15 p.s.i.g. 
Variable 
K o2,x 
A 
Kv 
KL 
Lp 
K1 
K2 
K31 
K32 
K3 
K4 
TABLE 3.3. 
Numerical value 
2 p.s.i.g./p.s.i.g. analogue setpoint control 
1 V/V 
0.2917 min 
7.2 cm3/min.cm. 
34.78 cm3/min.cm. 
1lS6.0 cm3/min. V 
280 cm2 
27.46 cm/V 
0.024 min.cm/cm3 
6.65 min. 
0.1730 p.s.i.gJcm. 
- 0.3 V/p.s .i.g. 
0.388 V/p.s.i.g. 
9.4 V/V 
3.65 V/P.s.i.g. 
1.36 p.s.i.g./V 
n 
" " 
d.d.c. 
" 
Numerical values of parameters in level control loop. 
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3.12 State variable model formulation 
The fundamental block diagram of the level control system was 
. given in Figure 3.5. The diagram may be redrawn into a more amenable 
form from which a state variable model may be written directly. 
3.12;1 Analogue setpoint control 
The pnewnatic level controller uSed in these experiments was of a 
proportional plus integral type. The transfer function of such a 
controller, when there is no deviation in loop SlltpOint is (56): 
~ = _ K (1 + _1_ ) 
iI (s) c "[IS 
m 
where P(s) is the lJlplace transform of the· controller output. 
This transfer function may be combined with Figure 3.5 to give 
Figure 3.1Oa which represents the loop in the time domain. Figure 
3.10b is a rearrangement of Figure 3 • lOa . 
Now the state variables are defined as the output of the integra-
tors and so by inspection the state variable continuous time dynamic 
model is: 
with x1(t) = f H{t) 
x 2(t) = H (t) 
The process measurements are: 
Yl = tank height (V) 
Y2 = control valve stem position (V) 
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~(t) 
-K v. 
-K 
v 
Y2 .••••••.• -. 
a. 
b. 
H{t) . 
>--r--X....:l;---J.= x ---1 J 
-K 
c 
FIGURE 3.10 State space representation of level analogue setIioint 
control loop. 
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H{t) 
and the observation model is 
By substituting the experimental parameters from Table 3.3, the state 
model becomes: 
! (t) = 
z(t) 
= [ 0 
0:26 
-o.~J 
0.631296J 
0.103806 
!.(t) ~(t) 
(3.12.1.1 ) 
(3.12.1.2) 
The above continuous time equations may be .written in the general 
fonn 
!(t) = F ~(t) + B u (t) (3.12.1.3 ) 
z(t) = ex (t) 
Now since this work is concerned with a digital computer sampling 
process measurements at diScrete intervals of time /:, t, the correSpond-
ing discrete time dynamic model is needed. It is well known that the 
discrete forms of equations (3.12.1.3) and (3.12.1.4) are given by (114) 
~ (k+1) = A~(k) + r.!! (k) (3.12.1.5) 
Z (k) = H !. (k) (3.12.1.6) 
where A = F /:, t (3.12.1. 7) e 
/:,t 
eFt B dt = [ (3.12.1.8) 
Equations (3.12.1.1) and (3.12.1.2) were discretised with /:'t '" 1 sec 
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according to equations (3.12.1.5) to (3.12.1.8) to yield 
[
Xl (k+1)] =[ 0.999852 
x2 (K+l) - 0.0177715 
0.0165858 ] [~(k)] 
0.990265 x 2(k) 
+r 0 ] Q. (k) 
LO.59228 X IO~4 1 
=TO 
LO.26 
3.12.2 Direct digital control 
0.631295 
0.103806 
(3.12.1.9 ) 
(3.12.1.10) 
If a process control computer is substituted for the analogue con-
troller in the block diagram shown in Figure 3.5, then since the computer 
only executes control at discrete time intervals, the closed loop system 
may be considered to be composed of discrete and continuous time elements. 
Such a closed loop system is illustrated in .Figure 3.11 
E(k 
computer 
~(t) 
Zero Order 
Hold 
Measurement 
Load 
FIGURE 3.11. Block diagram for computer control system. 
Process 
'!he sampler or ar.alogue-to-digital converter transfo:nns a continu-
ous time signal E(t) into a sampled signal E(k}, and the zero order 
hold or digital-to-analogue converter is required to maintain control 
over the system during intervals between data transfers. 
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H(t) 
---- ---- - -------------------
Discrete t:ime systems may be analysed using z transfonns (114) or 
by considering the t:ime domain solutions. '!he latter approach is 
adopted in this study. 
The t:ime ~omajn block diagram for'the computer control loop is 
shown in Figure 3.12. 
Zero Order 
Hold 
Computer 
f 
x,.= H(t) 
FIGURE 3.12 State Space representation of level direct digital 
control loop. 
Now defining xl as the output of the integrator, a state model for: 
the open loop process may be written as: 
. () -1 ~ t = -
, 1p 
~(t) + 
1; ] 
[ 
M(t) 1 
, ~(t~ 
(3.12.2.1) 
'Equation (3.12.2.1) is of the same fom as equation (3.12.1.3) 
and so discretising according to equations (3.12.1.7) and (3.12.1.8) with 
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a discrete san'ple time of b. t gives: 
(3.12.2.2) 
The computer control algorithm was choser. to be the discrete equiva-
ler.t of the- propc·rtional~plus-integral ar.al.ogue controller. This may 
be wr'itten as (43): 
(3.12.2.3) 
Now this is a standard recursion fonnula of the general fonn: 
Cadzow and Martens (114) have derived a Jordon canonical state space 
representation of this equation which is: 
x(k+l) = - a l x(k) + El (k) 
E2(k) = b3 x(k) + bo El (k) 
Substituting from equation (3.12.2.3) and, defining x = X z yields: 
x 2(k+l) = xz(k) + El (k) (3·.12.2.4) 
E2(k) = tc~: ) x2(k) + Kc( 1 + ~ :) El (k) (3.12.2.S) 
The state space flow diagram illustrating the diScrete time controller 
algorithm is shown in Figure 3.13. 
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+ 
b.t 
-
Uni 
f-___ ~de1ay 
+ 
FIGURE 3.13. State space representation of diScrete t:ime proportional 
plus integral controller. 
Now remembering 
El (k) = - K1K3 Xl (k) 
M(k) = - KZK4Kv EZ(k) 
equations (3.12.2.2) to (3.12.2.5) may be combined to give Figure 3.14 
- K m 
The process observations are 
Y 1 = tank height (V) 
'Y2 = valve demand signal (V) 
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1 
+ 
Unit 
)--- delay 
x2(k) 
- 1 
FIGURE 3.14 State space representation of level direct digital control loop. 
-6.t 
et 
Q. (k) 
Notice that the observation Y2 is not a true procesS measurElllent, but 
is in fact the control action detennined by the control a~oritbm. The 
"pseudo" measurement was chosen because it is calculated in the computer 
and so avoids the need for a control valve stem position measurement 
instrument. The observation model is: 
Using the process parameters of Table 3.3 and a diScrete time 
sampling interval of 2 seconds the state model becomes: 
.:!:(k+1) = [0.955594 
- 0.631295 
Z (k) = [ 0.631295 
-0.703443 
0.006402] 
1. 
.:!:(k) + 
x (k) 
[ O.O~18"] 
(3.12.2.6) 
(3.12.2.7) 
~ (k) 
The models given by equations (3.12.1.9), (3.12.1.10) and (3.12.2.6), 
(3.12.2.7) which describe the analogue setpoint and d.d.c. loops respec-
tively are now in the standard fonn to implement the linear time invari-
ant Kalman filter, and are swmnarised in Table 3.4. 
The process disturbance ~ (k) is an unmeasured variable and is 
modelled as a zero mean white noise sequence {! (k)} 
For linear time invariant models, tests for controllable and observ-
able systems are. given by Wiberg (115). 
A system is said to be controllable if the following test is true: 
rank [r, Ar, A2r, An- 1r ] = n 
The corresponding test of observability is 
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! 
Control Sample t:ime , 
A r H !H ; loop (sec) : 
, 
Analogue [ 0.999852 0.0165858] 
[0.592:8 x 10-4] [0~26 0,631295] i 1. , setpoint ! 
-0.0177715 0.990265 0.103806 , , , 
i 
, 
Direct [0.955594 0.0~402 ] [0.118:6 x 10-3] [ 0.631295 
0.1:4288] . digital 
2. 
-0.631295 -0.703443 
setpoint 
TABLE 3.4 State variable modelB for analogue setpoint and direct digital control loops. 
rank H = n 
HA 
HA2 
• • 
HAn- 1 
Now applying these tests to the models of Table 3.4 reveals that both 
the analogue setpoint and d.d.c. loops are complete:q controllable and 
observable. 
3.13 §YStem dynamic characteristics 
The open loop dynamic response of the level control system was 
detennined by setting the system at the steady state specified in Table 
3.2, and then imposing a step change of 140 cm3/min on the tank input 
flowrate IlJ. by using the computer to alter the setpoint of the Secon-
dary flow control loop. 
The eXperimentally measured tank hef&b,t response is shown as curve 
1 in Figure 3.15 where it is compared with the theoretical response 
detennined from the first order transfer function of equation (3.11.1.11) 
using the parameters given in Table 3.3. 
The first order system .time constant is determined when the experi-
mental response is 63.2% complete (56) and is calculated as 7.07 min 
which compares favourably with the value given in Table 3.3 •. ' 
The closed loop responses for both the analogue setpoint and d.d.c. 
loops were experimentally obtained in a similar manner by initially 
controlling the hef&b,t at the desired setpoint and then :Introducing a 
step load disturbance of 750 cm3/min. 
Figures 3.16a and b show the experimental and theoretical hef&b,t 
responses for the analogue and d.d.c. loops respectively. 'Ibe theore-
ticalresponses were calculated from closed loop models defined in Table 3.4. 
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The state space model for the analogue setpoint control loop 
provides a reasonable representation for the experimental response as 
shown in Figure 3.l.6a. The discrepancies between the responses may be 
accounted for in the inaccuracy of actually detennining the controller 
settings from the dials on the pneumatic instrument. 
HOWever, Figure 3.16b shows that the d.d.c. model of the control 
loop is a poor representation of the exper:imental response. The 
reason for these differing responses was eventually traced to be in the 
process canputer digital/analogue converter. It was found that the 
least six bits of the digital/analogue converter were permanently dis-
connected. This means that the 0-10 V clDPllter output signal was dia-
cretised into 16 steps instead of the usual 1024 increments, thereby 
giv:ing a discontinuous control signal characterised by steps of approxi-
mately 0.6 V. The effect of this computer output signal is to produce 
rather "slack" control. 
Unfortunately this process ccuputer fault was not discovered until 
after the malfunction detection experimental programme was completed. 
However, as far as the implementation of the Kalman filter is concerned, 
the effect of this fault is to produce a diacrepancy between the system 
model and the experiJllental response thereby canpounding the uncertainty 
problem. 
When the malfunction detection experimental programme was complete 
the computer digital/analogue converter was repa:ired and an. exper:imental 
step response for the d.d.c. loop was detennined as above (using the 
same controller constants). This experimental response together with 
the theoretical response derived from the d.d.c. state variable model 
is shown in Figure 3.16c. As expected, these responses show better 
agreement than those shown in Figure 3.16b. 
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3.14 Experimental procedure 
3.14.1 Analogue setpoint control 
All of the experiments were performed with the procesS operating 
at the steady state characteristics detailed in Table 3.2. The tank 
height was controlled at the desired value using the pneumatic con-
troller by opening the isolation valve 1 and closing 2 as shown in 
Figure 3.4. The PDP 11-20 process computer introduced an unmeasured 
disturbance into the flowrate %. by :imposing a pseudo-random binary 
sequence (PRBS) on to the flow controller setpoint. The PRBS had an 
amplitude of 1 l/min and a basic switching time of 15 secondS, as well 
as a programmed facility to start the sequence at randomly selected 
points in the chain. In addition to creating this disturbance, the 
computer logged 1000 process measurements of tank height and control 
valve stem pOSition at 1 second intervals. 'IhiB logged data was sub-
sequently analysed off-line on an ICL 1904 A computer using the Kalman 
filter and malfunction detection method discussed earlier. 
sane typical time histories of the process var:iAbles are shown in 
Fi&ures 3.17 a-c. 
3.14.2 nirect digital control 
These exper:iments followed the same fo:noat as those above except 
that computer control was achieved using a PDP 11-20 computer by closing 
. . 
isolation valve 1 and opening 2, as shown in Figure 3.4. The unmeasured 
PRBS flow control setpoint disturbance had an amplitude of 0.6 l/min 
with a switching time of 5 secondS. At 2 second t:ime intervals the 
process computer perfomed the control task and logged measureinents of 
tank height and the control valve demand s~ls. 
Typical t:ime histories of the process var:iables are shown in F~S 
3-18 a-c. 
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3.15 Kalman filter design using Mehra's adaptive estimator 
Sections 3.11 to 3.12 have been concerned nth the creation of a 
mathemati~l model to represent the level control system. !he function 
of the Kalman filter is now to relate the process measunments via the 
mathematical model to yield a data base from which loop security may be 
assessed. 
However section 3.5 has detailed that the mechanisation of the 
Kalman filter is no trivial matter because of the \Dlcertainty of the 
mathematical model and difficulty of choosing suitable a priori statis-
tical parameterS. To overcome these problems Mehra' s adaptive estima-
tor (87), as described in Appendix Ill, was used in this work. 
The level control system was assumed to be operating in a malfuno-
tion free condition and a batch of 1000 process measurements was 
recorded. 
Mehra's technique was implemented on an I.C.L. 1904A computer and 
his direct method of· estima ting the optimal Kalman gain by measurement 
refiltering was used. A maximum of 8 iterations was used on the data 
\Dlless the gain converged according to the criterion: 
tr (b. K b. KT) < 0.0001 
" ",' @T Successive estimates of Kopt' R, were not obtained by analys-
ing further batches of measurement data as suggested by Mehra. 
3.15.1 Analogue setpoint control 
The state variable model for this control loop was given in Table 
3.4. The Kalman filter was used to process the measunments and two 
arbitrary data sets of a priori infonnation were chosen to effect this. 
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The a priori data sets are given in Table 3.5 and are denoted AM! 
and AM2. Table 3.5 alBo shows the steady state Kalman gain and error 
prediction covariance matrices resulting from the usual Kalman filter 
algorithm. 
Although the Kss and P{k/k)ss matrices in Table 3.5 do not explic-
itly describe how well the Kalman filter is working, the fact that they 
are numerically small does indicate that perllaps filter measurement 
decoupling has occurred. 
In each run, for the sample of 1000 points the resultant innovation 
sequence ~ (k) was generated and the estimates of the autocorrehtion 
A ~ A ) 
matriceS CO' U1 •••. Ck {k = 60 were· calculated from equation (A.IIl. 
7. ). The white noise test revealed that the innovation sequence was non-
white and so Mehra fS algorithm was used to esdmate the optimal Kalman 
gain by iterating on the measurements. The iteration sequence is shown 
in Table 3.6 from which it can be seen that the algorithm doeB not 
converge. This non<onvergence results, at the final iteration, in a 
large in'cremental Kalman gain correction term, IJ. K, and an esdmated R 
matrix with a negative diagonal element. 
Now one possible source of error in the results presented above 
lies in the assumptions concerning the noise sequences ,I Qi (k) I and 
1 i{k) I· Mehra fS method assumes that these sequences are uncorrelated 
with zero mean. The validity of the zero mean assumption in the experi-
ments performed was not necessarily true. However a method due to 
Godbole (106), (107) generalised Mehra I s technique to handle the non-
zero mean correlated noise case and was reviewed in section 3.7.2. 
Godbole1s modification was included in the analysiS, although it was 
still assumed that the sequences 1 ~ (k) I and h:{k) I were uncorrelated. 
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Run Q R :(o) P{%) KSS P{k/k)SS 
AM! 1000 [0;' 0:'] [:] [0;0' 0.:,] [0.3 • ",-5 0.42 x ",-3] ~.16 x ",-3 0.5 x '0'" -2 -3 0.5 x 10-0 .0.17 x to-· 0.1 x 10 0.18 x 10 
. 
AM2 10000 [o~o, o~o, ] [: ] [0.0' 0] [°. 31 x '°-2 0.13 X lO-'J [0." x '0-' 0.5 x '0-4 o 0.01 0.43 x 10-1 0.84 x 10-2 0.5 x 10-4 0.69 x to-: 
TABlE 3.5 .. A priori information for Kalman filter design in analogue setpoint control loop. 
Run AMl / M , Run AM2 / M 
Iteration Percentage of points lying Percentage of points lying 
number outside the 95% outside the 95% 
confidence limits. confidence limits. 
First Second First Second 
measurement measurement measurement measurement 
0 100 100 100 100 
1 100 30 100 .. 30 
2 63.33 25. 66.67 31.67 
3 100. 53 .33 100. 51.67 
4 93.33 63.33 93.33 63.33 
5 100. 58.33 100. 58.33 
6 96.67 80. 96.67 83.33 
7 100. 63.33 100. 63.33 
8 96.67 53.33 96.67 86.67 
A 
2.18915 J [-1.09825 Kopt [-1.10219 2.17994 J 
1.93259 1.15811 1.92808 1.16669 
l:l K [ 0.355117 -o.0383561J [ 0.365263 -o.0262073J 
-0.306376 0.204687 -0.311216 0.204639 
1\ [-0.346 x 10-3 -0.508 x 10-:] [-0.340 x 10-3 . -0.513 x 10-: R 
0.142 x 10-3 0.183 x 10-3 0.137 x 10-3 0.182 x 10-3 
TABLE 3.6 Kalman gain estimation using Mehra IS direct method on 
analogue setpoint control measUrements -
runs AMl/M; AM2/M. 
211 
The a priori statistics corresp<:nding to nm AMl al1.d the process 
measurements were reanalysed mdng Mehra's modified algorithm and the 
resultant iteration sequence, denoted as nm AMl/G is shown in Table 3.7. 
-
Run AMl/G 
Itera- Innovation sequence mean Percentage of points lying out-
side the -95% ccnfidence limits 
tior. First Second First Secor.d 
number measurement measurement . measurement measurement 
0. -0.0.0.38870.2 0..541456 10.0.. 100. 
1 0..0.236335 0..0.042750.9 SQ. 23.33 
2 0. .0.145027 0.0.0.1.06255 33.33 :11.67 
3 0.0.198971 0..0.0.564762 38.33 28.33 
4 0..0.151437 0..00.588248 2.5. 28.33 
5 0..0.1790.15 0..0.0663521 33.33 31.67 
6 0. .0.151878 0..0.0.7284 25. 31.67 
7 0. .0.165251 0..0.0.750.063 31.67 25. 
8 0..0149736 0..0.0.80.9775 20. 25. 
" [- 1.117068 2.3327 l K opt 1.9410.8 0..921385 
b.K [ 0..0.990.945 - 0..10.1863 ] 
- 0..1220.53 0.0.70.9527 
~ [- 0..343 x 10.-3 
- 0..337 x 1O-3J 
0..189 x 10.-3 0..175 x 10.-3 
TABLE 3.7 Kalman gain estimation usillg Mehra's modified method on 
analogue setpoint control measurements ~ run AMl/G. 
These results show that convergence was still not achieved after 
8 iterations and the estimated matrices were similar to those obtained 
without Godbole's modification in nm AMl/K. 
Now visual inspection of the process measurement time histories 
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shown in I"igure 3 .17 reveals that the process measurement noise is 
small and possibly unrepresentative of a true control loop. Jazwinski 
(57) has commented on dynamic systems with perfect measurements (Le. 
R = 0) and points out that although the Kalman filter is valid, the 
matrix P(k/k-1) can become ill-conditioned leading to difficulties in 
the computation of P(k/k). Although this phenomenon is not directly 
related to Mehra's algorithm it was sunnised that a similar effect was 
being exhibited. 
To investigate this idea the process measurements were artifici-
ally made more "noisy" by adding a computer generated zero mean 
Gaussian random variable to each measurement. The covariance matrix 
of the computer based measurement noise was : 
[
0.0064 
0. 
0. ] 
0.0004 
(3.15.1.1) 
The "noisy" measurements corresponding to Figures 3.17 band care 
shown in Figures 3.19 a and b. 
Using the initial conditions corresponding to AMl, Mehra's direct 
method was used to estimate the optimal gain by analySing the "noisy" 
measurements, and the resulting iteration sequence is given in Table 
3.8. 
The results of optimising the Kalman gain using these "nOiSy" 
measurements in Mehra's algorithm modified by Godbole to account for 
non-zero noise means are given in Tahle 3.9 for the a priori informa-
tion sets corresponding to runs AMl and AM2. 
Tables 3.8 and 3.9 illustrate that Mehra's direct adaptive 
estimator and the modified method of Godbole Show convergence to an 
" optimal Kalman gain K
opt ' which is numerically quite similar. The 
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RUN AM1/~N 
Iteration Percentage of points lying oUtside the 9sJ, 
confidence limits 
number First measurement Second measurement 
0 100. 100 •. 
1 36.67 15. 
2 76.67 21.67 
3 41.67 51.67 
4 43.33 58.33 
5 51.67 56.67 
6 SO. 56.67 
7 51.67 56.67 
8 Convergence 
~oPt [-0.427082 . 1.17257] 
0.803763 1.94171 
~K [ 0.619 x 10-3 0.265 x 10-3] 
-0.459 x 10-3 0.706 x 10-3 
• 
,.. 
[ 0.490 x 10-2 . 
-0.103 x 10-2] R 
0.637 x 10-3 0.~2 x 10-3 
P1iT [-0.4164 x 10-2 0.1018 x 10-2] 
0.1052 x 10-1 0.2662.x 10-2 
TABLE 3 .8 'Kalman gain estimation using Mehra' s direct method on 
analogue setpoint control ''noisy'' measurements -
run AMl/MIN. 
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N 
S. 
Run AMl/G/N Run AM2/G/N 
Iteration Innovation sequence Percentage of po:ints lying Innovation sequence Percentage of points lying 
number mean outside the 95% confidence mean outside the 95% confidence limits limits 
First Second First Second First Second First Second 
measurement measurement measurement measurement measurement measurement measurement measurement 
0 ...{).0045 0.5418 100. lOO. 0.20641 0.367272 100. 100. 
1 0.024 0.00426 15. 15. 0.02381 0.004286 18.33 15. 
2 0.0350 0.00654 16.67 8.33 0.03487 0.007554 16.67 8.33 
3 0.02773 0.0089 13.33 20. 0.02723 0.008927 1l.67 20. 
4 0.0281 0.01 13.33 20. 0.0284 0.0101 13.33 20. 
5 0.0285 0.00972 13.33 20. 0.0285 0.00968 13.33 20. 
6 0.0287 0.00878 13.33 20 0.0287 0.00979 13.33 20. 
7 0.0286 0.00976 13.33 20 0.0286 0.00975 13.33 20. 
8 Conver.e:ence 0.0286 0.00977 13.33 20. 
" K 
opt [...{) • 413443 1.3154 ] [ ...{) .41343 5 1.31525 ] 0.75243 1.64501 0.752738 1.64706 
6K [ -3 ...{).208 x 10-3 ] [-0.102 x 10-4 -0.174 x 10-~] 0.272 x 10_3 
,..() • 700 x 10 ...{).287 x 10-2 0.465_ x 10-3 0.304 x lO-
A [ -2 
...{).788 x 10:3] [ -2 -S:~~i ~ ±8:~] R 0.522 x 10_3 0.521 x 10_3 0.570 x 10 0.510 x 10. 0.570 x 10 
~ [...{).385 x 1O:~ 0.113 x 10:~] [-0.386 x 10:~ -2] 0.113 x 122 
0.910 x 10 0.205 x 10 . 0.910 x 10 0.207 x 10 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --- -- --
TABLE 3.9 Kalman gain estimation us:ing Mehrats modified method on analogue setpoint control. "noisy" measurements-
runs AMl/G/Nj AM2/G/N 
I 
estimated matrices " A AT T Rand P (k/k-1) (found by solving PH = P(k/k-l)H ) 
are consistent and in particular R ill a good estimate of the Cl.lllll'uter 
generated llleallUrement noise covariance matrix given in equation (3.15.1.1). 
The results of Table 3.9 show the robustness and consistency of the 
general innovation correlation adaptive estimator since the algorithm 
" converges to the same K
opt for different a priori statistics. 
However, even though the gain optimiBation algorithms converge, 
inspection of Tables 3.8 and 3.9 reveals that the resulting "optimal" 
innovation sequence fails the white noise test, although the method 
which includes Godbole's modifications shows less violations of the 95% 
confidence limits than Mehra's direct method. This means tha t the 
resulting Kalman filter is not optimal. There are several reaSons 
which may account for this feature. 
Primarily Mehra's innovation.correlation adaptive estimator does 
not explicitly cope with the problem of uncertainty in the system 
dynamic and measurement models A, r and H. The method actually 
assumes that these models are correct'and equal to the true system model. 
In this work the A, rand H matrices used as. the' process model were 
certainly subject to parameter uncertainties, and therefore it is 
reasonable to expect Mehra's adaptive estimator performance to be 
degraded, as exemplified by the non-whiteness of the resultant innova-
tion sequence. 
A second feature is that Mehra's problem formulation is for a 
linear time invariant dynamic system. However,the level control loop 
model was in fact non-linear and although a linearised model about.a 
particular steady state was derived, the validity of such a model may 
have been violated due to the relatively large process disturbances. 
Another source of non-linearity lies in the control loop pneumatic 
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hardware. For example, the pneumatic controller was represented by 
an ideal proportional plus integral transfer function given in equation 
(3.11.2.1), while in practice such a realisation would. ~ unlikely. 
Again it is suggested that the consequence of these non-linearities is 
to cause a degradation in the perfonnance of the adaptive estimator. 
A further assumption of Mehra's estimator is that the record 
length of process observations is long enough to justify the approxi-
mation that the estimated innovation correlation matrices Ok are 
equal to the true correlation functions. This is only valid if there 
are an infinite number of .process observations, and lIO in practice there 
A· is an estimation error associated with the calculation of Ok' Again 
this error may degrade the. innovation correlation algorithm. In this 
work a sample of 1000 process observations ·was used to calculate Ck' 
However, in spite of these apparent sources of error,Mehra's 
unmodified and modified innovation correlation estimator does still 
converge to an estimate " . of· the optimal Kalman gain Kopt ' as illustrated 
A 
in Tables 3.8 and 3.9. The resultant Kopt when used in the Kalman 
filter generates state estimates &(k/k) which are more accurate· than 
those obtained from ordinary Kalman filtering with the a priori 
statistics given earlier. 
and b for run AMl/G/N. 
This feature is shoWn in Figures 3.20 a 
The "noisy" measurements . .r(k) are shown 
as well as the estimates i(k) = H g(k/k) resultiIig from the usual 
Kalman filter, with the a priori formation AMl, and the opt:i.m&l 
filter gain from run AMl/G/N. These Figures illustrate that the 
estimates resulting from ordinary Kalman filtering using the a priori 
information AMl are extremely poor. The adaptive estimator is able 
to detect this inadequate filter performance, and in spite of all the 
limitations discussed above manageS to estimate a Kalman gain which 
results in greatly improved estimates i(k). 
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3.15.2 Direct digital control 
The experience of estimating the optimalKalman gain in the 
analogue setpoint control loop revealed that Mehra1s algorithm was 
unsatisfactory when the process measurement noise was small. In these 
experiments the tank height process measurement was made "noiSier" by 
physically altering the damping adjustment on the height measurement 
/j, P / P transmitter. The second "pseudo measurement" in the d.d.c. 
loop was the calculated valve demand signal, which of courSe was 
deterministic and hence uncontaminated with random measurement noise. 
The state variable model describing the d.d.c. loop was given in 
Table 3.4. 
Now 1000 process measurements, sampled at 2 second intervals, 
were analysed by the ordinary Kalman filter to estimate the system 
state using the following set of a priori information. 
Q = 1000 
R = ° .] 
0.1 
!(O) = 0 
P(O/O) = [~ ~] 
Ordinary Kalman filtering resulted in the steady state matrices: 
= [0.108 x 10-2 - 0.117 x 1O-2 J ~s 3 1 0.177 x 10- 0.181 x 10-
P(k/k) =°.171 x 10 [ 
-3 
ss 0.280 x 10-4 
220 
0.280 x 10-4J 
0.160 x 10-1 
The 1000 process measurementS were analysed using Mehra' s direct 
gain estimator as before and the resulting iteration sequence is shown 
in Table 3.10. 
Run OO/M 
Iteration Percentage of points lying outside the 9% 
number confidenc'e limits 
First measurement Second measurement 
° 
91.67 91.67 
1 10. 23.33 
2 8.33 10. 
3 8.33 16.67 
4 5. 16.67 
5 5. 13.33 
6 5. 16.67 
7 5. 13.33 
8 5. 16.67 
9 5. 13.33 
-" [°.980574 x 10-1 
- L86566 ] Kopt 
0.904654 
-
0.503898 
~K [ -2 0.785 x 10-2 ] 0.105 x 10 
0.106 x 10-1 0.519 x 10-1 
A [0.480 x 10-4 0.702 x 10-3 ] R 
0.480 x 10-4 - 0.367 x 10-3 
TABLE 3.10 Kalman gain estimation uSing Mehra's direct method on 
direct digital control measurements - run OO/M 
These results do not show convergence to an optimal gain, although 
the incremental change ~ K at the last iteration is small compa·;~~ to 
R
opt ' The resulting innovation sequence of the second measurement 
fails the white noise test indicating the subopt:imality of the"opti-
mised" filter. However, the-most disturbing feature of the algorithm 
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is that ~22 is negative. 
This problem was encoWltered in the previous work on the analogue 
setpoint control loop where it was suggested that the algorithm failed 
because of the low process measurement noise. In this d.d.c. loop 
it is known that the pseudo measurement Y2(k) is noise-free and again 
it is suggested that this feature cauSes algorithm breakdown. 
To overcome this problem the valve demand signal pselldo-measure-' 
ment was contaminated with noise generated by the process computer. 
However, in this experiment,rather than generating a zero mean Gaussian 
random variable, a pseudo random binary sequence was formed. This 
PRBS represents an approximation to a zero mean white noise sequence, 
and waS chosen because the computer generation of such sequences is 
trivial. The PRBS had a baSic period of'1023 and an amplitude of 
0.15. At each time interval the measurements were sampled and the 
computer generated PRBS was added to y 2 (k) to yield a, "noisy" signal. 
Now using the "noisy" measurement vector and the model with the 
a priori statistics given earlier, both Mehra's direct method and the 
algorithm which includes Godbole's modification'Were used to adapt the 
Kalman filter to accoWlt for Wlcertainty. These runs are denoted 
1lMl/M/N . and OO/G/N respectively, and the resulting algorithm itera-
tion Sequences are given in Table 3.11. 
The results show that both algorithms fail to converge to an 
optimal Kalman according to the criterion given earlier . After 8 
'iterations the resultant 
.-
K
opt yields an innovation sequence which 
fails the white noise test in each case, although Godbole's modifica-
tion reSults in fewer violations of the 95% confidence limit. Some 
reaSons for the failure of the white noise test were discussed in the 
previous 'section. A further ,contribution to the performance 
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Itera- Run OO/-'.fLN Run OO/G/N 
tion Percentage of points lying outside Innovation sequence mean Percentage ot" points -J ~~, outs1de the 95% confidence limits. the 95% confidence limits 
.number 1st measurement 2nd measurement 1st measurement 2nd measurement 1st measurement 2nd measurement 
0 91.67 91.67 0.003313 0.18076 91.67 93.33 
1 .. 10. 18.33 -0.006757 0.007093 8.33 18.33 
2 10. 36. -0.01044 0.013617 6.67 30. 
3 6.67 28.33 -0.009773 0.0135706 6.67 31.67 
4 15. 28.33 -0.01018 0.0136ll 10. 31.67 
5 20. 20. -0.01013 0.01365 10. 31.67 
6 20. 20. -0.009684 0.01482 10. 28.33 
7 20. 20. -0.009576 O.OlSll 10. 31.67 
8 20. 20 . -0.00983 0.01449 10. 28.33 
N 
~ 
.-
[ 0.68647 [ 0.703524 -0.206078 J Kopt -0.225944 J 
-O.1l488 0.417491 -0.391664 x 10-1 0.338993 
. 
, 
L1K ~0.228 x 10-2 -2J 
56 -2 0.375 x 10-~ 0.100 x 10 [0. 7 xl0 
0.223 x 10-1 0.560 x 10-2 -1 0.298 x 10-1 0.850 x 10 I 
i 
[0.523 x 10-2 0.154 x 10-2J [ -2 0.153 x 10-~ I 
" 
0.531 x 10 , R 
0.984 x 10-3, 0.229 x 10-1 . -2 0.227 x 10-1 
i 
0.178 x 10 
"T [0.851 x 10-2 -O.llO x 10-1] b 0.842 x 10-2 -0.918 x 10-~ PH 
-0.326 x 10-2 0.141 x 10-1 -0.109 x 10-2 0.110 x 10-1 
TABLE 3.11. Kalman gain estimation on direct digital control "noisy" measurementS •. 
Runs OO/WNj OO/G/N. 
---------------------------~- ---------
degradation of the adaptive estimator in this work arises because of 
the measurement noise on the observation Y2(k). Recall that 
Mehra's problem formulation defines the measurement noise to be a zero 
mean Gaussian random variable. In this work the contaminating noise 
added to the measurement Y2(k) was an approximation to white noise 
in the form of a PRBS. Since this is not a true zero mean 
Gaussian random variable, then adaptive estimator performance may be 
expected to be degraded. 
To illustrate this point a Simulation, denoted !M2/G/N was per-
formed corresponding to rim IMl/G/N by contaminating the measurement 
Y2(k) with a computer generated zero mean, Gaussian random variable 
of variance equal to the PRBS. The results of using Mehra's algorithm 
with Godbole's modification are shown in Table 3.12. 
Comparing runs IMl/G/N and IlM2/G/N in Tables 3.11 and 3.12 does 
in fact confirm the above postulation concerning the degradation of 
filter performance due to the PRBS measurement noise.' Table 3.12 
for rim IlM2/G/N reveals that the Kalman gain does converge to an 
optimal value and the resulting innovation sequence white noise test 
has fewer violations of the 95% confidence limit than run IMl/G/N. 
Despite the suboptimality of rim IlM1/G/N the resultant estimated 
, A " 
matrices Rand P (k/k-1) are consistent and the Kalman filter using 
K
opt provides improved state estimates g(k/k) over those obtained 
from ordinary filtering uSing the assumed a priori information. This 
is illustrated in Figure 3.21 a-b, which compareS the "noisy" measure-
ment vector I(k) with the estimated measurements i(k) resulting 
from ordinary and "optimal" Kalman filtering. 
The results presented in section 3.15.1 and 3.15.2 have high-
lighted several features of Mehra' s innovation correlation adaptive 
estimator. 
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'.;-' 
Run IH2/G/N 
Iteration Innovation sequence Percentage of points lying outSide 
number mean the 9~' confidence limit. First Second First Second 
measurement measurement measurement measurement 
0 0.0039763 0.17037 91.67 93.33 
1 -0.006359 0.006803 10. 8.33 
2 -0.010546 0.010409 8.33 6.67 
3 -0.009686 0.012148 8.33 5. 
4 -0.009819 0.011894 6.67 5. 
5 -0.009928 0.011622 10. 3.33 
6 -0.009951 0.001lS68 10. 3.33 
7 -0.0099565 0.001l55 10. 3.33 
8 Convergence 
K opt [0. 737577 -0.178306 ] 
0.544531 1.08129 
I::,K [-0.129 x 10-3 -0.961 x 10-4] . 
0.362 x 10-2 0.278 x 10-2 
A LO•523 x 10-2 x 10-3] R 0.592 
-2 0.185 x 10-1 0.1401 x 10 
"'T [0.878 1 -2 -0.836 x 10-
2] PH x 0 
0.773 x 10-3 0 .. 277 x 10-1 
TABLE 3.12 Kalman gain estimation on direct digital setpoint control 
"noisy" measurements -·nm IM2/G/N. 
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Fundamentally it has been found that for systems in which the 
measurement noise is small (Le. the covariance matrix R is small), 
the' adaptive estimator fails to converge and the resultant parameter 
estimates are not consistent. In this study this problem was 
solved by artificially increasing the measurement noise. using a 
computer based random variable generator. 
In all of the experiments performed the resultant innovation 
sequence did not satisfy the white noise test of Kalman filter 
optimality, although in each case Godbole1s modification to Mehra1s 
basic method yielded fewer violations of the 95% confidence limit. 
Some reasonS for this unsatisfactory feature were discussed. However, 
in spite of the uncertainty in .the system models, the inherent non-
linearity of the process, and the non-whiteness of a·measurement noise 
sequence, the resultant estimated matrices 
... 
consistent and in particular, R was close 
" Kopt ' 
to the 
it and ~T were 
true value R. 
The innovation correlation algorithms were shown to be robust and 
consistent and converged to the same estimated matrices for different 
a priori information. 
In spite of the approximations used in implementing the adaptive 
estimator, the resultant "optimised" Kalman filter yielded accurate 
state estimates ~(k/k) as illustrated by canparing ;r(k) and 
" ;r(k) 
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3.16 Malfunction detection experiments and determination 
of>the loop malfunction gain p 
Experiments were performed on both the analogue setpoint and 
direct digital control loops, and are denoted AS and IS reSpec-
tively. 
The experimental procedure was detailed in section 3.14 and the 
estimator of Figure 3.3 was> used to calculate the loop secur~ty para-
meters ~(k) from the process measurementS. The numerical values of 
the parameters used in the bias estimator were derived from the Kalman 
filter optimisation procedure of the previous section (runs AMI/G/N and 
IlM1/G/N) and are summarised in Table 3.13. 
The malfunctions introduced into the system were similar to those 
investigated in the flow control loop experiments, and are given in 
Ta ble 3.14, while the complete experimental programme is summarised in 
Table 3.15. 
Table 3.15 also includes the values of the control loop malfunction 
gain III which was defined in section 3.2. 
To illustrate the derivation of this function an example for the 
analogue setpoint control loop is considered. 
The control loop block diagram of Figure 3.5 is redrawn as Figure 
3.22 for convenience. 
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r 
A 
" i%'r Pb(O/O) Loop A H KOpt R 
AS [O._~ 0."'_] ~ o. [0. 0 .• 31>95] fO·4J3443 1.J1~ ] 0.522xJ.O-2 o. ~ r·"5rlO-' o.=o-'ro. o. 
0.59228xlO-4 0.26 0.103806 0.75243 1.64501 o. 0.Slxl-O-3 -2 -2 10, 0.990265 
0.910xl0 o.20SxlO o. 
~.Ol7771 ; 
L L ! , 
~o.m ... 0._] ro· llB76xl.O-3 ~ •• 3U95. 0.· [,.7035'4 -o.""78~ -, ~ [0 ;""""'-, -0. 9l1lili>-~ i IS 0.53lxlO o. 
-0.631295 1. o. .703443 o.ll428 ~.0391664 0.33899 -1 
-0.""""'-' 0.llihlO-1 JI [10.] O. O. 22z.x1.O 
L.. L 
TABLE 3.13. Numerical values of parameters :in loop security parameter estimator. 
Loop malfunction Source 
Level measurement Level differential pressure 
zero error transducer 
Level measurement Level pressure / current 
zero error converter 
Control valve Current / pressure converter 
zero error 
Control valve Valve stem linear 
zero error potentiometer 
TABlE 3.14. Malfunctions introduced into laboratory level 
control rig. 
* denotes computer simulated error. 
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Codc 
A 
B 
C 
n* 
Loop Valve stem Run Malfunction p 
position number 
measured 
AS Yes AS/I 
- -
11 AS/2 
- -
11 AS/A a A + 10% 0.2105 V/p.s.i.g. 
11 AS/A b A+IO% 0.2105 V/p.s.i.g. 
11 AS/A c A -10% 0.2105 V/p.s.i.g. 
11 AS/B B - 10% 1.0 V/V 
11 AS/n* D + 10% 1.0 V/V 
ffi No 00/1 
- -
11 ffi/2 
- -
11 ffi/3 
- -
11 ffi/4 
- -
11 ffi/A a A + 10% ..Q.516 V/p.s.i.g. 
11 OO/A b A + 10% 11 
11 ffi/ A c A + 10% 11 
11 ffi/ A d A + 10% 11 
11 ffi/ A e A - 10% 11 
11 ffi/ A f A - 10% 11 
11 ffi/ A g A - 10% 11 
11 ffi/B a B + 12.5% -1.32 V/V 
11 ffi/B b B + 12 • .)% 11 
11 ffi/C a C + 10% ..Q.7353 V/p.s.i.g. 
11 ffi/C b C + 10% 11 
11 ffi/C c C + 10% 11 
11 ffi/C d C - 10% 11 
11 ffi/C e C - 10% 11 
11 ffi/C f C - 10% 11 
. 
TABlE 3.15. Ex:periments perfonned on laboratory level control rig. 
*.denotes computer simulated error. 
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1 K (1 + --;:-s ) 
C .I 
if (s) 
m 
+ 
+ 
I(s) 
i(s) 
~(s) 
-K v 
FIGURE 3.22 Block diagram for analogue setpoint control loop. 
1 
A malfunction in the ~ pip transmitter is rep~esented by a load 
disturbance I (s). Now the transfer function for the response of the 
control valve stem position to L (s) is: 
i(s) 
-= 
I (8) 
Defining Kc(-Kv ) KIK2 = KF and rearranging gives: 
i(8) = - (K2Kc1: I 1: p ;. + s(K2Kc L p + K2Kc 1: I) + KZKc ) 
[(B) 
For a step change of magnitude L in I(s) then: 
i(s) = 
2 
- L (K2KcL I1: P s + S(K2Kc1: p + K2Kc1: I) + K2Kc) 
s( 1:1 Lp s2 + s( 1:1 +1: I ~) +~) 
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ii(s) 
Now the final value theorem states (56): 
limit x( t) = limit s x(s) 
t _00 
So x (00) 
Substituting the parameters of Table 3.3 yields: 
x (00) = - 0.2105 L 
hence p = 0.2105 V/p.s.i.g. 
The gain, p, for a pure measurement error in the valve stem 
position or the pi! transmitter is simply 1.0 v/v. 
The d.d.c. loop may be analysed in a similar manner to determine 
p and the resulting values are summarised in Table 3.15. 
3.17 Malfunction detection experimental results .. 
Based upon the information generated by the state and loop security 
parameter (l.s.p.) estimators there are two types of check which indicate 
loop malfunction. 
The first method is based upon the information generated by the 
Kalman filter. The filter innovation process waS defined.in equation 
(3.6.2.1). At a particular setpoint and load the process measurements 
were sampled and analysed by the Kalman filter, so that an innovation 
time series could be generated. This sequence may then be compared to 
an original malfunction free innovation sequence, corresponding to the 
same loop setpoint and load, and the changes examined. In fact, this 
type of check was adopted in the flow-control loop experiments where a 
reSidual process was monitored for indications of malfunction. 
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The methods of residual analysis discussed in section 2.6.2 and 
2.6.3 may be applied to the filter innovation sequence, while some 
statistical tests of the time series were given by Hehra and Peschon 
(108 ). In these experiments inferences of loop security were derived 
by monitoring the innovation mean using a student's 't' test. As was 
pointed out in section 2.9, it was found that it was necessary only to 
monitor the valve demand innovation, and the results are presented in 
the same format as section 2.9, except that no innovation normalisation 
was perfonned. 
The l.s.p. estimator fonns the basis for the second method of mal-
function detection. This estimator uses the innovations generated by 
the Kalman filter to estimate parameters which are indicative of the 
control loop security. Since a time series of bia.s eStimates ~(kik) 
are fonned, a simple convenient visual display of the· loop malfunction 
is possible. 
The model formulations for the l.s.p. estimators in the analogue 
setpoint and d.d.c. loops were given in section 3.10. For the 
analogue setpoint control loop the l.s.p. b1 (k) was indicative of mal-
function in the piI converter, while b2(k) arose because of an error 
in the control valve stem pOSition measurement or malfunction in the 
actual feedback control loop instrumentation. The d.d.c. loop mal-
functions were summarised by a single l.s.p. b(k). 
At a particular loop setpoint and load, the process measurements 
A 
are analysed to yield estimates of the l.s .p. 's ~(k/k). These para-
meters then represent a characteristic of the control loop under the 
given process operating conditions. At sane later date, with the 
control loop operating at the same setpoint and load, the l.s.p.'s 
may be re-estimated and compared visually, or by Some other means, with 
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the original parameter estimates. Inferences may then be made con-
cerning the control loop security. 
3.17.1 Analogue setpoint control loop 
The results corresponding to the experiments detailed in Table 
3.15 are given in Table 3.16 and Figures 3.23 to 3.27. 
These results show that the method of examining the innovation 
sequence mean is able to indicate loop malfunction. The runs AS/1 -
AS/2 illustrate the consistency of innovations statistics when the 
Run Valve demand innovation Modulus of change in mean of 
~umber sequence statistics valve demand innovation 
Mean Variance Actua.L Significant change 
change at the 95% limit 
AS/1 0.97697 x 10-2 0.101908 x 10-2 
- -
AS/2 0.838387 x 10-2 0.9370383 x 10-3 0.138583 x 10-2 0.272922 x 10-2 
AS/Aa 0.146417 x 10-1 
-2 0.1l1302 x 10 0.4872 x 10-2 0.2850387 x 10-2 
AS/AI: 0.107003 x 10-1 0.102374 x 10-2 0.93233 x 10-3 0.2789575 x 10-2 
AS/Ac 0.298211 x 10-2 o . 972764 x 10-3 0.678759x10-2 0.27662 x 10-2 
AS/B 0.16343 x 10-1 0.949316 x 10-3 6 -2 o. 5733 x 10 . 0.273785 x 10-2 
AS/D~ -1 0.18452 x 10 0.1l5655 x 10-2 0.86823 x 10-2 0.287957 x 10-2 
TABLE 3.16 Behaviour of valve ~emand innovation for analogue setpoint 
c?ntro1 loop malfunction experiments .• 
Figure 
3.23 
3.23 
3.24 
3.24 
3.25 
3.26 
3.27 
control loop is malfunction free, while the other runs show the . magnitude of 
the observed :innovation mean shift compared to the significant shift at the 
95% confidence limit. 
In addition to the statistics of the innovations, the estimates of the 
l.s.p.'s reveal some interesting features. 
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" " The estimates b1 (k/k) and b2(ly'k) for the malfWlction free runs 
are shown in Figures 3. 23a and b. -The parameters are not zero, as may 
be expected for an error free loop, when the Kalman filter is operating 
optimally. There are two possible explanations for these non-zero 
parameter estimates. 
Primarily the Kalman filter used to generate the innovation data 
base for malfWlction detection waS not optimal. The filter used in 
this study-resulted from Mehra's adaptive estimator, run AMI/G/N, which 
was discussed in section 3.15. The suboptimality of the derived 
filter was indicated by the non-whiteness of the innovation sequence, 
as shown in Table 3.9. 
The second possible source of error lies in the selection of the 
a priori information for the secondary.l.s.p. estimator. It was 
pointed out in section 3.10 that to implement this secondary filter 
the designer must choose the a priori covariance matrix Pb(O/O). 
The effect of the choice of this matrix on the estimated value 
of ~(k/k) was investigated by repeating run AS/1 with various initial 
matrices P;(O/O). The results are given in Table 3.17, which 
A 
indicates that !!(k/k) is relatively insensitive to Pb(O/O) and so 
Pb(O/O) = diag (10) waS maintained throughout the studies on the 
analogue setpoint control runs. 
Figures 3.23 to 3.27 confirm the postulations made in section 3.3 
concerning the effect of malfunction on control loop operation and in 
particular the l.s.p. estimator is able to discriminate between some 
types of loop malfunction. For example, run AS/B, which has a -10% 
P/I transmitter zero error, results in the l.s.p. estimates shown in 
Figures 3.26 a and b. There is a large deviation between the currently 
246 
Pb(O/O) b1 (k/k) b2(k/k) hI (k/k) b2(k/k) b1 (k/k) " b2(k/k) 
k 500 500 750 750 1000 1000 
LO. 0.] 0.16l.l42 0.12704 0.23368 0.164786 0.16998 0.172775 o. 10. 
[1. 0] 0.160535 0.12694 0.23297 0.164656 0.16958 0.172655 
o. 1. 
L· 1 O. ] 0.154707 0.125932 0.226108 0.163395 0.165641 0.171487 O. 0.1 
[0.01 O. ] 0.113392 0.117948 0.17444 0.153157 0.134082 0.161781 
O. 0.01 
, 1\ 
'TABLE 3.17. Effect of Pb(O/O) on ,2(k/klin analogue setpoint 
control experiments. 
A 
estimated 1.s.p. b1(k/k) (denoted Qy curve 2 in Figure 3.26a), and the 
malfunction free characteristic (denoted by curve 1).' Figure 3.26b 
A 
shows that the corresponding change in the l.s.p. b2 (I</k) is small. 
This phenomenon is exactly that expected for a p/I transmitter mal-
function as discussed in section 3.10. 
The knowledge that a pure measurement error has occurred in the 
p/I transmitter and the estimated loop security parameter b1(k/k) 
associated with it meanS that the measurement Y1 (k) can ~ corrected 
to eliminate the effect of the malfunction. 
fu section 3.10.1 the p/I malflDlction was modelled as: 
Now the measurement Y1 (k) is biased because of the malfunction and so 
the true proceSS measurement is: 
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" The loop security parameter b1(k/k) is an estimate of b1(k) 
and from Figure 3.26a it can be seen that the loop malfunction causes 
" b1 (k/k) to deviate by -1.016 from the malfunction free estimate, thus 
the compensated procesS measurement becomes: 
Now the actual error imposed on to the. pi! transmitter measurement 
was -1.0V and so the malfunction compensation provides excellent 
estimates of the true process meaSurement. 
This error compensation technique is particularly valuable when 
the measurement Y1(k) is used in some other process performance 
evaluation computer program, because the compensated measurement may 
be used as a substitute for the real measurement until the pi! trans-
mitter is repaired. 
Examina tion of Figures 3.25 to 3.27 reveals the presence of a 
" loop malfunction which causes the parameter b2(k/k) to be large. 
Such a deviation could arise from either a pure measurement error in 
the control valve stem pOSition or a 6 pip transducer malfunction. 
The l.s.p. estimator is unable to discriminate between these two 
types of malfunction. 
The actual shift in the estimates of the l.s.p.'s fran the mal-
function free characteristics may be compared with the expected 
deviations derived from a conSideration of the loop malfunction gain 
~. These results are sUllDllarised in Table 3.18. 
Notice that the check based upon monitoring the innovation mean 
does not determine the malfunction for run AsIAb as shown in Table 
3.16 . However, inspection of Figures 3.24 a and b, and Table 3.18 
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shows that the l.s.p. estimator does give an indication of this fault. 
Summarising, these experiments on the analogue setpoint control 
loop have shown that the proposed malfunction detection method is able 
Run Expected deviation due Actual deviation due 11 to malfunction to malfunction 
number 
" (V) b'2 (V) ~1 (V) ()2 (V) b1 
AS/l -
AS/Aa 0.2105 V/p.s.i.g. o. 0.2526 0.045 0.166 
AS/Ab 0.2105 V/p.s.i.g. o. 0.2526 0.1128 0.18 
AS/Ac 0.2105 V/p.s~i.g. o. -0.2526 0 • .00015· -0.172 
AS/B 1.0 V/V -1.0 o. -1.016 -0.0441 
AS/D* 1.0 V/V o. i{).5 0.175 0.362 
TABLE 3.18 Expected and actual shifts of loop security parameters for 
analogue setpoint control experiments. 
to expose errors. In particular, the method can discriminate between a 
p/! transmitter malfunction and a pure valve stem position measurement 
error or a 6 pip transducer malfunction. However, the check is unable 
to differentiate between thes~ two latter malfunctions. 
3.17.2 Direct digital control loop 
Table 3.19 details the statistics of the control valve demand signal 
innovation sequence corresponding to the experiments outlined in Table 
3.15. RunS DS/1 - 00/4 represent malfunction free experiments and the 
results show the consistency of the innovation statistics, The reniaining 
experiments demonstrate that malfunctions can be detected by examining 
the shift of the innovation mean from the malfunction free characteristics. 
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Run . Valve demand innovation Modulus of change in mean of I 
numbe. statistics ·valve demand innovation Figure I 
Mean Variance Actual Significant 
change change at 95% 
limit 
DS/l -1 0.321232 x 10-1 0.155451 x 10 
- -
00/2 0.602586 x 10-2 0.306119 x 10-1 0.951924 x 10-2 0.155242 x 10-1 
00/3 0.390723 x 10-2 0.31716 x 10-1 0.1163787 x 10- 0.156602 x 10-1 
00/4 0.274055 x 10-1 0.315153 x 10':'1 0.118604 x 10-1 0.156356 x 10-1 
OO/Aa -0.277109 x 10-1 0.309236 x 10-1 . -1 0.43256 x 10 0.155627 x 10-1 
00/ Ab -0.226125 x 10-1 0.310138 x 10-1 0.381576 x 10-1 0.155739 x 10-1 
00/ Ac ~.242276 x 10-1 0.319993 x 10-1 0.397727 x 10-1 0.15695 x 10-1 
DS/Ad ~.240471 x 10-1 0.312199 x 10-1 0.395922 x 10-1 0.155993 x 10-1 
OO/Ae 0.106938 0.385525 x 10-1 
. . -1 
0.913929 x 10 0.164775 x 10-1 
OO/Af -1 0.898643 x 10 0.340735 x 10-1 0.743192 x 10-1 0.159468 x 10-1 
OO/Ag 0.986288 x 10-1 o . 34666 x 10-1 0.830837 x 10-1 0.16018 x 10-1 
OO/Ba -o.1ll814 0.516182 x 10-1 0.1273591 0.17936 x 10-1 
OO/Bb -0.105139 0.45693 x 10-1 0.1206841 0.172898 x 10-1 
DS/Ca -0. -1 .534161 x 10 0.341493 x 10-1 0.689612 x 10-1 0.159559 x 10-1 
DS/Cb -0.515355 x 10-1 0.334092 x 10-1 0.670806 x 10-1 0.158666 x 10-1 
OO/Cc -0.432993 x 10-1 
. -1 
0.330094 x 10 . 0 .• 588444 x 10-1 0.158181 x 10-1 
DS/Cd 0.148659 0.556092 x 10-1 0.1331139 0.18358 x 10-1 
DS/ee 0.157395 0.556232 x 10-1 0.1418499 0.183599 x 10-1 
DS/Cf 0.152682 0.655709 x 10-1 0.1371369 0.193727 x 10-1 
TABLE 3.19. Behaviour of valve deriland innovation for direct digital 
control loop malfunction experiments. 
3.29 
3.29 
3.29 
3.29 
3.30 
3.30 
3.30 
-
3.31 
3.31 
3.31 
3.32 
3.32 
3.33 
3.33 
3.33 
3.34 
3.34 
3.34 
The. malfunction detection method based upon the 1.s.p. estimator was 
also used to check the control loop performance. At a particular loop 
setpoint and load the Kalman filter processed the measurements to yield 
an innovation sequence data base from which a 1.s.p; ~stimate S(k/k) 
was determined. Figure 3.28 shows this parameter estimate for the 
four experiments on the malfunction free control loop' 00/1 - DS/4. 
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This F i,gure illustrates that there is quite a wide spread of b(k/k) 
values which is unsatisfactory. 
A . . 
1he effect of Pb(O/O) on the quantity b(k/k) was investigated by 
eJaUDining run DS/1 for different a priori estimates of Pb(O/O)~ The 
. A 
results are given in Table 3.20 which shows that b is insensitive 
to the choice of Pb(O/O) and so Pb(O/O) '" 10 was used throughout 
these experiments. 
It is suggested that the reason for the inconsistency in the four 
malfunction free runs was due to the initial mechanisation of the l.s.p. 
estimator. At the beginning of the algorithm for runs DS/1,DS/2, DS/4, 
large values of the l.s.p. estimator gain ~(k) were asso~iated with 
. " large innovations, thereby generating large estimates b(k/k). The 
matrix Kb(k) Soon decayed to its nominal value which was small. Now 
the baSic loop security parameter algorithm is: 
~ " b(k/k) = (I - Kb(k) S(k» b(k-1/k-1) + Kb(k) Y. (k) 
This equation is baSically a "smoother" and since Kb(k) was small, its 
A 
b(k/k) A Pb(O/O) b(k/k) b(k/k) 
k 500 750 1000. 
[10 ] 0.280462 0.27064 '0.267823 
[0.01 ] 0.231668 0.229343 0.231403 
TABLE 3.20 
A 
Effect of Pb(O/O) on b(k/k) in d.d.c. experiments. 
,.. 
response is slow, thus if b(k/k) was initially large, it would decay 
to the true value very slowly. 
1hia problem was overcome by delaying the beginning of the estimation 
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,.. 
of b(k/k) until the matrices ~(k), S(k) and y. (k) had achieved 
their nominal values. This delay was chosen to be k = 100. The 
A .. 
resulting estimates of b(k/k) for runS 00/1 - 00/4 are shown in 
Figure 3.29 from which it may be seen that reasonable consistency with 
a spread of 0.12, is achieved. 
,.. 
Figures 3.30 to 3.34 Show how the parameter b(k/k) varies when 
the control loop is subject to malfunction while Table 3.21 compareS 
the actual change of b(k/k) with the expected change calculated from 
the knowledge of ~. 
Run Expected deviation Actual deviation 
number ~ due to malfunction due to malfunction ~ (V) • b (V) 
00/1 
- - -
DS/Aa -0.5106 V/p.s .i.g. - 0.619 - 0.284 
DS/Ab 11 11 - 0.244 . 
DS/Ac 11 11 ;.. 0.246 
00/ Ad 11 11 - 0.249 
ffi/ Ae 11 0.619 0.556 
DS/Af 11 11 0.462 
ffi/Ag 11 11 0.516 
DS/Ba -1.32 V/V - 0.66 - 0.72 
ffi/Bb 11 11 - 0;673 
DS/Ca -0.7353 V/p.s.i.g. - 0.882 . - 0.392 
ffi/Cb 11 11 . - 0.391· .. 
DS/Cc 11 11 - 0.357 
DS/Cd 11 0.882 0.781 
DS/Ce 11 11 0.823 
ffi/Cf 
" " 
0.758 
TABLE 3.21 Expected and actual shifts of loop security·parameter 
for direct digital control experiments. 
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These results show that the two proposed techniques of malfwlction 
detection can detennine faults in a d.d.c. loop. However, the checks 
do not yield any diagnostic information concerning the source of the 
control loop malfunction. 
3.18 Concluding r~rks 
A general method for detecting malfunction in an analogue setpoint 
or direct digital control loop has been proposed in this Chapter. 
The method aSSumes that the control loop can be represented by a 
linear, time invariant state variable model. The proposed checks can 
only be performed when the control loop is operating at a ·particular 
setpoint and nominal steady state value of process load as. detailed in 
the algorithm specification. 
The fundamental technique is based upon analysing closed control 
loop aperation under conditions of malfunction. The feasibility of 
detecting a particular instrumentation malfunction in a given control 
loop has been formulated in terms of a malfunction gain, ~, relating 
the change in magnitude of the control valve demand signal to the mal-
function. As'the magnitude of ~ increases, the ease of malfunction 
detection increases. In fact, for some critical loops where small 
malfunction cannot be tolerated, it is suggested that ~ may be used 
as a design criterion in specifying the control loop. 
Two malfunction detection techniques have been developed and both 
can be used while the control is operating·on~line. The two check 
methods are based upon an analysis of the available process meaSure-
ments using a Kalman filter to provide the data base for loop security 
interrogation. 
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I 
The Kalman filter used in the development of the proposed checks 
was constrained in this d1apter to be "opt:imal", although this is not 
a necessary condition for the implementation of the malfunction detec-
tion schemes. The problem of designing an "opt:imal" Kalman filter, 
due to uncertain a priori information about the system models and 
process noise statistics has been considered and Kehra's adaptive 
estimator was used to overcome this difficulty. 
The experimental results derived from a level control loop have 
shown that this adaptive technique fails to converge to an "opt:imal" 
filter when the true process measurement noise is small. In noisier 
systems, however, it has been found that the method is robust, consis-
tent and provides good estimates of the system state in spite of poor 
a priori information. 
The first proposed malfunction detection method is based upon 
the comparison of an original and current innovation sequence generated 
by the Kalman filter from a control loop operating at the same setpoint 
and load in each case. This check is applicable to both analogue set-
point and direct digital control loops. However~ the information 
gained from this check is only that a malfunction exists in the control 
loop and no diagnosis of the caus,e is possible. This type of check 
was in fact ,used in the detection of malfunction in a flow control 
loop. 
The second' check method is based upon the estimation of various 
loop security parameters which are indicative of malfunction." These 
parameters are calculated 'from the innovation sequence, generated by 
the KalIDan filter, and various system matrices est:imated in Mehra's 
adaptive est:imation scheme. This method provides a convenient and 
simple visual display of control loop security and does yield sane 
diagnostic in forma tion. 
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The laboratory experiments on an analogue setpoint control loop 
have shown that this method is able to discriminate between a pII 
transmitter malfunctiOn and other control loop errors. When the 
Kalman filter is designed optimally, the resulting estimates of the 
loop security parameters may be used to compensate for, this pII trans-
mitter malfunction, thereby creating a substitute corrected process 
measurement which is available to the computer. This is particularly 
important when this measurement is used in other computer programs for 
process evaluation, since incorrect measurements render such calcula-
tions useless. 
However; these comments do not apply to a dfrect digital control 
loop and as in the first check method" the loop security parameter 
estimation yields no diagnostic information on loop malfunction. 
The limitation of the proposed algorithms is the requirement that 
the tests should be perfonned at the same control loop setpoint and 
under the same process load each time an assessment of loop security 
is required. 
The setpoint constraint is not a major drawback since, as discussed 
in the flow control loop experiments of Chapter 2, it is possible to 
store in the computer the meanS of the innovation sequence or the loop 
security parameter estimates for several different valu,es of setpoint. 
Thus, when a malfunction' check is perfonned the current control loop 
characteristics may be compared with the stored values at the given 
setpoint. 
The problem of "large" changes in the nominal value of the load is 
more difficult. 
If the load change is measured, or can be approximated, from other 
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process considerations, then this poses no problem since the basic 
state variable model may be extended to include this extra coefficient. 
For example, the state space representation of the analogue setpoint 
control loop used in this Chapter, assuming constant nominal process 
load., was 
~(k+1) = A x{k) + r Q. (k) 
- - ~ 
I (k) = H ~(k) + .!(k) 
where ~ was a deviation variable representing small random unmeasured 
load disturbanceS. Now if Qi is subject to large changes, which are 
measured, the state variable model may be written as: 
~(k+1) = A x{k) + r Q. (k) + r w (k) 
- - ~ - (3.18.l) 
I (k) = H ~(k) + .! (k) (3 ,18 .2) 
In this fonnulation, .!(k), A, C, I{k), H, .!(k) have the same meaning 
and values as defined in Table 3.4. The process load Qi (k) is 
measured at each sample interval and w{k) is a zero mean Ge.ussian 
white noise sequence of covariance Q. . w{k) is included to account 
for uncertainty in measuring ~ (k) and other stochastic disturbanceS. 
Equations (3.18.l) and (3.18.2) are suitable for use in the Kalman 
filter, c.f. equations (3.4.l) and (3.4.2), and the malfunction detection 
method may be used with this new fonnulaticm. 
However, the case where the load is unmeasured and varies widely 
over short periods of time is not easily accounted for in the present 
method and it is suggested that this is an area for further research. 
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CHAPl'ER 4 
THE ROLE OF MALFUNCTION DEfECTION IN RELIABILITY, 
KAINTAINABILITY AND AVAILABILITY. 
4.1 List of Symbols 
A random var:iable assoc:iated with . 
real var:ia ble a. various 
mean system downtme per inspection interval tme units 
randllill var:ia ble assoc:ia ted with e1 
event consisting of an observation of the 
monitor signal at tme 1: when it is healthy. 
randllill vam ble assoc:ia ted with eZ 
event consisting of an observation of the 
monitor signal at time 1: when it is 
unhealthy. 
conditional probability density function for 
the monitor signal a. given event eZ 
f CUt ,e2) A/T
m
,E2 m 
fE (e1) 
1 
fE (eZ) Z 
fT (t) 
conditional probability density function for 
the monitor signal a. given event eZ and tm 
probability density function for event e1 
probability density function for event eZ 
equipnent/system failure probability density 
function; designer1s failure density function. 
probability density function for tme of failure 
when the monitor signal is a. 
-
fT/T~t(t/t ~ 1:) Conditional probability density function describing 
time of failure given survival up to time 1: 
f T/ Tm,E1 
(t/tm, e l ) conditional probability density function for 
time to failure given tm and event e1 
fT/Tm,Ez (t/tm, ez) conditional probability density function for 
time to failure given tm and event ez 
probability density function for time to init:ial -
malfunction. 
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fTJ~ (tJe1) conditional. probability density function for time 
to initial. ma1.function given event e1 
f
TJE2 
(tJe2) conditional. probability density function for t:ime 
to initial. ma1.function given event e2 
f
TJA
,E
2 
(to/a. ,e2) conditional. probability density function for 
time to initial. ma1.function t
m
, given the monitor 
signal. a. and the event e2 
f~ (Q) probability density function for t:ime to failure Q 
(operator's failure density function) 
proba bility density function for t:ime of failure 
when the monitor signal. is a 
f~/T~L(Q/t~L) conditional. probability density function for 
t:ime of failure Q given survival. up to tme L 
f~/T = L (~/tm = L) conditional. probability density function 
m 
for t:ime of failure Q given the t:ime of 
observa tion equa1.s the initial. ma1.function t:ime 
(tenninal. failure density function) 
fQ/ T El (Q/tm, e1 ) conditional. probability density function 
m, 
for t:ime of failure Q given tm and the 
event e1 
f~/Tm,E2 (~/tm,e2) conditional. probability density function for 
t:ime of failure ~ given tm and the event, e2 
fX (x) 
F( L ) 
K 
k 
probability density function 
failure probability distribution (= [LfT(t) dt) 
constant in equation (4.7.l..5.6) 
constant in equations (4.6.l..4), (4.6.l.o5) and 
constant in equation (4.7.1.1.1) 
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m 
R(9} 
Rn(t} 
R01 (9) 
ROII(9} 
Rom(9} 
T 
t 
x 
x 
z{t} 
constant in equation (4.7.1.2.1) 
constant in equation (4.7.l.6.l) 
mean time between failure (1 lA ): 
constant in equations (4.6.l.4), (4.6.l.S) 
and (4.7.1.1). 
mean time between failure for an 
inspected system. 
constant in equation (4.7.1.1.1) 
constant in equation (4.7.1.2.1) 
constant in equation (4.7.1.6.1) 
prOM bility. 
system reliability: reliability function on 
the des:i,gner's time scale: des:i,gner' s 
reliability. 
reliability function on the operator's t:ime 
scale: opera tor's reliability. 
des:i,gner's reliability. 
operator's reliability 1 
operator's reliability 11 
operator's reliability III 
random variable associated with t. 
time : time on the des:i,gner1s time scale. 
random variable associated with tm 
time of initial malfunction measured on the 
des:i,gner's time scale. 
random variable associated with x 
dummy variable 
hazard rate on des:i,gner1s time scale. 
time 
units 
time 
units 
time units 
11 11 
11 
" 
11 
" 
failures/ 
. unit time 
z{t/t~1) 
Greek letters 
a 
13 
n) 
e 
e 
I-1T 
I-1T 
m 
l-1a/T =1 
m 
1-1 x 
hazard rate corresponding to fa:i.lure density 
function fT/T~"[ (t/t;?1 ) 
hazard rate corresponding to fa:i.lure density 
function f T/ T E (tit ,e1 ) m' 1 m 
hazard rate corresponding to fa:i.lure density . 
function f T/ T E (tit ) 
. . m' 2 m,e2 
monitor signal 
probability level 
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(measured from the t:ime of monitor observation 
:i..e. 8 = t -"[ ) 
randan variable associated with e 
hazard (failure) rate (constant) 
mean of random variable T 
mean of randan variable Tm 
mean of random variable a given that this 
is measured from the t:ime of the :i.nitial 
malfunction. 
mean of the dunmy random variable X 
:i.nspection frequency; 
t:ime of observation of the equipnent andjorof 
the monitor, measured on the designer's t:ime 
scale. 
jo:i.nt probability density function of the 
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4.2 Introduction 
AB the chemical industry has developed, the st:imulatiim of the 
economic rewards which may be obtained from rapid process commi ssioning, 
fewer major equipment failures, reduced maintenance costs and a ltigher 
on-stream production t:ime has led to the increasing application and 
development of reliability engineering (3). (7), (116), (117). 
The concepts of reliability engineering originated in the aircraft 
industry during world War n, and have now developed into a discipline 
with applications ranging :from the aerospace to the nuclear reactor 
industry. Reliability engineering relies heavily upon probability 
theory for its developnent, and many of the fundamental concepts may 
be found in references (28), (118) -(121). 
Paralleling this growth has been an interest in the monitoring of 
equipnent to detect potential failures in advance. 1his may result 
in four advantages: 
i) Dangerous proceSS Situations which may put personnel at risk 
may be avoided. 
ii) Unscheduled process stoppages which diBrupt production may be 
avoided. 
iii) Unnecessary damage to equipment may be prevented by identifying 
the fault at an incipient stage, 
iv) A rational approach to equipment maintenance may be employed 
since the forewarning of :impending fail.ure enables a planned 
scheduled repair to be perfonned rather than an emergency repair. 
Also the need to djsmantle serviceable equipnent for examination 
during the preventive maintenance period may be avoided. 
The use of a monitoring device for any particular application 
requires a knowledge of the failure mechanisms of the system, the 
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operating Characteristics of the heal.thy system and the optimum type 
of monitor for the given system. Edwardli and Lees (1) have suggested 
that malfunction monitoring schemes. can be based upon the condition or 
perfonnance of·the equipment. However, the fonner is more couunon and 
is referred to as condition monitoring. 
Sane methods of equipnent condition monitoring have been reviewed 
by Dowson (11) and Trotter (12). . The method of vibration analysis is 
well developed and widely USed to monitor the state of rotating 
machinery (122), (123), (124). Other monitoring techniques, such as 
shock pulse testing (125), meChanical debris analysis (126) and acoustic 
ineasurements (22), (127), (128), (129) are less well developed, but 
their practical appl.ication is increasing. Typically these monitors 
produce a signal which is indicative, with some degree of uncerta:inty, 
that the equipment is healthy, unheal.thy or failed. 
The case for using a. process computer to monitor and detect system 
mal.flUlction was considered, in general terms, in Chapter 1. Initially, 
in formulating this project, it was decided to examine the role of 
equipment condition monitoring by considering. the conSequences of equip.. 
ment inspection and malfunction detection on both the economic and 
rel.iability aspects of the system. Details. of this study are given in 
section 4.4. 
However, as this project developed, it became apparent that the 
precise way in Which the condition monitor· :infol1lllL tion was used to 
modify est:imates of the system rel.iability, availability and ma:inta:in-
ability was not adequately described by the existing rel.iability theory. 
Section 4.5 of this Chapter is a contribution to such a theory. 
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4.3 Some fWldamental concepts and definitions 
Inperfonning any study in reliability engineering it is of prime 
importance to define explicitly what constitutes an equipment failure. 
Lees (4) has suggested that the most common practical definition 
of instrument failure is that the instrument is not operating to the 
satisfaction of the process operator. 
Green and Bourne (119) have fonnally defined failure as: 
"The condition of a component, equipment or system whereby a 
particular performance characteristic or m.unber of performance 
characteristics, of such a device has moved outside the assessed 
specification range for that characteristic in such a way that 
the component, equipment or system can no longer perform 
adequa tely in the deSired manner." 
The point about these definitions is that the application of the 
equipment determines what constitutes a failure. This feature was 
discussed in Chapter 2, when the rel:ia.bility of a flow control loop was 
discussed in terms of the reproducibility and absolute accuracy of the 
system. 
Equipment failures may be further subdivided into revealed and 
Wlrevealed failures. 
A revealed failure is defined in (119) as a failure of a component, 
equipment or system which is autanatically brought to light on its 
occurrence. 
An WlTevealed failure (119) is a failure of a component, equipment 
or system Wich remains hidden Wltil revealed by some thorough proof-
testing. procedure. 
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To complete this definition, the concept of proof testing is 
required (ll9). 
"Proof testing is a method of ensuring that a component, 
equipment or system possesses all the required performance 
chamcteriBtics and is capable of responding to input conditions 
in the deSired manner. tI 
In terms of these definitions the malfunction detection algorithms 
developed in this thesis and (1) and (9) are system proof tests des~ed 
to detect unrevealed failures, particularly gmdual and developing 
faults. 
4.4 The effect of a periodic equipment inspection policy on some 
reliability perfo:noance indices 
'Dlis section examines the effect of equipJlent condition monitoring 
on seveml aspects of system reliability. 
There is an extensive litem ture on the design of opt:iJDal inspection 
and maintenance policies for stochastically failing equipment. Reviews 
of these schemes have been given by McCall (130), Berg and Epstein (131), 
and Jardine (132). Ingeneml, the des~ of such policieS is based 
upon the optimisation of some formulated economic objective function. 
For example, the cost of equipment inSpection in terms of labour, lost 
production, etc., may be balanced again~t the benefits of' detecting 
failure, such as minimising the equipJlent repair time. 
However in this section a much more fundamental approach is 
adopted. Possibly the s:implest equipment inspection scheme of all is 
the periodic policy, where the state of the system is determined every 
"( time units. Now one of the suggested advantages of using a process 
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computer to monitor equipment condition was that the machine could 
perfonn very frequent tests or checlal of the system state without 
incurring a higher probability of error in interpreting the results. 
'Ihi.S is contrary to the human operator's performance. AlBo, the 
use of a process computer to monitor equipnent condition is relatively 
inexpensive, since often tests may be perforined while the equipnent is 
on-J.ine. 
In the follow:ing sections it is assumed that a process canputer 
is used to periodically inspect and detect unrevealed faults in the 
system, and the effect .of the inspection frequency, 1 , on some 
features of the system reliability is examined. 
It is assumed throughout the analysis that the computer is a 
perfect detector, i.e. if an unrevealed equipment failure is present, 
then the computer detects it with probability 1. 
4.4.1 Mean downtime per inSpection interval 
Suppose that a system is operated continuously and is inspected 
for an unrevealed fault every 1 time units. An example of such a 
system may be a control loop which is examined for malfunction using 
one of the techniques developed earlier. Obviously, the system can 
be in a failed state during some proportion of the time between 
monitorings without the process operator being aware of this. 
Now let the system failure probability density function be fT(t), 
ehen the mean system downtime in the interval (0,1 ) between ·inspections 
is (120): t ~ (1 - t) fT(t) dt 
o 
d 1 represents the mean time from system failure until inspection (and 
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detection) • Now assuming the repair time is significantly less than 
the time between monitorings, the mean downtime (unavailability) in a 
time period T can be found in the steady state as: 
L 
i 
Clearly, d1: is a function of 1: , and an investigation of how this 
relationship varied with inspection interval for several eqUipment con-
f~ tions was conSidered. Table 4.1 summarises the systems analysed 
and the assumptions made in deriving the system failure density function 
fT(t). The fundamental failure probability density function for a 
single equipment was assumed to be exponential with a hazard rate A • 
'!he relationship between d 1: and 1: for various systems is shown 
in Figure 4.1. This Shows that d1: decreases as the inspection interval, 
1: ,decreases, although the relationship is not linear and the reduction 
in downtime achieved becomes smaller as the inspection frequency increaSes. 
In particular, it can -be seen that for system applications where an 
infrequent inspection policy is adopted, then a 2 out of 3 parallel redun-
dIlnt system will, on average, be in -a failed condition for more time than 
_a single equipment. Thus, in terms of the mean downtime per inspection 
interval, a single eqUipment offers better perfo:nnance and also represents 
a smaller capital cost. 
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Configuration fT(t) A d1: Alisumptions 
Single A e-At 0.001 1: -\ (1- e-A1: ) 
-
equipment 
TWo equipment . i) Switch is ~erfect. 
standby redun- A2 t e-At 0.001 -h 2 2 ii) Equipments fail only in the on-e (1:+ -r) + (1: - T) line ~osition; 
dant system. iii) SYStem is failed when both 
equipments are failed. 
iv) Both equipments have the same 
failure rate and ex;ponent:ial 
failure probability density 
function. 
TWo equipment 
e..)..1:(..1_..!... e-A1: i) System is failed when both 
parallel redun- 2 A (e~t_e-2A t) 0.001 ) equipments are failed. A 2A 
dantsystEIII. + (l: ;. ir ) ii) Both equipments have the same failure rate and' exponent:ial 
failure probability density 
function. 
TWo out of three i) System is failed when two or 
parallel redun- 6 A (e-2A t _ e-JAt ) 0.001 ! (i + .1 e-2~.l: _ ~ e-3AT ) more equipments are failed. 
dan t systEIII. 
A 2 3,. ii) All equipments have the same 
+1: failure rate and exponent:ial failure probability density 
function. 
TABLE 4.1. Effect of inspection interval on system downt:ime. 
1 
A 
1 
2A 
downtime/inspection 
interval 
time units 
2-3 parallel 
~-,ingle V equipment 
2 parallel 
2 standby 
o ~~~=e~----------~I~----------------~~In----------o 1.0 2.0 
Normalised inspection interval At 
FIGURE 4.1 Effect of inspection interval on systElll downtime. 
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4.4.2 Mean t:ime between failures of maintained redundant systems 
'Dle mean t:ime between failure (MTBF) of a system is often used as 
a fi8w'e of merit in reliability engineering, and is defined as the 
expected t:ime for a system to reach a failed state. 
It may be shown (118) tbat the MTBF is given by integrating the 
reliability fWlction, R{t), aver the range t = 0 to 00 
m = lR (t) dt 
o 
Thus on average any given redWldant system w:iJ.l fail once every m 
t:ime units if the failed components of a redundant system are not 
replaced Wltil the complete system fails. 
m may be increased by introducing a maintenance policy (130), 
(131). Suppose the adopted policy is one such tbat the system com-
ponents are inspected periodically to determine failure, and on deteo-
tion, failed components are repaired or replaced. If this policy is 
USed then the system may be expected to fail less frequently tban it 
would without inspections, because it is assumed tbat every new opera-
ting period after inspection begins with full system redWldancy 
restored. Thus the MTBF for the inspected system; dehoted m"[, 
becomes longer tban m and in theory it would become infinite if 
failed redWldant components were immediately detected and replaced. 
m"[ is a function of the inspection interval,"[ , and Bazavsky 
(133) has shown that it is related to the system reliability, R (t), 
according to: 
"[ 
!R{t) dt 
o 
1 - R{"[) 
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Under the adopted maintenance policy, the redundant system is 
inspected for failures in its canponents every l: time units. If the 
inspection reveals failed components, they are replaced or repaired so 
that full system redundancy is restored. If an inspection does not 
reveal failures, then assuming the system components have exponential 
failure probability laws, the system is considered renewed. 
The inspected system MTBF, ml: ' is a -function of the inspection 
frequency, l:, and the relations between them for several redundant 
systems were derived using equation (4.4.2.1) and are given in Table 
4.2. The assumptions made in deriving Table 4.2 were the same as 
those described in Table 4.1. 
Figure 4.2 shows how m. varies, as a function ofl: for the systems 
Configuration fT (t) R (t) m ml: 
Two equipment 
-At e..f..t(l +A t) m - e-l..l:~m +l: ~ standby A 2t e 2 
- e-t..l:(l +A l: ) 
redundant 'X 1 
Two equipment 
2A(e-zAt_ e...:t..t ) e..{..t(2 _ e...:t..t ) 
...:t..l: 2 e -A l: 
parallel 1- m-e (A-~) 
2A 
redundant 1 - e:::Xl: (2 - ;=-t) 
Two out of 
- ).: -Al: 
6A(e-zAt_ e-3At ) e-zAt (3 _ 2e~t ~ -2 I(3 2e ) three m - e 2X - 3A 
parallel 1 _ e-2Al:(3- _ 2e-Al: ) 
redundant 
TABLE 4.2. Effect of inspection interval on redundant- system mean time 
between failures 
given in Table 4.2. 
In each of the systems considered there is quite a Significant 
improvement in MTBF as the inspection frequency increases (orl: decreases). 
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Mean 
time !Q. 
between A 
failure 
m 
1: 
6 
A 
1 3 4 
Nomalised inspection interval A 1: 
5 
2 standby 
2 parallel 
2/3 parallel 
6 
FIGURE 4.2 Effect of inspection interval on redundant system 
mean system between failure 
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4.4.3 
In particular, for a two equipment standby redundant system, the MTBF 
can be doubled by inspecting the system once every 0.75 lA time units. 
For example, suppose A = 0.001 then m = 2000. Now using the· 
described inspection policy with I = 750, gives mI = 4000. 
DesY;n and economics of maintained redundant systems 
A designer is often called upon to specify a system to meet a 
certain MTBF criterion. There are a number of design alternatives 
available, ranging from a single equipment to redundant systems main-
tained in such a way as to minimise some cost function. The precise 
selection of the system is a function of many criteria. However, to 
illustra te the value of a malfunction detection policy, it is assumed 
that the designer has only two alternatives. 
To meet the specified MTBF the designer may use an n parallel 
redundant system or a 2 parallel system employing a periodic inspection-
maintenance policy with an inspection interval I 
Section 4.4.2 has shown that by choOSing the interval I , the 
designer can achieve any deSired system MTBF, and so make the 2 
parallel system equivalent to any n parallel redundant system. 
For example, the 2 parallel system with a periodic inspection 
policy has a MTBF given in Table 4.2 by 
\ -AI 3 -/\1 (2 e ) 
m = "iX- e X-~ 
I 1 _ e-X"! (2 - e-I) 
Now Suppose the deSign requirement is for a system to have a MTBF of not 
11 less than OX" . The designer may thus choose a 3 parallel redundant 
system or a 2 parallel system with a periodic inspection-maintenance 
policy Where 1 is determined by solving:-
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~. -At 3 -At: (2 e ) 
= iA- e X-~ 
1 - e-Xt (2 _ e=1) 
The solution of this equation yields the maximum value of the inspection 
interval t max which meets the design requirement. Any inspection 
interval t less than tmax consequently results in the 2 parallel system 
having a longer MTBF than the design specification. 
In a similar manner, the value tmax such that a 2 parallel system 
has an equivalent MTBF to any n parallel redundant system may be deter-
mined. 
The results of such an analysis are shown in Figure 4.3. . This 
Figure shows that the inspection frequencies needed to replace n 
parallel systems are modest. For example, a 7 parallel redundant 
system may be replaced by a 2 parallel system With a periodic inspection 
scheduled every O~65 time units, where ~ is the MTBF of a single 
component. 
Summarising, sections 4.4.1 to 4.4.3 have examined and quantified, 
in terms of some reliability perfonnance indices, the consequences of 
employing a periodic malfunction detection policy to determine unrevealed 
failures in plant equipment and instruments; 
This rather brief and tentative study has revealed that the conSe-
quences of monitoring can be profound and that, for the reliability 
perfonnance indices conSidered, relatively infrequent inspections 
resulted in Significant improvement. The indications are that campu-
terised monitoring schemes, which may be implemented frequently, would 
enhance the overall system security and as such should be the subject 
of continuing effort so that baSic system malfunction detection 
algorithms are available. 
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7 
6 
Number 5 
of 
para.llel 
redundant4 
equipments 
3 
2 
• 
; .. 
• 
2A 
Maximum Inspection Interval 
1 3' A 2/\ 
1: of 2 para.llel redundant 
max 
systems. 
FIGURE 4.3 Equivalence of n parallel and inspected 2 parallel systems. 
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4.5 The effect of malfunction monitoring on reliability, 
maintainability and availability 
.' 
.'. , . 
Despite the voluminous literature on reliability and maintenance 
probl.e1DB and policies (130), (131), the effect of equipment malftmction 
monitoring does not appear to have been adequately considered in terms 
of reliability theory. 
Derman (134), Kolesar (135), Klein (1.36) and many others have repre-
sented a single equipment, subject to degradation, by a series of 
healthy, unhealthy and failed Markov states and subsequently derived 
maintenance policies designed to achieve the odnimisation of some 
economic objective function. The proposed maintenance strategies 
assume that an equipment inspection procedure is capable of detecting 
which state the system is in at the observation time. 
A more general Markov model was used by Saw and lave (137) who 
assumed that the equipment state could not be observed directly, but 
only through a probabilistic observer. The extension of the Markov 
system degradation representation to redundant systems has not proved 
trivial, although Mine and Kawai (138) have considered two equipment 
systems. 
The problem of a post-mortem failure diagnosis has been considered 
by Gross (1.39). It is assumed that a 2 component system fails, but 
whether component 1 or 2 is the cause is unknown. The repairman can 
use a diagnostic monitor which enables the failed component to be 
located. By balancing the additional cost incurred in system repair 
if the repainnan makes the incorrect decision concerning the choice of 
component for repair against the cost of purchaSing a diagnostic tool 
Gross determines·the optimal amount to be spent in providing such a 
tool. 
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Polovko (140) and Jensen (141) have examined the problem of calcu-
lating the reliabiJ.ity of systems which are subject to gradual failure 
(as opposed to catastrophic failure) due to component parameter drift. 
In this case failure is defined when the system output does not-meet 
some predetermined specification. 
Dle problem of equipments deteriorating over a period of time in 
store has been discussed by Welker (142). The degradation process is 
characterised by some ContinUDUS parameter (for example temperature) 
which is discretised to form a series of Markov states. By using 
Markovian theory with this monitoring process an equipment replacement 
maintenance policy is derived. 
However, in spite of this activity, there does not appear to be an 
adequate framework for the assessment and contribution of malfunction 
monitoring to reliabiJ.ity. In this work the approach adopted is that 
the reliabiJ.ity is a function of the state of knowledge of the system 
(143), and as such can be decomposed into the designer's and operator's 
reliabiJ.ity. The impact of malfunction monitoring on the operator's 
reliability is then considered. 
The mathematical quantities and notation used in the following 
sections have been reviewed in Appendix I, while some problems encoun-
tered in the use of Markov models are given in Appendix V. 
4.5.1 Malfunction monitoring 
Some reviews of malfunction monitoring techniques were discussed 
in section 4.2. In general, equipnent monitors are special, dedicated 
instruments which measure some distinctive feature of the system's 
condition or perfo:nnance. However, a monitor need nO.t be·a special 
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instnnnent and a process canputer examining the state of its measuring 
instnnnents may als.o be considered as a ma:Lfunction monitor. 
The fundamental feature of these monitors is that they produce a 
signal which is indicative of the equipnent health. This signal on 
. which the monitor is based may be a direct reading or a derived function 
(for example, vibration measurements often involve spectral analysis). 
However, in each case it is assumed that the final monitor signal v.ill 
resemble the function shown in Figure 4.4. 
This ·curve has three regions: I, the equipnent is healthy; 
n, the initial ma:Lfunction has developed at time tm' so that the equip.. 
ment is unhealthy and failing; Ill, the equipment has failed. Region 
Il represents the failure characteristic of the equipnent and is the 
time period in which incipient malfunction detection is possible. 
I n. III 
Monitor 
signal 
.Time t 
Figure 4.4 Typical signal from malfunction monitor. 
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4.5.2 Re~bility! m~int~in~bility ~d ~v~ilAbility 
Before proceeding with the theoretical development, it ill necessary 
to explicitly define what can and cannot be achieved by malfunction 
monitoring. AIJ a vehicle for ·dilIcussion a single equipment is con-
sidered since this illustrates most clearly the capabilities and 
limitations of malfunction monitoring. 
4.5.2.1 Failure and reliability regimes 
Failure rate may be regarded as a property of the equipment, 
although it may not be known. Reliability, however, ill a probability 
which an engineer estimates. Now adopting the interpretation of 
Tribus (143) that probability ill smplya n\Dllerical encoding of the 
state of knowledge about a system, then the concept of reliability may 
be decomposed into several different regimes. 
The first reliability regime pertains to the plant designer!s 
ri.ewpoint of the equipment operation. The designer adopts a macro-
scopic view of the equipment ·operation and ill concerned with the over-
all reliability of the equipment measured from the t:ime of plant start-
up. This tme ill denoted t. In fonnulating his estimate of reli-
ability the designer considers the ·overall failure rate and charac-
teristiCS of the equipment. This reliability ill the conventional 
reliability, R{t), which ill referred to here as the "designer's 
reliability", 
The second reliability regime ill thAt of the plant operator. The 
plant operator ill much more concerned with the ~ operation of 
the equipment than the designer since, after the ·plant sta~p, he can 
inspect the equipment for failure at any particular t:ime 1: and thereby 
actively update hiS knowledge of equipment operation. For example, 
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the desii;ner may estimate that the reliability of the equipment 
surviv:ing 1: time units fran start up as R(1: ) -= 13 • However, the 
operator can :inspect the equipment at time 1: and if it is operating 
his assessment of reliability is 1, while if it is failed it is O. 
This is not the same reliability estimate as the desii;ner1s. 
The time scale of the plant operator is measured from the time 
that he observes the state of the equipment and is denoted Q. Since 
the observation occurs at time 1: on the first time scale t then: 
(4.5.2.1.1) 
By redef:in:ing his time scale like this, the operator can make a running 
or dynamic estimate of the reliability, denoted R(Q). This is true 
, whether or not the plant opera tor is practising malfunction monitoring, 
s:ince the information ga:ined at each izispection is Simply that the 
equipment has not failed :in the ':interval (0,1:). 
This second reliability regime is referred to as the "operator1s 
reliability" • 
If the plant operator is practis:ing malfunction monitoring, however, 
his state of knowledge about the equipment operation is :increased 
further by conSidering the monitor ':information. When the operator 
examines ,the monitor at time 1: and records a healthy mon;i,.tor signal, 
then he has three pieces of :information. He knows the overall equip-
ment failure rate and failure probability density function, the fact 
that the equipment has not failed :in the interval (0,1: ) and finally 
that the monitor signal is healthy and so immediate equipment failure 
is less likely. However, if the signal is unhealthy when he examines 
the monitor, he again knows the,above information except that he now 
expects failure to be more likely :in the near future. 
using these various :information sets, it can be seen ,that there 
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are four possible reliability regimes and est:imates to consider: 
i) Designer's reliAbility; 
ii) Operator's reliAbility I - no monitor; 
iii) Operator's reliAbility II - monitor 
signal healthy; 
iv) Operator's reliAbility III - monitor 
- signal unhealthy. 
1hese different est:imates of the reliAbility of a single equipment 
do not in any way change its failure rate. However, they can be used 
to modify decisions in the operation and maintenance of1he equipment. 
4.5.2.2 Maintainability and availability 
Several advantages of equipment monitoring were discussed in 
section 4.2. However, the aspect considered here is the reduction of 
repair time and the improvement of maintainability. There are several 
ways in which equipment repair may be improved by monitoring. These 
include avoiding severe equipment damage, pennitting better repair 
strategies (such as the organisation and coordination of maintenance 
crews, and the location of the relevant equipment spares), and allowing 
better planning of process operation. If these benefits did material-
_ ise, then repair time and consequently maintainability of a single 
equipment may be a function of monitoring. 
Since single equipment availability is also a function of repair 
time and failure rate, then it too may be a function of the monitoring 
activity; 
However, as already stated, the -reliAbility of a single equipment, 
in the conventional Sense of the designer's reliability, is not affected 
by monitoring. 
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4.6 Reliability functions for a single equipment 
4.6.1 Designer1s reliability 
'l'h:ia is the conventional reliability function. Denoting the 
overall probability failure density function by fT(t), then the 
reliability flD1ction is given by: 
~(t) = 1 - fT(t) dt Jt 
o 
If the designer uses an exponential failure density function for 
f T( t), then: 
fT(t) c: A exp (-At) 
Rn(t) = exp (-A t) (4.6.1.3 ) 
If a Weibull failure density flD1ction is used, then (118): 
fT(t) c: k tmexp(- ~:+~) (4.6.1.4) 
~(t) = exp (- ~+m;1) 
4.6.2 Operator1s reliability I 
In this case the opera tor does not ,have the benefit of a maL-
fuD.ction monitor, but' he can inspect the equipment at any t:ime 1: and 
satisfy hlmself that the equipment has not failed. Thus at the 
inspection time 1: the infomation available to the operator is: 
i) The equipment has not failed in the interval (0,1: ). 
ii) The overall probability failure density function of the equipment. 
He can use this infomation to condition the failure density func-
tion and pose the question: "What is the probability of failing at 
time t, given equipment survival up to time 1: (i.e.t> 1: )1" 
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Mathematically, the conditional failure density flDlction is 
described by {28}: 
f T/ T ~"t (t / t ~"t ) = 0 
fT{t) 
= 
1 - jiT{t) dt 
"t s;t<oo (4.6.2.2) 
o 
Now setting e = t -"t and using the random var:iable transfonnation 
theorem (28), 
= 
fT{e+t) 
o <e<oo 
1-F{"t) 
and so the rel:iabiJity becomes: 
e . 
RoI (e)= 1 - jfe/T>"t (e / t>"t) de 
o 
'" 1 __ .....::1 __ 
.1-F{"t) 
e J fT (eH) de 
o 
lIhen fT ( t) is exponent:ial then: 
RoI (a) = exp (-Aa) 
If fT{t) is a Weibull flDlction then: 
a 
(4.6.2.5) 
(4.6 .2.6) 
1 - . 1 J k(8+"t)m f_k(8-R)m+1) d8 
(
_ k"t m+1). exp, m+1 .. 
exp m+1 . . 
o (4.6.2.8) 
RoI (a) s:imply represents a "running" est:imate of the rel:iabiJity 
designed to include the fact that the equipment has not failed up to 
the current observation t:ime. 
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4.6.3 Operator's reliability 11 
The operator has a malfWlction monitor. At time t he examines the 
monitor and recordS a healthy s~l and so he has the following 
infonnation: 
i) The equipment has not failed in the interval (0, t), i.e. 
t <t<oo 
ii) The monitor reading is healthy and so incipient failure has not 
begun, i.e. 1 <tm:S:OO 
iii) The terminal probability failure density function. This density 
function represents the wear-out characteristic of the equipment 
and it is assumed that this can be derived from an analysis of 
the experimental failure data when the time of failure is measured 
fran the first occurrence of the init:iAl malfunction, i.e. 1 = t 
m 
This is denoted fg /~ =1 (e /tm = t ). 
iv) The malfunction monitor is perfect, i.e. the instrument does not 
fail. 
The reliability function may be derived as follows. 
Let the event el be defined as the facts that a monitor observation 
is made at time t , the s~l is healthy, t < t:5:00 and 1 < tm:5:00. 
Now defining a joint probability density function for the random var:iAbles 
T, Tm and El gives (28): 
PT,Tm,~ (t,tm,el ) = fT/Tm,El 
Integrating ldth respect to t and el yields the marginal failure m. 
density function fT(t), i.e. 
fT(t) = J J fT/Tm'~ (t/tm,el ) fTm/~ (tm/el ) fEl (el)dtm del 
range range 
. Tm 
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However, the event el is a certain event and so: 
fE (el ) = 5 (e l ) 1 
Then equation (4.6.3.2) becanes: 
fT(t) = f fT/Tm,E
l 
(t/tm,el ) \/~ (tJel ) dtm 
range 
Tm 
Now recalling that e = t -1: and using the transfonnation theorem 
(28) gives: 00 
. fe(e)= ffT/Tm'~ (1:+e/t m,el ) fTJ~ (tJel ) dtm (4.6.3.5) 
1: 
The density function for the randan variabJ.e Tm' conditioned upon the 
event el' simply states that Tm cannot have a value in the interval 
(0,1:) '. Mathematically this is given by: 
fTm (tm) t < t~OO (4.6.3.7a) 
fTJ~ (tJel ) = :t 
1- ffTm (tm)d tm 
'0 
=0 
The reliability function is deteI1llined fran equation (4.6.3.5) as: 
e 
or 
RoII( e) = 1 - f f e (e) de , 
o 
1 -
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4.6.4 Operator's reliability III 
The operator has a monitor which he :inspects at time 1:, but this 
t:ime the signal :indicates an unhealthy equipnent. Therefore at the 
observation time the following :infonnation is available to the operator: 
i} The equipment has not failed:in the :intervai (0,1:), i.e.1: <t<oo 
ii} The monitor read:ing is unhealthy and has a particular value a. at 
time 1: , and cansequently 0 < t ~ 1: • 
. m 
ill} The terminal failure density flmction felT =1: (9 /tm =1: ). 
m 
iv} The probability density flmction describ:ing the values of the 
monitor signal values a. frem the t:ime of :initial mal.i'uilction. 
It is assmned that this would. be determ:ined exper:imentally from 
the characteristics of the monitor. 
v} The malfunction monitor is perfect, i.e. the :instrument does not 
fail. 
The derivation of the reliability proceeds as follows. The event 
e2 is def:ined as the observation time 1:, the signal is unhealthy, 
0< tms 1: and 1: < tSoo. Then writing the joint probability 
density function for the random variables T, . Tm and E2 gives: 
Integrating with respect to tm and e2 yiel.dl! the marginal probability 
density flmction f f fT/Tm,E2 (t/tm,e2) fTn/E2 (tn/e2) fE2 (e2}dtm de2 
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But by definition: 
fE (e
z
) = 5 (e
z
) 
Z 
The conditional probability density function fToIEz (tole
z
) is 
derived frlJll the probability density function for the time of initial 
malflDlction fT (tm) given the event eZ' i.e. 0 < tms t . 1his 
m 
is given by,: 
fToIEz (tm/ez ) = 
= 0 
In this context fToIEz (tolez) is;1n a priori density function. 
However, there is ;1vailible further infonnation in the form of the 
malfunction monitor si,gruLl a. which may be used to modify the estimate 
, The joint probability density function for the random vari.a.bles 
Tm' A, EZ may be written as: 
= fA/Tm,Ez (a./tm,ez ) fTo!EZ (to!ez) fEZ (ez ) 
(4.6.4.7) 
F.qullting (4.6.4.6) and (4.6.4.7) yields B<1yes; theorem: 
fA/Tm,Ez (a. /tm,ez ) fToIEz (to!ez )' 
fA/Ez (a. fez) 
z95 
But by the extension :rule (28),(143) fA/E2 (a/e2) may be written 
as: 
f 
and so equation (4.6.4.8) becomes: 
= fAlT,E (a /tm,e2) fT lE (tu/e2) f Tu/A,E2 
(tu/a ,e2) . m 2 of 2 
f fAIT E (a/t ,e2) fT lE (tu/e2) dtm ~ 2 m of 2 
range 
Tm (4.6.4.10) 
The conditional probability density function f Tu/A,E2 
(tu/a ,e2) is an 
a posteriori density function. This is simply the conditional density of 
T given the value a, and expresses the degree of belief of the location m . 
of the value of tm given the result of observing the malfunction monitor. 
Equation (4.6.4.10) is used in place of (4.6.4.5) in equation (4.6.4.4) 
to give: 
Changing the variable e = t -t and using the transformation theorem (28) 
t . !fT/ Tm,E2 ( t +e/tm,e2) f Tu/A,E2 (tu/a ,e2) d tm 
o 
The reliability function then becomes: 
e 
ROIl! (e ) = 1 - f f e (e ia) dB 
o 
e 1: 
= 1 - f f fT'T E· (1: +ejtm,e2) fT lA E (to!a ,e2) d tm de 
, m' 2 n( , 2 
o 0 
4.7 Illustrative example 
4.7.1 Basic probability density fWlctions 
The expressions for the designer's and operator's reliability were 
given in equations (4.6.1.1), (4.6.2.5), (4.6.3.8) and (4.6.4.13). 
Their use will be illustrated, but first the probability density fWlc-
tions used in the previous mater:iAl will be considered, and typical 
density fWlctions chosen for the illustrative example. 
The main probability density fWlction used is the Weibull fWlction 
which is 
and !-LX 
(118): 
fx (x) '" k J!l exp (- kmX:~) 
r~\ 1) 
= 
m + 1 (L ). l/mH 
m+1 
This density ftmction is very flexible and byappropr:iAte choice of m 
and k can be made to approximate other standard probability density 
fWlctions. When m = 0 the exponent:iAl distribution is obtained, and 
when m = 1 the distribution becomes the Rayleigh distribution. Thus 
the parameter m determines the' shape of the distribution while k 
does not affect the shape but, serves as a scaling factor. 
4.7.1.1 Overall failure density fWlction fr--ill 
It is assumed that the designer knows fran an analysis of the 
equipnent failure data the overall failure density fWlction, which is 
represented in this case by the Weibull fWlction: 
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The corresponding hazard function is 
m1 
z (t) = k1 t 
For the purpose of this analysis it is assumed that the operator 
knows. the equipment tenninal failure density function. This is deter-
mined on monitored equipment by analysing the data on failures when the 
t:ime of failure is measured from the initial malfunction t:ime t
m
• In 
this eJIllmple it is assumed that the teIminal failure hazard rate is 
given by: 
Generally the failure density function is related to the hazard 
l1L te according to (li8): t f z(t) dt) 
o 
Thus using equation (4.7.1.2.1) in (4.7.1.2.2) the corresponding tel1llinal 
failure density function is found as: 
fT(t) = 0 
'" (kz+ kit - tm)~) ~ 
Setting e = t - 1: and noting t '" 1: then the transformation theorem 
. . m 
yields the tel1llinal failure density function 
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m 
felT =1: (9/tm=1:) = (~+ k:3 g 2) exp 
m 
Now consider the event el' which is an observation at t:ime 1: with 
the monitor signal healthy. 
The opera tor's equipment failure model· is described as follows. 
He knows the equipment has not failed in the t:ime :interval (0, 1:), and 
that it cannot fail IDltil the :initial malfunction has occurred. After 
t the equipment fails accord:ing to the tezminal probability failure m . 
density function. Thus the hazard rate is: 
z (t) = 0 
= 0 
O<t:::;: 1: . (4.7.1.2.5&) 
1:< t~tm (4.7.1.2.5b) 
tm<t:::;:oO (4.7.l.2.5c) 
and the' corresponding failure density function is: 
= 0 
0< t~ 1: 
1:< t~ tm (4.7.l.2.6b) 
~+1 
k3(t - t m) 
-kz(t- t m) - m2 + 1 
t < t< oa(4.7.l.2.6c) 
m ". 
Now the failure density flDlction conditioned on the t:ime t
m
· and 
on the event el is detennined using an equation corresponding to 
(4.6.3.7), i.e. 
fT/Tm,Et (t/tm,el ) = 
so 
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- k (t - t ) -2 m 
Now setting e = t -1 and using the randan variable transformation 
theorem (28): 
f'e/T E (e/tm,e1 ) = 0 m' 1 
e<o 
= 0 0< e<t
m 
-1 (4.7.1.2.8b) 
~ 1 k ( 1 +e - t t2 + 1 
= (~+ k3(1 +9- t m) ) exp . - k2(1 +9- t m) - 3 m2 + 1 m 
t -1<9<00 (4.7.1.2.8c) m -
4.7.1.3 Failure density functions fT/Tm,E2(t/tm,e2) 
t'a/T E (e/tm,e2) 
m' 2 --.:..~-
The development of these density functions follows the same procedure 
as above. The event e 2 is a monitor inspection at time 1 resul.ting in 
an unhealthy signal. 
The operator thus fo:nnulates a failure model which :infonns h:im that 
the equipment has not failed up to t;ime 1 , that the initial malfunction 
has occurred at some time 0< tm~ 1 and that the equipment will subse-
quently fail according to the tenninal probability failure density func-
tion. For thiS model the hazard rate becomes: 
z (t) = 0 O<t::;;: tm (4.7.1.3.1a) 
.. ~ 
= k2 + k3(t - t m) t m< ts: 1: (4.7.1.3.1b) 
= ~ + "J (t - tm)~ 
The corresponding failure density functi<n is: 
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= 0 I o<t< tm (4.7.~;!~2a) 
m . (t - t ) 
= (k2+ k3(t - t ) 2) exp _ k2(t _ t ) _ 'J m m m m + 1 2 
(4.7.1.3.2b) 
Now conditioning the failure density function an tm and event e2 
gives 
= 0 O<t";;;. 
= I m2+1 k3 (1: - t ) exp -k2(. _ t ) _ m m m2 + 1 
The .variable is changed accorcUng to e = t -1: which yields (28): 
1-
301 
4.7.1. 4 Summary of failure density functions 
Sketches of the shapes of typical failure density functions for 
the four reliability reg:imes are shown in Figure 4.5. Figure 4.5& 
shows the designer's failure density function calculated from equation 
(4.7.1.1.1) with valUes ~ = 0 and 3. Figure 4.5b gives the operator's 
failure density function fT/T~1:(t/t> 1:), correaponding to operator's 
reliability II, which is calCulated from equations (4.6.2.3) and (4.7.1.1.1) 
This function is s:imilar to Figure 4.5& except for the modification due 
to t . 
The failure density function,. f T .... E (t/tm,e1 ) for a particular 
'"m' 1 
value of tm envisaged by the operator, correspOnding to operator's 
reliability II, is shown in Figure 4.5c. This is calculated fran 
equation (4.7.1.2.3) with an assumed valUe mz = 3. 
Figure 4.5d shows fT'/T E (t/tm,e2) for operator's reliability ITI, 
. m' 2 . 
which aga:in involves a modification by truncation at the observation 
t:ime 't. The density is determined from equation (4.7.1.3.3) with the 
same valUe of mz as above, and tm is a particular value envisaged by 
the operator for the purpose of the sketch. 
Figure 4.6 shows the corresponding hazard rates. 
'lhe analysis of section 4.6 assumed that the operator knew the over--
all probability density function for failure when time was measured from 
the beginn:iJlg of the equipnent's life (t = 0), fT(t), and the terminal 
failure .density when the failure time was measured fran the time of the 
initial malfunction (t '" t m, e '" 0), fe/Tm=t (e/tm =1:). 
However, there is a third probability density function which is 
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o 
a. 
m=3 1 
Time, t 
m=O 1 
Time,t 
b. 
c. d. 
FIGURE 4.5 Typical failure density functions. 
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Time, t 
Time,t 
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.. 
o Time, t 
a. 
c. 
m=O 1 
m=3 2 
T:ime,t 
Typical hazard rates. 
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b. 
d. 
=0 
------~~----------~ 
t Time, t 
m=3 2 
T:ime,t 
.. 
needed. This is the density function describing the time of ulitial 
malfunction, fT (t
m
) , when time is measured from the beginning of the 
m 
equipment life (t = 0). 
In practice this may be available from an analysis of the experi-
mental data, however,. it is assumed that this is unlikely and therefore 
must be derived. 
Suppose that the observation time 1: is made equal to the initial 
malfunction time tm' then by definition 
e = t - tm (4.7.1.5.1) 
or t = t - ~ m 
NOli fT (t) and feiT =1: (e/tm =1:) are given and so m 
be determined fran the transfonnation theorem as (28): f fT (t) 
range. 
T 
(4.7.1.5.2) 
The range of t and e are both 0 to 00 and so examination of equa tion 
(4.7.1.5.2) reveals that in theory negative values of tm are possible. 
However,thiS contradicts intuition since it is :impossible for the 
equipment to malfunction before it has started to operate, i.e. tm 
cannot be less than 0, although tm can equal o. 
Now for t > 0 equation (4.7.1.5.3) becomes m-
oo f fT(t) fS/Tm =1 (t - tu!tm = 1:) dt 
tm 
arid for tm ~ 0, theoretically 
fTm(tm) = fOOfT(t) fe / Tm=1(t - tu!tm=1:) dt 
o 
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Since tm cannot be less than 0, then a density function is fonned 
where the probability of obtaining tm < 0 is located, in the fonn of 
an impulse, at the origin, i.e., 
o 00 
P{tm<O) = I I fT{t) fe/Tni 1: (t - tJtm=1:) dtdtm (4.7.1.5.6a) 
-00 o 
= K 6 (t
m 
= 0) 
The resulting probability density function fT (t
m
) is therefore 
m 
a mixture of both an impulse at the origin and a continuous function, 
which is given by substituting equations (4.7.1.1.1) and (4.7.1.2.4) 
o 00 
II 
_00 0 
= K (j (t = 0) 
m 
exp 
m 
({k2 + k3{t - tm) 1x 
) dt 
m2 
({k2 + k3{t - t m) ) x 
Then the failure density functions conditioned upon the events e1 and 
e2 are given by equations (4.6.3.7) and (4.6.4.5) respectively, i.e.: 
fT (tm) 
fTJEl (tu! e1) =. --:;;m'---1:-_-
/fTm (tm) dtm 
(4·7.1.5.8) 
1 -
o 
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4.7.1.6 Density functions f"",T
m
,E
2 
(a /tm,e2), f Tu/A,E2 (tJ a , e 2) 
The density function f A/~,.E2 (a /tm,e2) described the location 
of A, given a particular observation time 1: and :initial mal£unction 
time ~ '" t
m
• 'Il1iB density is dependent upon the characteristics 
of the malfunction monitor and the equipment failure characteristic as 
shown in Figure 4.4. 
In this study it is assumed that fA/T
m
,E
2
(a/tm,e2)is given 
by a Weib~type distribution.· However,:in this Case the monitor 
variable is nonnalised to be :in the range O~ a$ 1 and so the Weibull 
density function of equation (4.7.1.1) istransfozmed using the 
rela tion (28): 
a '" 
Hence 
x 
x+l 
0:::;;: a< 1 (4.7.1.6.1) 
The a posteriori·conditiona1 probability density function for the 
time to initial malfunction fTJA,E2 
(tm /a , e 2).is 
equation (4.6.4.10) using (4.7.1.5.9) and (4.7.1.6.1). 
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f 
, 
calculated from 
4.7.2 Reliability estimates for a single equipment 
4.7.2.1 
The probability density functions described in section 4.7.1 are 
noW used to estimate sjngle equipment rel:ia.bility for the four regimes 
discussed earlier. 
The parameters used in this example are given in Table 4.3. 
i 
1 
2 
3 
4 
\.LT 
!-lefT =1: 
m 
!-IT 
m 
1: 
a. 
TABLE 4.3. 
k. m. 
:1. :1. 
0.04 0 
0.02 1 
0.1615 1 
("t - t
m
) 
-
25 
3 
21.8 
25 
0.25; 0.75 
NumericRl v~lues of, the parameters used in the 
illustrative example. 
A priori density functions 
The overall equipment failure characteristic fT{t), which the 
des~er knows, is the exponent:ial density function (m1 = 0) with a mean 
!-IT = 25. 1his is shown in Figure 4.7. 
To determine the operator's reliabilities, it is assumed that the 
operator has a priori information in the form of experimentally deter-
mined probability density functions fe/T
m
=1: (e/tm=r.), fA/T
m
,E
2 
(U/tm,e2) 
and the calculated function fT (tm). These were given in equations m, 
I 
1" 
(4.7.1.2.4), (4.7.1.6.1) and (4.7.1.5.7) and using the parameters of 
Table 4.3 are shown in Figures 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10. 
FigIITe 4.9 was derived by assuming k4 = (-1:- t
m
), i.e •. the 
scaling factor increases linearly as the difference between the 
observation time t and the time of initial malfunction detection t
m
• 
Normally it is expected that in practice this density function would 
be available from an experimental analysis of the malfunct:ion monitor 
signal characteristics. 
Notice in Figure 4.10 that fT (t
m
) is a discontinuous function 
m 
consisting of an impulse at the origin and a continuous function. 
The ratio of the means of the total equipment life (1-1 T) to the 
unhealthy period (1-1 elT =t) is 25 : 3. 
m 
4.7.2.2 Designer's reliability 
The deSigner's reliability is simply calculated from the overall 
equipment failure probability density function using equation (4.6.1.1) 
and is actually gi""Eln by equation (4.6.1.5) with k = k1 and m = m1 • 
This reliability is shown in Figure 4.11. 
4.7.2.3 Operator's reliability I 
The operator's failure density function I fe/T;;:::t (e/t;::: t) and 
reliability I are calculated from equations (4.6.2.4) and (4.6.2.5) 
respectively and are shown in Figures 4.1Za and b. 
Since the fUndamental overall equipment failure characteristic is 
exponential, then observation at time t contributes nothing to the 
aSsessment of reliability and the operator's reliability I is the same 
as the deSigner's except the time scale :Ui different. This is a basic 
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property of the exponential probability distribution (li8). 
4.7.2.4 QPerator's reliability 11 
The 
are 
This failure density function is calculated from equation (4.6.3.5). 
density functions felT· E (e /tm,e1 ) and fT lE (trlel) which 
m, 1 . of 1 . 
required for this integration were calculated from equations 
(4.7.1.2.8) and (4.7.1.5.8) respectively. 
The operators reliability Il Roll (e) was subsequently determined 
by equation (4.6.3.8). 
This calculation procedure is summarised as a flow diagram in 
Figure 4.13. The integration limits of equation (4.6.3.5) are changed 
from 1: to 00 to 1: to 1: + e in Figure 4.13, which may be verified by 
inspection from equations (4.7.1.2.8). 
Figure 4.14 shows the density function fTrlEl (trle1) while the 
resulting operator's failure density function f e (El) and his reli-
ability Il, R
oIl ( El) are shown in Figures 4.1,Sa and b. 
Figure 4.1Sb also shows the operator's reliability I and reli-
ability III if the time of initial malfunction tm is the current 
observation time 1: (which is calculated by integrating equation (4.7.1.2.4». 
This Figure illustrates that operator's reliability 11 is significantly 
higher than operator's reliability I in the immediate future (Le. e small). 
·This is the expected result since there is a malfunction monitor which is 
showing a healthy signal and therefore there is a greater probability that 
equipment failure will. not occur in the immediate future. Operator's 
reliability III is much lower than operator's reliability I or Il. Again 
this is the expected result since the monitor signal has changed from 
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FIGURE 4.13 Flow diagram of operator's reliability II calculation. 
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1.0GG 
healthy to lDlhealthy thereby :indicat:ing that the equipnent has 
started to wear out and so there is a much greater probability that the 
equipment will fail :in the near future. 
4.7.2.5 Operator's reliability III 
The calculation procedure is outl:ined :in F:l.gure 4.16. 
The a priori :infonna tion :input was aescribed above. This first 
stage :in the calculation is the determ:ination of f
TJE2 
(tJe2 ) which 
is shown :in Figure 4.17 for 1: = 25. '!he a posteriori density function 
f I (t la ,E2 ) is then calculated from equation (4.6.4.10) and is Tm' A,E2 m' 
shown :in Figures 4.l8a and b fora=0.25 and 0.75. 
The operator's failure density function nI, f e (e;a) and his 
reliability function R
oln (e) are then determ:ined from equations 
(4.6.4.12) and (4.6.4.13), and are illustrated :in Figures 4.19a and b, 
and Figure 4.20 respectively. Curves are shown for the same parameter 
values as :in Figure 4.18. 
Also shown :in Figure 4.20 for comparison are the operator's reli-
ability I and reliability nl if the time of :initial malfunction is the 
current observation time. These additional curves were also illustrated 
:in F:l.gure 4 .1Sb. 
The same comments apply to the comparison of the reliability curves 
:in Figure 4.20 as were made :in section 4.7.2.4. In particular the 
operator's reliability In estimate when a= 0.25 is lower than that for 
a = 0.75. This is expected s:ince a reading a = 0.25 means that the 
:initial equipment malftmction occurred further in the past from 1: than 
that :indicated by a= 0.75. Therefore the equipment has been ttwearing-
out" longer and so has a higher probability of fail:ing :in the immediate 
future. 
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4.7.2.6 SUllllllll.ry of reliability functions 
The designer's reliability and the operator's reliability I - III 
are shown together in Figure 4.21, which il1.ustrates how they are 
related. The curves are self explanatory. 
4.8 Applications of the reliability functions 
The immediate application of the operator's reliability functions 
with malfunction monitoring is as an operational tool to obtain updated 
estimates of the reliability of single equipments and systems. However, 
it is anticipated that the knowledge of the functions could be used to 
detennine a "real time" maintenance strategy which involves continuous 
decision-making, after the detection of the initial malfunction. 
Another application is as a design tool to obtain estimates of 
reliability, maintainability and availability of Systems as a function 
of the particular maintenance policy adopted when a malfunction is 
detected. Such a study may in fact suggest the optimal type of action 
to take when a malfunction is shown on the monitor. 
Although the theory developed in this study has emphaSised the 
condition monitoring of machinery and malfunction detection in instru-
ments, it is potentially applicable to a diverse range of monitoring 
activities from non-destructive testing to medical work. For example, 
in non-destructive testing the ideas may be applied to the monitoring 
of crack growth in materials to determine-reliability functions. 
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4.9 Concluding remarks 
The effect of equipnent malfunction monitoring On some aspects of 
system security has been considered. A periodic inspection policy was 
used to detennine unrevealed equipment failures and the relationship 
between inspection frequency and several reliability performance indices 
was examined. It was found, for the criteria considered, that the 
system security increased as the inspection frequency increased and in 
particular significant improvements of perfonnance could be achieved by 
adopting relatively infrequent inspection policies. 
The second part of this Chapter was concerned with the relation 
between malfunction monitoring and reliability, maintainability and 
availability. The reliability of a system has been categorised into 
four regimes depending upon whether malfunction monitoring is carried 
out or not and the type of information obtained from a monitor. 
EXpreSSions have been derived for the reliability function of a 
single equipment with and without malfunction monitoring from the time 
of observation of the equipnent state. The information required to 
Use these expreSSions is the conventional reliability function together 
with the probability density functions for the time to failure and for 
the monitor signal after the initial occurrence of the malfunction. 
These reliability expreSSions may be used as an operational tool 
to give "running" estimates of the reliability of the equipment or as a 
design tool to obtain advance estimates of the equipment reliability, 
maintainability and availability. In this latter case it is necessary 
to specify maintenance policies in whiCh the monitoring is an integral 
part. The determination of suCh maintenance policieS and their 
relation to the information gained from a malfunction monitor provides 
a basis for further researCh. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION) 
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· This thesill has examined ways in which a proceSs computer can be 
used to improve the overall security of chemical plant by detecting 
instrument and equipment malfunction. To this end the first part of 
this study developed methodS by which a process computer can be used to 
detect malfunction in its own instrumentation and control loops. The 
second study in this thesill assumed the existence of malfunction 
detection techniques and examined the role of malfunction monitoring in 
improving process security. 
in some detail. 
These two aspects will now be diBcussed 
Chapter 2 has described a control valve position - flow check 
which may be implemented on a process computer to detect malfunction 
in a flow control loop. The fundamental idea of the proposed detection 
algorithm ill that for loops in which there ill a constant system flow 
pressure drop characterilltic, there exists a unique relationship between 
the control valve pOSition and the flowrate. ThiB means that knowledge 
of the valve pOSition implies a measurement of the flowrate, which ill 
additional to the usual primary flowmeter measurement. Thus the 
control loop has measurement redundancy, thereby providing a foundation 
for a malfunction detection algorithm. 
Two types of check have been developed. In the first a control 
valve characteriBtic is obtained of flowrate vs valve position. nu.s 
requires that the valve be moved over its entire range of travel, 
thereby permitting the or~inal and current characteristic to be com-
pared. This full valve characterilltic compariBon enables the source 
of the malfunction to be detemin,ed in some cases. 
The second check method assumes that control valve "stroking" is 
inadmiBsible and so uses a state estimator to process the measurements 
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to yiel.d a data base from which the control loop security is inferred. 
The actual check is based upon the comparison of the original and 
current residuals generated from the state estimator. No diagnostic 
infonnation concerning the source of the malfunction can be obtained 
from this check. 
In formulating this check the state estimates were not constrained 
to be particularly accurate, and so no dynamic modelling of the control 
loop was necessary. The sole purpose of the state estimator is to 
condition the process measurements into a convenient form for loop 
security interrogation. 
The proposed methodS do not require additional process instrumen-
tation, but exploit the capability of thecanputer to proceSs, store 
and display infonnation. The computer storage and time requirements 
for the checks are modest and since most malfunctions appear not to 
occur very SUddenly the algorithms can be executed at quite infrequent 
intervals and at low computer priority. 
The malfunction detection algorithms have been tested by ·extensive 
laboratory trials on an experimental rig which USed industrial control 
equipment. In addition some industrial experiments have been per-
formed. . These revealed that models based upon process design manuals 
were adequate to implement the proposed checks.and no difficulty was 
experienced in tracking the operation of d.d.c. loops ·or calculating 
the values o{ residuals. However, during the period of experimentation. 
control loop malfunction did not occur, although a simulated fault lias 
detected by the algorithm. 
the major assumption in the derivation of this position-flow check 
is that the system flow-pressure drop characteristic is relatively 
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constant. If this criterion is' not completely met then the lev"l of 
detectable malfunction will be increased. The adaptation of the method 
to control loops which do not satisfy this assumption of constant system 
flow-pressure drop characteristic is an area for further research. 
However, in spite of this it is considered that the flow control loop 
malfunction detection techniques are at a stage where more comprehensive 
industrial tests will be most profitable in determining the value and 
success of the methods. 
In principle, there appears to be no reason why the techniques of 
Chapter 2 should not be generalised to other control loops. All that 
is required of the loop is that there should be a constant load and a 
known relationship between the controlled variable and the valve demand 
signal, thereby creating measurement redundancy. The success of the 
method will then depend upon the characteristics of the control loop 
such as the dynamics. However, in practice the relationship between 
the controlled variable and the valve demand signal is unknown and so 
a more general malfunction detection technique is needed. 
Chapter 3 has developed a general malfunction detection method to 
encompass all control loops uSing a Kalman filter. This method was 
adopted so that tests could be performed on operating control loops. 
Also it was desired to generate optimal estimates of the control loop 
state vector when the system was without malfunction, thereby increas-
ing the process operator's knowledge of the loop operation. 
The control loops are modelled by linear time - invariant transfer 
functions and it is assumed that the load entering the loop is constant 
at some nominal value although some stochastic deviations are accounted 
for. At a given setpoint and load there is an expected control valve 
demand signal. Deviations from this expected value are used to 
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determine the loop malfunction by directly estimating various loop 
security parameters or examining changes in the statistical properties 
of the resulting filter innovation sequence. 
The implementation of the malfunction detection method has been 
separated into two problems; the first being the ordinary Kalman 
filter and the second being Friedland's filter to estimate the loop 
security parameters. The mechanisation of the primary Kalmari filter 
is fraught with uncertainty in the system models, noise statistics and 
initial conditions. These problems were overcome by using the innova-
tion correlation technique of Mehra to directly estimate the optimal 
Kalman gain. The combination of Mehra's and Friedland's algorithms 
reduces the uncertainty problem to the specification of one covariance 
matrix. 
The malfunction detection method has been tested on a laboratory 
level control rig, where experiments on both analogue setpoint and 
direct digital control loops have been performed. It was found that 
Mehra's adaptive estimator failed to converge to the optimal state 
estimator if the true process measurement noise covariance matrix was 
small. However, in "noisier" systems the technique proved to be 
robust and consistent. 
The loop security parameter estimator is successful in estimating 
control loop malfunction and in particular is able to diagnose and 
estimate the magnitude of a measurement instrument fault in an analogue 
setpoint control loop. Thus a correction can be made to the measure-
ment and hence a substitute measurement is available for use in other 
computer programs. The experiments on the d.d.c. loops provide no 
diagnostic information. 
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The second check method which is based upon examining the statistics 
of the Kalman filter innovation sequence also indicates control loop 
malfunction, but no diagnostic information is obtained. 
The main limitation of· the proposed check is the need for a 
relatively constant nominal load. If this is not true, but the load is 
measured or can be approximated, e.g. from the overall process through-
put, then the method can still be used simply by including this 
"measurement" in the system model as disCUSSed .in section 3.18. For 
the case of an approximated or estimated unmeasured load the level of 
detectable malfunction will depend upon the malfunction gain. p, and 
upon how well the load can be estimated. For example, errors in esti-
mating the load may cause a loop security parameter to change by x%. 
Hence the malfunction has to be of such a magnitude that the resultant 
change in the loop security parameter is greater than x%. 
The case of unmeasured load disturbances which cannot be approxi-
mated and which occur relatively frequently is more difficult to account 
for and the methods will fail to detect malfunction under these 
circlDDstances. 
AS in the control valve position-flowmeter the modification of 
the method to cope with large unmeasured load changes is a topic for 
further exploration. 
The methods of malfunction detection developed in Chapters 2 and. 3 
have been based upon the premise that in a given control loop, which is 
operating at a particular setpoint and load, there is a unique relation-
Ship between the controlled variable and the control valve. demand signal. 
This relationship has been exploited to detect malfunction. 'lhe tech-
nique used in this thesis was to relate the control loop measurements 
through a state estimator mathematical model to yield a data base from 
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which inferences on loop security could be made. 
The precise form of the state estimator used for malfunction 
detection differed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
The flow control loop check in Chapter 2 assumed that there was a· 
known steady state relationship between the system flowrate (controlled 
variable) and the control valve demand signal, i.e. the control valve 
characteristic. This relationship was additional to the usual equation 
describing the primary flowmeter measurement. Now a state estimator 
was used to process measurements of the valve demand and flowmeter 
A 
signals to estimate the system flowrate Q, thereby creating a set of 
residuals from which loop security could be inferred. 
The philosophy adopted in designing the flow control loop estimator 
was that the simplest technique which detected malfunction was the best. 
It was· therefore considered. unnecessary to model the dynamics of the 
loop and a steady state model was assumed, although some dynamic effects 
were accounted for by expanding the steady state estimator into a track-
ing steady state .estimator. A The resultant state estimate, Q, was 
therefore not necessarily optimal. 
The malfunctions in the control loop were detected by examining 
the difference between the assumed state estimator model and the .actual 
process under conditions of no malfunction and malfunction. 
The techniques of Chapter 3 used the same fundamental ideas as 
Chapter 2, Le. the concept of relating the control valve demand signal 
and the controlled variable, except that the more general case of state 
estimation was conSidered. 
In Chapter 3 it was assumed that the steady state measurement 
equation relating the valve demand signal to the tank height was 
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Wlknown. The design of the state estimator was also constrained to 
y'ield optimal state estimates and therefore the state estimator was 
based upon a dynamic model of the closed loop. A Kalman filter state 
estimator was used to relate the resultant process measurements and 
hence generate a residual from which loop malfunction could be inferred 
exactly as was done in Chapter 2. 
This discussion has highlighted the common and differing features 
of the proposed malfWlction detection algorithms suggested in Chapters 
2 and 3. The choice of method in any particular application will 
depend upon: 
i) The degree of information known. 
For example, the application of the tracking steady state 
estimator to the level control loop requires the characteristic 
of the tank height versus the control valve demand signal. 
usually this ~ill not be available but could be determined on-
line during normal process. operation. 
ii) The quality of the info.nnation required. 
If optimal state estimates are required when the control loop 
operates in a malfWlction free condition, then it is Wllikely 
that the tracking steady state estimator would be adequate. 
Also the diagnostic information on malfunction which is gener-
ated from the Kalman filter may be important in some applications. 
iii) The characteristics of the control loop. 
iv) The available effort for technique implementation. 
The use of the Kalman filter method for detecting control loop 
malfunction is likely to involve more work than the tracking 
steady state estimator because of the modelling. and computer 
programming involved. 
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Many of these' features may be explored by exam:ining the Kalman 
filter method applied to the flow control loop, while the tracking 
state estimator's performance may be tested by detecting malfunction 
in the level control loop. 1hese comparisons could be performed on 
the existing laboratory rigs. 
The final part of this thesis has assumed the existence of mal-
function detection algorithms or malfunction monitors and has examined 
the effect of monitoring on equipment reliability, availability and 
maintainability. 
The details of this study are given in Chapter 4. 
Initially, it was assumed that a periodic inspection policy was 
used to detect unrevealed equipnent malfunctions and the relationship 
between the inspection frequency and several reliability performance 
indices was examined. 1his analysis shows that the system security 
increases as the inspection frequency increases and in particular 
Significant improvements can be achieved by adopting relatively infre-
quent inspection policies. 
'The second part of Chapter 4 has considered how the information 
obtained from a malfunction monitor can be used to update estimates of 
reliability, availability and maintainability. 1he system reliability 
is viewed as a numerical encoding of the process operator's state of 
knowledge of the system rather than an inherent system characteristic. 
Using this concept, the reliability of a system has been categorised 
into four regimes depending upon whether malfunction monitoring is 
performed or not, and the type of information obtained from a monitor. 
Reliability expreSSions for a single equipnent have been derived 
for these four regimes based upon the time at which a monitor inspection 
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occurs (if monitoring is practised) and the indicated monitor signal. 
These expressions are derived from probability density functions and 
the information required is the .conventional reliability fWlCtion . 
together with the probability density functions for the time to failure 
and for the monitor signal after the occurrence of the initial mal.-
function. 
These reliability expressionS provide an operational tool to give 
"running" estimates of equipment reliability. It is envisaged that 
these renewed estimates may provide a basis from which real time 
decisions concerning equipment maintenance policieS may be made. 
However, precisely how this information can be incorporated into the 
deciSion making process is not trivial. 
For example, if a process engineer inspects a malfunction monitor 
which indicates a failing equipment, then he can use one of the derived 
reliability expreSSions to estimate the probability of equipment sur-
vival in the subsequent time intervals. He is then faced with a 
deciSion either to let the equipment continue operating, thereby risking 
severe equipment damage, but performing a planned repair, or to shut the 
equipment down immediately and perform an emergency repair. The 
operator's decision must balance the relative advantages and disadvantages 
of these criteria. It is suggested that the determination of "real time" 
maintenance policies is an area. for further study •. 
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A.I.I List of Sym~~~ 
A matrix 
a vector 
a. 
-~ 
.th ~ vector 
a .. 
~J 
.. th le f ~J e ment 0 A 
a( ) parameter 
B matrix 
b scalar variable 
C matrix 
c .. 
~J 
1j th cofactor of A 
E( ) expectation 
E{/ ) conditional expectation 
F(x) probability distribution function for 
random variable X 
probability density function describing 
random variable X 
joint probability density function 
describing random variables Xl and Xz 
fX /X (xI/xZ) conditional probability density function I Z 
k 
n 
m 
p( ) 
pyf.x) 
describing Xl given X2 = Xz 
discrete time counter 
matrix· dimension 
matrix dimension 
probability 
probability function for discrete random 
variable X 
PX:t' Xz(xl,xZ) joint probability function describing discrete 
random variables Xl and X2 
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--.. 
r 
x 
x 
x 
x 
Greek letters 
Superscripts 
T 
I 
Subscripts 
o 
k 
conditional probability function describing 
discrete random variable Xl given Xz= x 2 
matrix dimension 
initial time 
time at kth sampling interval 
time 
sampling interval 
random variable associated with the real 
variable x 
random vector associated with the real 
vector 'l!; 
vector 
ith element of x 
real variable 
i th scalar variable 
expected value of random variable X 
expected value of random vector X 
variance of random variable X· 
matrix tranSpose 
matrix inverse 
matrix pseudoinverse 
initial value 
kth sampling interval 
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time units 
time units 
" " 
" " 
A.I.:! Nomenclature 
In this Appendix the notation and mathematical quantities used in 
this thesis are defined. Although most of the concepts used are 
standard, they are included here to avoid confusion in terminology. 
Several estimation problems considered here will be restricted to 
those containing discrete time dYnamic and measurement models. In 
other wordS, the dYnamics and measurements are treated at fixed time 
increments which take on only integer values, Le. a(k) = a(tk ) where 
tk = t + k/1 t with t the initial time treated in the problem and /1 t 
o 0 
the time increment used. If the parameter a(k) doeS not vary with 
time, then the subscript k is omitted. If the state dynamics are 
characterised by a difference equation with constant coefficients, the 
model is said to be stationary. 
When the dynamics and measurement models are written matrix-vector 
notation is used. 
underscore, Le. 
x = 
Vectors are denoted by lower-caSe letters with an 
x 
n 
(A.I.2.1 ) 
where xi' i = 1, • • • ,n are scalar quantities and are referred to 
as the components of the vector. If n = 1, the quantity x is a scalar 
and the letter is not underscored. Matrices are denoted by upper-case 
letters, Le. 
a12 ., . . . 
A = (A.I.2.2) 
a
n2 . . . ". 
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where the elements of A, a .. , i = 1, .•. , nand j = 1, .... , m are l.J 
scalars and n is the number of rows and m is the number of colwnns. 
If n = m = 1, A is a scalar quantity. 
The transpose of a matrix is denoted by a superscript T, i.e. 
all a 21 •..•..•..•..••.• an1 
= (A.I.2.3) 
Throughout this thesis several matrix operations are referred to or 
uSed. 1hese include the determinant of a matrix, the trace of a matrix, 
the inverse of a matrix and the pseudoinverse of a matrix. The deter-
minant of a matrix, A,is denoted by det(A) and is def:inable for square 
ma trices only, Le., the number of rows equals the number of colwnns. 
The determinant of A is given by: 
where A is given by equation (A.I.2.2) with m = nand c1i is the 
1ith cofactor and is the determ:inant of the subnatrix formed by striking 
out the first row·and the ith colwnn multiplied by (_ 1)i+1. 
The trace of a square matrix is defined as the Sum of the diagonal 
elements, Le., 
n 
tr(A) = L 
i=1 
a .. 
l.l. (A.I.2.5) 
The inverse of a matrix, A, is fomed as follows: 
where 
-1 
of A • 
= 1 
det(A) (c .. ) Jl. (A.I.2.6) 
th 1·· th 
c ji is the ji cofactor of A and (A- )ij is the ij element 
From equation (A.I.2.6) it is obvious that the inverse of a 
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matrix exists only if it is square and its determinant is nonzero. 
For matrices which are not square or those which have zero valued 
determinants, the concept of a pseudoinverse (27) can be applied. 
Before this concept can be defined, the concepts of linear independence 
and matrix rank must first be discussed. A set of n-vectors, i.e. each 
vector contains n components, ~1' .•• ,~, is said to be linearly 
independent if the following vector equation 
(A.I.2.7) 
implies that each scalar is zero. The rank of a matrix 
is then defined as the maximum number of linearly independent rows or 
columns of the matrix. For an n x n matrix, a determinant of zero 
implies a rank less· than n. 
Returning to the definition of the pseudoinverse of a m x n matrix, 
A of rank r, denoted by A""" , then: 
(A.I.2.8 ) 
where 
A = BC 
and B is m x. r, C is r x n and both B and C are of rank r. From 
equation (A.I.2.8) it is obvious that the pseudoinverse of a m x n 
matrix is an n x m matrix. A complete disCUSSion of the matrix pseudo-
inverse can be found in IJeutsch (27). 
Another matrix property that is referred to is that of a positive 
definite matrix. A real, symmetric (aij = a ji, i,j = 1, ••• , n) 
matrix A is said to be positive definite if the quantity b, 
b =l Ax 
is non-negative for all ! f Q and zero only if x = o. Similarly, A 
is positive semidefinite if b can be zero for some x f O. 
. - -
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The remainder of this APpendix deals with some basic definitions 
associated with random proceSscs. Initially the concept of a random 
variable must· be defined. Simply, a random variable X is a function 
whose values depend upon the outcome of a chance event. Here capital 
letters are used to denote random variables while lower case letters 
stand for particular values in the range of the random variable. 
Random variables may be discrete or continuouS. A random variable 
X is said to .be discrete if its range forms a discrete (countable) set 
of real numbers, while X is continuous if its range fonns.a continuous 
(uncountable) set of real numbers and the probability of X equalling 
any single value in its range is zero. 
If X is a discrete random variable then the probability function 
for X is a function of the real variable x and is denoted: 
PX (x) = p (X = x) for all real x 
The distribution function for a random variable X is defined and 
denoted as: 
F (x) = P (X ~ x) 
Hence F(x) gives the total accumulation of probability for X equalling 
any number less than or equal to x. 
If X is a discrete random variable, then: 
F (x) = L PX (x) 
x 
\\hen X is a continuous random variable then the concept of a 
probability density function is valuable. The probability density 
function is denoted by fX(x) and is related to the distribution 
function according to 
fX(x) = ~ F (x) 
and F(x) = P(X ~ x) = J 
_00 
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The expected or mean value of a random variable X is given by: 
I-1x = E (X) = L x Px (x) discrete X 
range 
of X 
00 
I-1x = E (X) = f x fX (x) dx continuous X 
-00 
The variance of a random variable is denoted by: 
0 2 = E ( (X _ I I )2) 
x t-"x 
A random vector, denoted!, is a vector wnose components are each a 
random variable. The above notation for one-dimensional random variables 
may be extended to the n dimensional Case and the joint distribution 
and density functions are given by: 
F (!) = p (~ ~ xl; 
xi "n. 
F (!) = f'! 
-00 -00 
fX (x) = 
. . . . , 
fJc <!) dxl . . dxn 
X ,,;; x ) 
n n 
Knowledge of the n dimensional density function fX <!) enables the 
one dimensional density function fXl (Xl) to "be determined. This "is 
called the marginal density function for Xl and is found by integrating 
fX "(!) over x 2 to xn ' Le. 
00 00 
fXl (Xl) = f·· f fx <!) dx2 dx3 .•• dxn 
-00 -00 
The expected or mean value of a random vector is given by: 
00 
1-1 ~ = E (~) = f! fx (!) d! 
_00 
A measure of how . . , 
variance matrix and is defined by: 
X vary together is called the co-
n 
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One of the most important concepts in the application of proba-
bility theory is that of independent random variables. n random vari-
ables are said to be independent if the joint density function or 
probability function will factor into the product of the marginals, i.e., 
... discrete 
continuous 
Another statement which is true for the random variables Xl·' .•. X to 
. n 
be independent may be Written in terms of the joint distribution function, 
i.e. , 
(x ) 
n 
If the above statements are not true then the random variables are 
dependent, and it is necessary to define a conditional probability 
function. Suppose Xl and X2 are jointly discrete random variables, 
then the conditional probability function for Xl' given X2 = x2 is 
defined to be: 
If Xl and X2 are continuous random variables, then the conditional 
density for Xl' given X2 = x2 is given by 
Of particular interest in estimation theory is the concept of a 
random or stochastic process. The estimation theory used in this work 
is limited to discrete random processes.. A discrete .random process is a 
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Sequence of random variables which are indexed according to their time 
of occurrence, i.e. Xk is the random variable at the kth time blterval. 
A sequence of random variables may be described by the probability 
distributions and density functions discussed above. 
A parameter of particular importance is the expected value of a 
random variable or vector at the k+l th time increment, !ktl' given that 
the sequence of random variables .!t to !k have· occurred. 
ditional expectation is defined by: 
00 
E~+1/!l' "", !k) = £4.+1 f! (:!l' ••• , :!k+1) ~+l 
fx (:!l'····' 4.) 
The con-
Further information and definitions for random processeS may be 
found in· Papoulis (28). 
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APPENDIX II 
PROCESS DATA VALIDATION CHECKS 
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A.II.t List of symbols 
A 
aij 
b 
Cp 
D 
dij 
Ds 
ei 
e(D) 
e(dij ) 
!~) 
e(gi) 
e(~)g. 
J 
E 
FA 
f 
f. (l:) J 
ll. 
il-;"w ; 
A 
H~; Ht; 
I 
k 
L 
1 .. l.J 
1 
constraint matrix 
.. th 1 t fA 1.J e emen 0 
vector 
specific heat 
square matrix 
ijth element of D 
distillation column product 
relative error 
matrix of error coefficients in D 
ijth element of e(D) 
vector of error coefficients in ll. 
ith element of e(ll.) 
error in solution g. when matrix error 
1. 
coefficients are chosen to maximise 
solution vector error matrix 
distillation column feed 
vector 
non-linear constraint equation 
vector 
Wlit matrix 
fraction 
square matrix 
ijth element of L 
number of constraint equations 
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chu/lb.mole 
Ib.mole/hr 
various 
various 
Ib.mole/hr 
chu/lb . mole 
m 
m 
s .. l.J 
T' 
~B 
Greek 
o 
Ri 
bottom product flowrate from column B 
reflux flowrate 
vector of process measurements 
ith element of m 
number of process measurements 
condenser heat load 
distillation column heat loss 
reboiler heat load 
q line 
diagonal matrix 
ijth element of S 
temperature of column B overhead liquid 
temperature of column B subcooled overhead 
liquid 
temperature of column B overhead vapour 
overhead vapour flowrate from column A 
vapour flowrate below feed point in column A 
overhead vapour flowrate from column B 
bottoms product flowrate from column A 
bottoms product flowrate from column B 
vector of predicted process measurements 
ith element of Z 
vector of Lagrange multipliers 
latent heat 
measurement noise standard deviation 
sum of squares cost function 
vector of constraint equations 
Ib.mole/hr 
Ib.inole/hr 
various 
chu/hr 
chu/hr 
chu/hr 
Ib.mole/hr 
" 11· 
" 11 
" n 
n It 
-. 
various 
chu/lb.mole 
various 
Subscripts 
i 
A 
B 
Superscripts 
L 
T 
V 
- 1 
, 
variable i 
distillation column A 
distillation column B 
overhead product from column B 
feed to column A 
overhead vapour from column A 
overhead vapour from column B 
bottoms product from column A 
liquid 
transpose 
vapour 
inverse 
stripping section of column A 
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A.II.2 Sensitivity analySis 
Section 2.1 reviewed methods due to Ripps (35) and Nogita (36) for 
detecting instrument malfunction when the process measurements were 
related by linear equations. 
A least squares criterion was proposed to predict a consistent set 
of data 1. from a set of measured data !!!. This was written: 
m· 
= L (A.I1.2.1) 
i=1 
It was assumed that the measurements were related by linear relationships 
yielding the constraint equations: 
4J. = 
J 
m 
L 
i=1 
j = 1,2, •••• 1 (A.II.2.2) 
Now equation (A.II.2.1) may be minimised subject to the constraints 
(A.II.2.2) by introducing lagrange multipliers resulting in the solution: 
where: ~ 
1. 
A 
S 
is an (l.xl) 
is a (mx1) 
is an (l.xm) 
is a (mxm) 
2 
0 2 
i 
vector of lagrange multipliers 
vector of the estimates of the 
matrix of constraint 
matrix with 
s .. = 0 
l..J 
equation 
ifj 
11 is a (mx1) vector with 
2mi =-~ o 2 
i 
(A.n. 2.3) 
process measurements 
coefficients 
The solution given by equation (A.II.2.3) is valid only if the 
constraint coefficients a .. are known with certainty or are assumed as Jl.. . 
such. However, in fonnulating the constraint equations (A.II.2.2) often 
a.. will be subject to lUIcertainty, as for example in the case of 
J~ 
enthalpy coefficients in heat balances. It is then necessary to examine 
the ·sensitivity of the solution vector to this uncertainty in the co-
efficients a.. and detennine whether this invalidates the malilUlction 
J~ 
detection algorithm. 
Equation (A.II.2.3) is simply the solution of a set of linear 
equations. In order to develop a sensitivity analysis a general set of 
linear equations may be written as: 
D~ = f (A.II.2.4) 
where D = [:T :] 
~ = [;] 
f = [!] 
If e(D) denotes the matrix of errors in the coefficients of matrix 
D then Dwyer (38) shows that the change in the solution vector ~~) is 
given by: 
(A.II.2~S) 
Now usually the actual value of e(D) is lUIknOwn but often a bOlUld on 
each error is definable. In such caseS it is possible to detennine 
the maximum errors associated with each element g. 
. ~ 
of the solution 
II -1 . vector Hi' Reca. that ~ = D 1. and so equat~on (A.II.2.S) may be 
written: 
.!:.~) = D-1 (- e(D) Hi) (A.II.2.6) 
For a two dimensional problem this equation written in full 
becomes: 
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[
e (g1)] = 
e (g2) 
112] [- e 
122 _ - e 
where the matrix L = D-1. Multiplying out gives: 
(A.II.2.7) 
(A.II.2.8) 
Now by inspection of equation (A.11.2.7) it can be Seen that the error 
in g1' e(g1)' may be maximised by choosing the signs of e(d11 ), 
e(d12 ), e(d21 ) and e(d22 ) to be identical with those of -111g1' 
-111g2' -112g1 and -112g2 respectively. 
e(g1) • When these values e(diJ·) 
This error is denoted as 
g1 
are substituted into equation 
(A.11.2.8) they result in a value of which 
correspondS to the maximum error e(g1) . By similar reasoning, the 
g1 
values of e(d .. ) may be chosen to maximise the error in g2 by 1J -
examining equation (A.II.2.8) and choosing appropriate error signs. 
This results in an error e(g2) and a corresponding error in gl' 
g2 
denoted e(g1) , found by substituting the chosen errors e(d .. ) into 
g2 1J 
equation (A.11.2.7). 
These solution vector errors e(g.) may be combined to give a 
1 gj 
matrix of error coefficients of the general form: 
E= 
• (A.II.2.9) 
. -
• 
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A.II.3 Illustrative example: Distillation column mass and heat balallce 
This sensitivity allalysis was applied to the data validation method 
of llipps and Nogita by considering a mass and heat balance arowld all 
industrial distillation column situated at Works A. 
A schematic diagram of the column is shown in Figure A.n.l. 
The following notation is adopted in Figure A.II.l: 
* F = A 
V = A 
* W = A 
Q*= R 
VB = 
* ~ = 
= 
feed to column A 
overhead vapour flowrate from column A 
bottoms product from column A 
re boiler heat load for column A 
overhead vapour flowrate from column B 
reflux flowrate to column B 
column B product flowrate 
column B condenser heat load 
* W B = L A = bottom product flowrate from column B 
~ = hea t loss from both columns. 
The measured process variables are denoted by an asterisk. Now the 
constraint equations relating the process measurements are formulated 
by conSidering material and heat balances around the column as follows: 
1 ) Overall Mass Balance: 
(A.n.3.1) 
2) Overall Heat Balance: 
(A.n.3.2) 
were ~ = enthalpy of the feed 
MwA 
= enthalpy of the liquid WA 
HIla = 
11 11 11 11 
Ila 
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, 
VA 
-
c 
VB 
~f-
f4- ~ -r Ds 
LA 
A B 
" F"A 
Q 'i} 
R 
< Y 
W"" 
B . 
~ 
* WA 
FIGURE A.I!.l Schematic illuatration of distiJJ.ation colUmn. 
* denotes a process measurement. 
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Now % may be derived by considering a heat balance over the condenser, 
i.e. , 
where Ay = latent heat of vaporisation of vapour VB 
B 
C = specific heat of vapour VB 
Py 
B 
C = specific heat of condensed vapour VB 
PL 
T = boiling point of column B overhead liquid 
temperature of vapour VB 
temperature of column B subcooled overhead liquid. 
However, VB = ~ + Da and 
writing 
equation 
3) Mass Balance on the vapour: 
y = V' + (1 - q) F -B A A 
~+ 
AV' 
QL (1 - q) F - --A Ay 
A B 
where q = heat of vaporise 1 mole of feed FA 
molar latent heat of the feed FA 
, 
VA = vapour below the feed point in column A 
A ,= latent heat of vaporisation of vapour vA' VA 
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(A.n.3.3 ) 
4) Liquid balance on colWDn B: 
but LA = wB 
QL 
so lis = La + kAv 
B 
+ La HDa 
AV 
B 
(A.II.3.5) 
where k is a constant denoting the proportion of the total heat loss 
from coluinn B. 
The. constraint equations (A.II.3.1), (A.II.3.3), (A.II.3.4) and 
(A.II.3.5) may be written in the matrix fom of equation (A.n.2.1) as 
~ = AI = 0 (A.II.3.6 ) 
where A = 
1 -1 0 0 o 
- 1 o 
-Mw 1 0 A -(AV+H1ifli-(Hn .. +Av +H1+P.)-1 B -8 B 
-1 
-(l-q) 0 AV' 0 A 
H (1 + A~) 
B 
1 
H 1 
0 0 0 1 
-( 1 +~) 0 -:kf VB AVB 
and I = FA 
WA 
QR 
WB 
La 
Da 
QL 
373 
The important feature of these constraint equations is that many of 
the elements of matrix A are entha1py terms which themselves are functionS 
of temperature and pressure process measurements and therefore subject to 
some uncertainty. 
In order to examine the effect of this uncertainty, the masS and 
heat balance was closed by choosing the following parameters. 
A = 1 -1 0 0 0 -1 0 
1188.49 -1584.55 1 0 -4901.9 -6089.29 -1 
-1.34 0 -o.2203x1O-3 0 1.2465 1 0.2073x10-3 
0 0 0 1 -1 0 0 
and a vector of true measurements: 
I: = 194.712 1b.mo1e/hr 
18.1 
" " 
0.138785 x 108 chu/hr 
1934.72 1b.mo1e/hr 
1934·72 
" " 
176.612 
" " 
0.352202 x 107 chu/hr 
To demonstrate the use of Nogita's serial elimination algorithm 
several simulations were performed. 
The parameters of the constraint matr;ix A were chosen to be correct 
and assumed constant, while the measurement noise standard deviations 
were selected to be approximately S% of nanina1 measurementS. This 
results in a vector of measurement standard deviations of: 
10 
1. 
0.5 x 106 
100 
100 
10 
0.5 x 105 374 , 
i , 
l 
The measurement correlation matrix was assumed to be the Wlit matrix 
I, i.e. 
1. o. 
1. 
o. 
1. 
The experiments performed are given in Table A.n.l, where the 
measurement errors are defined in terms of a relative error: 
Simulation Predicted Predicted True Relative 
number measurements in error Yi value true 
Ml 
-
194.71 194.712 0 
18.1 8 18.1 8 0 
0.138786 x 10 0.138785 x 10 0 
1934.73 1934.72 0 
1934.73 1934.72 0 
176.611 176.612 0 
0.352202 x 107 0.352202 x 107 0 
M2 1, 4, 5 194.473 194.712 ~ 6 18.6 8 18.1 8 -0.5 
0.138655 x 10 0.138785 x 10 -0.003 
1932.73 1934.72 0.2 
1932·73 1934.72 0.2 
175.87 176.612 0.1 
0.35222 x 107 0.352202 x 107 0 
M3 1, 2, 4 194.8 194.712 -6 
19.79 18.1 8 -6 
0.138756 x 108 0.138785 x 10 -0.003 
1935.58 1934.72 0 
1935.58 1934· 72 0 
175.01 176.612 0.1612 
0.352204 x 107 0.352202 x 107 0 
TABLE A.n.l. Detection of measurement data inconsistencies on a 
distillation column • 
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error 
Found 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 6.023 
0 
-0.029 
0.18 
0.18 
0.027 
0 
- 6 
.,. 4.31 
-0.0088 
0.0088 
0.0088 
0 
0 
The results presented in Table A.II.1 illustrate the power of 
Nogitafs technique for detecting errors in process measurements, when the 
constraint equation coefficients are deterministically known. In the 
simulations MZ and M3, the method makes it clear which process measure-
. ments contain gross errors. 
However, when there is uncertainty in the constraint equation c~ 
efficients a sensitivity analysis should be perfonned. Consider again 
the constraint equations defined in equation (A.II.3.6). Many of the 
A coefficients are enthalpies or latent heats which were estimated from 
process measurements of temperature and pressure. Of course these 
measurements themselves are subject to errors (both' small random and' 
gross errors). It was determined that a ZoO temperature measurement 
error resulted in the following coefficient errors: 
= so chujlb.mole 
= 0.000005 lb.mole/chu 
= 0.05 
The sensitivity of the solution of equation (A.II.Z.3) to these 
coefficients errors was detennined by implementing equation (A.II.Z.6) 
and examining the max:imum errors in the solution vector uSing the method 
. discussed in deriving equations (A.II.Z.7) and (A.n. 2.8). The results 
of two sensitivity analyses are given in Tables A.n. Z and A.II.3, and 
are presented as a matrix of solution vector errors, E, corresponding to 
the predicted measurement vector :t.. 
Table A.II;Z shows the E matrix when the enthalpy coefficients ~, 
flwA and HIla of the constraint equations can each have an error of 50 
chu/lb.mole . 
376 
enthalpy errors, since the maximum solution vector errors are well 
within the measurement standard deviations. Hence the measurement 
error achieved in calculating enthalpies from process temperatures does 
not particularly hinder the operation of the grosS measurement detection 
algorithm. 
Table A.II.3, however, details the solution vector error matrix E 
when the constraint coefficient lfAv' has an error of 0.000005 lb.mole/chu. 
A . 
The results show that the maximum errors in the solution vector are now 
quite Significant. For example, the predicted measurement Yl can have 
an apparent error of 25 lb.mole/hr which is 2.5 measurement standard 
deviations. These solution vector errors would manifest themselves as 
gross measurement errors when a set of heat and mass balance data are 
analysed using Nogita's data consistency check and hence yield an incor-
rect solution. 
This feature is illustrated by examining the check method when the 
constraint equation coefficient 1 lA V ' has an "unknown" error of 0.000005. A . 
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25.11 0.24 6 - 0.84 x 10 - 201 - 201 24·9 0.2 x 105 
25.11 0.24 6 - 0.84 x 10 201 - 201 24.9 0.2 x 105 
-25.11 -(). 24 .0.84 x 106 201 201 -24.9 -0.2 x 105 
-25.11 -0.24 0.84 x 106 201 201 
-24·9 -0.2 x 105 
-25.11 -0.24 0.84 x 106 201 201 
-24·9 -0.2 x 105 
25.11 0.24 -0.84 x 106 -201 -201 24.9 -0.2 x 105 
25.11 0.24 -0.84 x 106 -201 -201 24·9 -0.2 x 105 
TABLE A.I1.3 Matrix of measurement error coefficients: 
coefficient in error. 
1/A I constraint VA 
1he constraint equations, measurement standard deviations and parameters 
have been given earlier. 
Table A.II.4 ·shows the resultS of two simulations. 
In simulation S1 there were no process measurement errors. Nogita's 
algorithm knows nothing of the constraint equation uncertainty and pro-
cesses the measurements in the usual manner. The final result is a 
suggestion that the measurements QR and QL contain groSs errorS, 
although the predicted value of the heat loss QL' is negative (i.e., 
there is a heat input to the distillation column), which is nonsense. 
However, this type of solution is not altogether valueless since it may be 
able to USe such results as an inference of which constraint equation 
coefficient is in error. 
The case of a gross meaSurement error and an uncertain constraint 
equation coefficient is more difficult to analyse and the simu-
lation S2 in Table A.II.4 details the· results of Nogita's algorithm. 
The method suggests measurements 1, 2 and 4 are in error, which is correct 
with respect to measurement Y1' However, the predicted measurements Z 
are nonsense and would inspire little confidence in these suggestions. 
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i 
I Simulation Predicted Predicted True value Relative error 
number measurements in error Yi True Found , I 
Sl 3,7 194.7 194.712 0 0 
18.1 8 18.1 8 0 0 
0.100238 x 10 0.138785 x 10 0 -7.71 
1934.69 1934.72 0 0 
1934.69 1934.72 0 0 
176.6 176.612 0 0 
'-3.3255 x 105 0.352202 x 107 0 
-77.1 
S2 1,2,4 146.43 194.712 ~ -10.83 
- 29.19 8 18.1 8 -0.5 -47.8 
0.138681 x 10 0.138785 x 10 -0.003 -0.024 
1937.36 1934.72 0 0.0026 
1937.36 1934.72 -0.003 0.0024 
175.622 176.612 0.1 0.0022 
0.352214 x 107 0.352202 x 107 0 0.0024 
TABLE A.I1.4 Detection of measurement data inconsistencies on a distillation 
colmnn; subject to constraint equation uncertainty. 
These results demonstrate that care is needed in making assumptions 
about the nature of the constraint equation coefficients. If these 
coefficients are not deterministic, then the particular application of the 
detection method will determine to what degree the performance is degraded. 
The sensitivity check derived earlier provides an insight into this 
phenomenon. 
A.II.4 Process data validation check when the constraint-equation 
coefficients are uncertain 
The problem of uncertain constraint equation coefficients may be 
solved by treating these coefficients as additional process measurements 
with a corresponding measurement error standard deviation. In tlrill case 
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the least Squares criterion of equation (A.U.2.l), i.e., 
m 
= 1:: 
i=1 
(A.II.4.1) 
can stilJ. be minimised, but the constraint equations are now non linear, 
i.e., equation (A.II.2.2) becomes: 
= f.Cl:) = 0 
J 
j = 1.2, ••• 1 (A.II.4.2) 
The minimisation of equation (A.II.4.1) subject to the non linear 
constraints of equation (A.II.4.2) may be solved directly as an optimisa-
tion problem by using standard techniques, e.g. penalty function optimisa-
tion, or the problem may be transformed into the solution of a set of non 
linear simultaneous equations by introducing lagrange multipliers. This 
latter approach is ilJ.ustrated here. 
In this example, the maSS and heat balances around the distillation 
column are considered again, except that.the uncertain coefficient 1/A V' 
A 
is treated as a further process measurement, yS' to be estimated. The 
set of constraint equations which are equivalent to equation (A.II.3.6) 
become 
ljJ2 = a 21 Y1 - a 22 Y2 + a 23 Y3 - a 25 Y5 - a 26 Y6 - a 27 Y7 = 0 
(A.II.4.4) 
ljJ 3 = -31 Y1 - Y3 YS + a35 Y 5 + a 36 Y6 + a 37 Y7 = 0 
(A.U.4.5) 
= o 
and the vector of measurements to be predicted is : 
3S0 
~ = 
FA 
WA 
QR 
~ 
La 
Da 
QL 
1 
fAV' A 
Now equation (A.II.1.1) is minimised subject to equation (A.II.4.2) 
by introducing the lagrangian multipliers "1 to "4 which results in 
the following set of non linear simultaneous equations 
022 (Y1- m1 ) +aU"l+ a 21 "2 - a 31 "3 = 0 
1 
(A.II.4.7) 
0 22 (Y2- m2 ) - a12 "1 - a 22 "2 
2 
022 (Y3- m3 ) + a 23 "2 - Y8 "3 
3 
2 Q2 
5 
2 
o 2 
6 
2 
Q2 
7 
= 0 (A.II.4.8) 
= 0 (A.II.4.9) 
= 0 (A.II.4.10) 
(A.II.4.11 ) 
(A.II.4.12) 
(A.II.4.13) 
= 0 (A.II.4.14) 
Given a set of process measurements mi , measurement standard devia-
tions o i' i = 1, 8 and the coefficients a .. defined. earlier, equations 
~J . 
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(A.II.4.3) to (A.II.4.l4) can be solved for the vector of unknown 
(~ , ll· 
The detection of gross measurement errors may be performed using 
Ripp's suggestion of discarding elements from the baSic least squares 
criterion in equation (A.II.4.l), i.e., 
.0 = [ Oi(Yi~:i)2 
i=l 
(A.II.4.l5) 
where 0. = 0 
~ 
if element i is discarded 
= 1 otherwise. 
The consequence of this new least squares criterion in equation (A.II.4.l5) 
is simply to modify the first term in equations (A.II.4.7) to (A.II.4.14) 
to 20i (y.- m.). Gross meaSurement errors are then determined by (j2 ~ ~ 
i 
examining p when measurementS are discarded, and the minimum .0 usually 
coincides with the gross measurement errors. 
This technique is illustrated by using the same parameters as before 
with ° 8 = 0.000005, and repeating simulations 81 and 82, denoted NS1 and 
NS2 respectively. The set of nOn linear equations (A.II.4.13) to 
(A.II.4.14) were solved uSing Powell's method for minimising a sum of 
squareS without calculating the derivatives. 
Table A.H. 5 shows how the least squares criterion .0 varies as 
measurements are discarded from the problem formulation for runs NSl and 
NS2. 
The predicted data set corresponding to the minimum .0 in each run is 
presented in Table A.II.6. Run NS1 shows that the method is able to 
cope with the uncertain constraint equation parameter lAy. by estimat-
A 
ing it as well as the other process measurements. Run N82 contains both 
t . d . lAy·' a gross measuremen error ~ m1 an an error ~ A • The results 
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SiJnulation N51 Simulation NS2 
Discarded Discarded 
measurements ~ measurements ~ 
0 0.8566 0 20.633 
1 0.8387 1 0.820 
2 1.3776 2 4.452 
3 0.8526 3 20.495 
4 0.8464 4 46.228 
5 0.8464 5 20.630 
6 0.8390 6 4·727 
7 1.1063 7 20.379 
8 0.000233 8 18.264 
1 ; 8 0.000232 1 ; 2 0.00216 
2 ; 8 0.486 -14 1 ; 3 0.817 
3 ; 8 0.13 x 10 1 ; 4 0.810 
4 ; 8 0.000176 1 ; 5 0.811 
5 ; 8 0.000176 1 ; 6 0.113 
6 ; 8 0.000232 -18 1 ; 7 0.795 
7 ; 8 0.139 x 10 1 ; 8 0.879 x 10-4 
TABLE A.II.5 Variation of ~ in non-linear distillAtion column problem. 
Simulation Predicted Predicted True value Relative error 
number measurements Yi True Found in error 
NS1 7 ; 8 194.712 194.712 0 0 
18.1 8 18.1 8 0 0 
0.138879 x 10 0.138785 x 10 -0.0188 0 
1934.72 1934.72 0 0 
1934.72 1934.72 .0 0 
176.612 176 .612 0 0 
0.353135 x !~7 0.352202 x 107 0 0.186 
0.2203 x 10 0.2203 x 10-3 
- 1· - 1 
NS2 1 ; 8 194.207 194.712 - 6 - 6.05 
18.6 8 18.1 8 - 0.5 0 
0.138763 x 10 0.138785 x 10 - 0.003 - 0.0074 
1935.21 1934.72 0 0.0051 
1935.21 1934.72 - 0.003 0.0021 
175.607 176.612 0.1 0 
0.352206 x 10~ 0.352202 x !~7 0 0 
0.22036 x 10- 0.2203 x 10 -'1 -0.934 
TABLE A.II.6 Detection of measurement data inconSistencies; non-linear 
distillAtion problem. 
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illustrate that the detection method determines these errors and also 
predicts a consistent, accurate data Set. The results presented for 
nms NS1 and NS2 in Table A.II.6 are a vast improvement over those of 
Table A.II.4 where the Wlcertainty in 1/'11. v. was ignored. 
A 
This Appendix has considered a process measurement validation method 
which maybe used to detect gross measurement errors. 'Dle method was 
applied to a typical distillation column and the effect of uncertainty 
in the process measurement linear constraint equation coefficients was 
examined. A method has been suggested whereby the sensitivity of the 
technique to these Wlcertainties may be examined, and it is suggested 
that this analysis Should be perfonned to test the feasibility of the 
method in any particular application. 
If this analysis reveals critical constraint coefficients the 
measurement validation check may still be perfonned by considering the 
Wlcertain coefficients as additional process measurementS. This fonnu-
lation results in an optimisation, subject to non-linear constraints, 
problem. The optimisation was solved here by using Lagrange multipliers 
to transform the problem into the solution a set of non-linear simultane-
ous equations, which were solved using Powell' s method. The serial 
elimination method of Ripps was used to detect malfWlction and simulations 
demonstrated the power of the technique. 
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APPENDIX III 
MFlIRA'S INNOVATION CORRELATION ADAPl'IVE 
ESTIMATOR 
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--- - --------------------------------------------------------
This Appendix describes Mehra IS algoritlun (~7) for a<iaptillg the 
Kalman filter to cope with uncertainty in a priori system information. 
The nomencla ture is the same as that used in Chapter 3. 
Mehra considers the system model described by: 
x (kti) = A x (k) + r.!! (k) 
I (k)· = H x (k) + ~ (k) 
(A.m.l) 
(A.III.2) 
The noise sequences j.!! (k)} and j ~ (k)} are assumed to be zero 
mean Gaussian, white noise sequences with covariances. 
E(,!! (k) l (j» = Q 5 (k,j) 
E~ (k) ~T (j» = R 5 (k,j) 
E(,!! (k) l (j» = 0 for all k,j and Q and Rare 
bounded positive definite matrices. 
The system considered above is also assumed to be completely 
controllable and observable. 
Now Mehra examines the steady state Kalman filter, as guaranteed 
by the constraint of system controllability and observability, for 
which the filtering equations are: 
g (k!k) = ~(k!k-l) + K(z (k) - Hi (k!k-l» (A.III.3) 
K = PHT (HPHT + R)-l (A.III.4) 
P = A (I - KIf) P (I - KIf)T AT+ AKRKTAT+ rQrT (A.IlLS) 
In equations (A.III.4) and (A.III.S) Q and R represent approximations 
to the true noise covariance matrices.' For this case, the covariance 
matrix of the innovation sequence is given by: 
'1.: = E ( Y. (i + k) y-T (i» 
= HPHT + R 
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k=O 
(A.IIL6 ) 
Since the autocorrelation function is not a function of tme (i), then 
the innovation sequence is stationary, and by virtue of linearity Mehra 
shows it is also GaUSsian • 
. The testing scheme proposed by Mehra is based upon the criterion 
that the innovation sequence be white for the Kalman filter to be 
optimal. This means that if Ck is est:iJDated then the filter is 
optimal if ~ is approximately zero for k > O. The estimate of ~ 
is formed as: N-k 
" 1 ~ = N L ~ (i + k) ~ T (i) i=1 (A.ilI.7) 
with N, the number of sample points assumed to be large. 
The elements of the matrix of the normalized autocorrelation 
coefficients are estimated by: 
" ( Ck )·· 1J 
where is the ijth element of the matrix P.k • It can be 
1\ 
shown that the probability distribution for (Pk).. is asymptotically 11 . 
Thus the 9Sfo confidence limits for (P k)' . for k> 0 are 
. l.l. 
Normal. 
+ (1.96/./N). The test for filter opt:iJDality therefore becomes: 
" Compute (Pk)ii' k> 0, for N sample points. If less than 
Sfo of the k values fall outside the band formed by the 9Sfo con-
fidence limits, the sequence ~(i) is white and the filter is 
optimal. 
If the above test is not passed, this indicates that the Kalman gain 
used in the filter equation is incorrect. To correct the filter, 
Mehra generates new estimates for Q and R. However, it is first 
necessary to est:iJDa te PHT 
NOW, using equation (A.TII.6), Mehra shows that an est:iJDate of 
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puT is given by 
AT A Ft 
PU=KC+L 
o 
-------
en 
where LFt is the pseudo inverse of 
L= HA 
HA(I - KH) A 
• 
H (A (I - KH»n-l A 
and r = (LT L)-l LT 
The estimate of R is given by: 
A " "'T R .= C - H (PH ) 
o 
(A.III.8) 
(A.III.9 ) 
To estimate Q, equations (A.III.9) and (A.III.S) are used, although 
the latter equation cannot be used directly since an estimate of P 
is not available. Equation (A,III.S) may be rewritten as: 
P = APAT+M+fQfT (A.III.l0) 
where M = . A(KCoKT - KHP _ PHTKT) AT 
Now the expression for P is substituted into the right hand side of 
equation (A.III.10). The process is repeated n-l times and the 
following set of equations is generated: 
k[l Aj fQfT (Aj)T = P _ Ak P(Ak)T _ 
j=o 
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k-l 
L 
j=o 
k=l, ... ,n (A.III.ll) 
If equation (A.ll.ll) :ill premultiplicd by Hand postmultiplicd by 
-k)T T (A H , the result is: 
k-l 
(A-k)T HT _ HA~T _ L HAjM(Aj-k)T HT 
j=o 
k=1, .•. ,n (A.III.12) 
The right hand side of equation (A.III.12) can be computed if PH and Co 
AT " are known. If the estimates of PH and Co are used in equation 
(A.IIl.12) then nm equations will be available to solve for the q2 
unknown elements of Q. Clearly if 2 q > nm, a unique solution can-
not be found. If the 2 q < nm, a solution can be obtained but first 
a linearly dependent subset of equations (A.IIl.12) must be chosen. 
'!he Kalman filter may then be adapted using the computed values of Q 
" and R. 
The adaptation scheme derived above is only applicable if Q hes 
nm or fewer unknown elements. If Q has more than run unknowns or 
unknown structure, then Mehra shows it :ill still possible to estimate 
" an optimal Kalman gain Kopt 
In his paper Mehra describes two related iterative procedures for 
" calculating K
opt • He proves that, for steady state filtering, the 
successive error covariance matrices (obtained at each iteration) con-
verge, i.e. Pj +1 < Pj and Pj > 0, and in conjunction the corres-
ponding sequence of Kalman gain Kj converge to some Kopt ' i.e., 
limit 
One gain estimation scheme proceeds as follows. 
i) Let Ko be initial or a priori gain of the filter. . Obtain an 
, 
estimate of Kl using equations (A.IlI.4) and (A.IIl.8) 
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(A.IlI.1;1) 
• 
" C 
n 
and obtain P~HT and R frc:xn equations (A.nI.B) and (A.nI.9). 
ii) ·Define 0 P1 = P2 - P1 and then obtain an estimate: . 
~1 = A(I - K1H) O~l(I -·K1H)T AT - A(K1- Ko) Co(K1- Ko)T AT 
where P. j = 1, 2 
J 
are the steady state error covariance 
A . 
matrices using Ko and K1 for the filter gains. 
A " OP 1 is the estimate of 0 P 1 using K1 
iii) Obtain {i!1 and K2 as follows: 
A . AT A T 
PHT=PH+OPH 2 1 1 
K2 = {~T (H P;-HT + R )-1 
oocome iv) Repeat steps ii) and iii) until l5Pil 
small with respect to ~ Pi ~ or 11 Kill • 
matrix nonn. 
. refers to a suitable 
.,. 
An alternative way of detennining K2 would be to refilter the 
A 
data sequence (f(k» using K1 and then using equation (A.III.13) 
t\ 
obtain a new K2 . This procedure may then be repeated until conver-
gence is obtained. 
This second measurement refiltering method was used in the present 
work. 
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APPENDIX IV 
FRIEDLAND'S BIAS ESTIMATOR 
391 
The nomenclature used in this Appendix has been defined in 
Chapter 3. 
In the application of the Kalman filter an accurate model of th~ 
process dynamics and observation is required. If this is not possible, 
then unknown parameters may be. added to the original state vector. 
The filter then estimates these unknown parameters or bias terms as 
well as the original state vector. Although this method is reasonably 
effective when the· number of bias terms is relatively small, a problem 
ariSes when the number of bias terms is comparable to the number of 
state variables of the original problem because of the larger problem 
dimension. Friedland1s paper (109) was thus motivated by the need 
for a method whereby the numerical inaccuracies introduced by computa-
tions with large vectors and matrices could be avoided. 
Although Friedland considers linear continuous time filtering, 
only the diScrete time case will be reviewed· here. 
Friedland writes the system models as: 
x (k+1) = A(k+1, k) ~(k) + Ab(k+1,k) ~(k) + !(k) 
b (k+l) = ~ (k) 
.r (k) = H(k) ~(k) + Hb(k) ~ (k) + .! (k) 
(A.IV.1) 
(A.IV.2) 
(A.IV.3) 
The matrices ~ and ~ determine how the components of the bias 
vector enter into the dynamics and observations respectively and repre-
sent the general case. 
Now an augmented state variable model may be written frOm equations 
(A.IV.I) - (A.IV.3) as: 
where 
z (k+l) = F(k+1,k) i. (k) + G !: (k) 
.r (k) = L(k) ~ (k) + .! (k) 
• 
~ (k) = t~-~~~j 
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~'(k+1,k) = 
[
A (k+l, k) : ~ (k+l, k) ] 
--------1--------
I 
o t I . 
G = 
L(k) = [H (k) : '\, (k)] 
Direct application of the Kalman filter of section 3.4 results in: 
g(k/k) = F(k,k-l) ~(k-l/k-l) + K(k)(r(k) - L(k) F(k,k-l) g(k-l/k-l» 
K(k) = P(k/k-l) LT(k) (L(k) P(k/k-l) LT(k):+ &(k»-l 
P(k/k-l) = F(k,k-l)P (k-l/k-l)FT(k,k-l) + G Q (k-l) UT (A.IV.4) 
The error covariance matrix P(k/k-l) may be partitioned as: 
P(k/k-l) = 
where: 
Px (k/k-l) = variance of the original state x 
Pb (k/k-l) = variance of the bias b 
P xb (k/k-l ) = covariance of ! and ~ 
Now by partitioning of the other matrices in a similar fashion and 
uSing a transformation of the variance e·quation (A.IV.4), Friedland 
derives the following recursive algorithm for estimating the bias ~(k). 
The subscript x refers to matrices calculated by ordinary bias-free 
Kalman filtering. 
U(o) = 0 : M(o) = Pb(o) 
S(k) = H(k) U(k) + '\, (k) 
V(k) = U(k) - Kx (k) S(k) 
~ (0) = 0 
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M(k+1) = M(k) - M(k) ST(k) (H(k) P
x 
(k/k-1) HT(k) + R (k) 
+ S(k) M(k) S7 (k»-l S(k) M(k) 
~ (k) = M(~l) (VT(k) HT (k) + Hb(k» R-1 (k) 
1\ . /"< .1\ 
~(k/k) = (1 - ~(k) S(k» .!!(k-1/k-l) + ~(k) (z(k) - H(k) ,!(k/k-1» 
U(k+1) = A(k+1,k) V(k) + Ab(k+ 1, k) 
A 
In this algorithm Kx(k), P
x
(k/k-1) and ,!(k/k-1) are calculated 
from the usual Kalman filter as if there were no bias .!!(k) present. 
ThuS the result of Friedland's variance transformation is that the 
problem of estimating the state ,! in the presence of a constant but 
unknown bias .!! is decomposed into two separate tasks. The first part 
is the standard Kalman filter algorithm that generates an estimate of 
the state vector ~(k/k) as if there were no bias present. The second 
filter due to Friedland estimates the bias vector b(k/k) from the 
innovation sequence generated by the "bias-free" Kalman filter. 
Finally, Friedland shows that the "bias-free" estimate of the state 
f(k/k) and the estimated bias f(k/k) may be combined to form an optimum 
state estimate A' ::!;(k/k) according to: 
~ '(k/k) = ~(k/k) + V(k) ~(k/k) 
Recent extensions of Friedland's technique to cover time varying 
bias and randomly varying bias estimation have been given in references 
(110), (111). 
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APPENDIX V 
MARKOV RELIABILITY MODElS . 
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A. V.1 List or symbols 
k1 ) 
) constants in hazard rate equation 
k2 ) 
ps.(t) probability of being in state 
~ 
s. at time t. 
~ 
P. . transition probability from state i to j. 
~J 
R(t) system reliability . 
. th ~ system state. 
T random variable associated with time 
t time 
D.t time increment 
time on time scale t 
X random variable associated with the system state. 
z(t) hazard rate 
Greek letters 
failure rate 
Subscripts 
0, 1, 2 state 0, 1 and 2 
i state i 
j state j 
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failures 
(Wlit time)2 
time units 
" " 
" " 
" " 
failure 
Wlit time 
failure 
Wlit time 
A.V.2 Markov processeS (118), (120) 
Markov models play a central role in relia bili ty theory. Markov 
models are a fWlction of two random variables, the state of the system 
X and the time of observation T. Reliability theory is usually con-
cerned with the discrete-state continuous time Markov process. 
A Markov model is defined by a set of probabilities P.. which 
" . ~J 
define the probability of transition from any state i to any state j. 
The important feature of a Markov process is that the future stateS of 
the process depend only on its immediate past history, i.e. the transi-
tion' probability P ij depends only on states i and j, and is com-
pletely independent of all past states except the last one, state i. 
In order to formulate a Markov model it is first necessary to 
define all the mutually exclusive states of the system. For example, 
in a system composed of a single equipment there are two possible 
sta tes : So = Xl' the element is good, sl = Xl' the element is 
failed. The states of the system at time t = 0 are called initial 
states,and those representing a final state are called final stateS. 
The set of Markov state equations describes the probabilistic transi-
tions from the initial to the final states and the transition proba':" 
bilities must obey the following rules: 
i) The probability of transition in time 11 t from one state to 
'another is given by z(t) 11 t where z(t) is the hazard associ-
ated with the two states in question. 
ii) The probabilities of more than one transition in time 11 t are 
negligible • 
Although Markov models have been extenSively used some conceptual 
difficulties were enc,ountered in the course of this work. 
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Consider a single equipment with an overall constant hazard rate 
A failure/tmit time. 
o 
lJefin· s d :mg . 0 an sl as good and failed sta tes, Ps (t + I::. t) 
o 
and P
Sl 
(t + I::. t) as the probability of being in states So and sl 
at time ·t +1::. t, and Ps (t)" and Ps (t) as the probability of being 
o 1 
in state So and sl at time t then the Markov state equations are: 
P (t +1::. t) = (1 - A I::.t) P (t) So 0 So (A.V.2.1) 
P (t + I::. t) = A I::. t Ps (t) + Ps (t) 
Sl 0 0 1 
(A.V.2.2) 
These equations yield, in the limit, the first order differential 
equations 
dPs (t) + Ao Ps (t) 0 0 = d't 0 
(A.V.2.3) 
dPSl (t) = A o Ps (t) 
d't 0 
(A.V.2.4) 
Equations (A.V.2.3) and (A.V.2.4) may be solved using laplace 
transforms with the initial conditions (Ps (0), Ps (0» to yield: 
_ Aot 0 1 
Ps (t) = Ps (0) e (A.V.2.S) 
o 0 
and = 1 - Ps (0) 
o 
(A.V.2.6) 
Now the reliability of the Single equipment is the probability of being 
in state s i.e., 
o 
R(t) (0) e 
-A t o (A.V.2.7) 
Suppose the single equipment is now considered to have 3 states, 
Le., So is the good state, sl is an unhealthy state (equivalent to 
a degrading equipment) and s2 is the failed state. Then the Markov 
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. graph becomes (118): 
FIGURE A.V.l Markov.graph for an equipment with a single degraded State. 
In this process AOl tJ. t is the probability of the equipment 
. moving from a good to a degraded state, X 12 tJ. t is the probability 
of moving from the degraded to the failed state and A 02tJ. t is the 
probability of the equipment failing directly. 
The Markov state e qua tions are: 
. Ps (t +tJ.t) = (1 - (X + X )tJ.t) Ps (t) 
.0 02 01 0 
(A.V.2.8) 
Ps (t +tJ. t) = X tJ. t Ps (t) + (1 - A 12tJ. t) Ps (t) (A.V.2.9) 
1 0 1 0 1· 
P (t +tJ. t) = A tJ. t P (t) +A12tJ. t Ps (t) + Ps (t) (A.V.2.i0) s2 O2 So 1 2.. 
Solving the resultant differential equations, subject to the initial 
conditions P (0), P (0) and P (0) gives: 
So sl s2. 
~(A +A )t 
p(t) = P (0) (1· _ e 01 02 ) 
So So 
-A t 
Ps (t) = Ps (0) e . 12 + 
1 1 
1 
P (t) = 1 - L 
s2 
i=o 
P (t) 
si· 
(A.V.2.11) 
(A.V.2.12) 
(A. V .2.13) 
The equipnent reliability may be defined as the probability of not being 
in state. s2' i.e. 
R(t) = 1 - PS2(t) = Ps (t) +. Ps (t) o 1 
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-A t 
+ Ps (0) e 12 
1 
(A.V.2.14) 
Now the three state single equipnent model is characterised by 
the hazard rates A 01 ' A 02,A 12 but how these coefficients are 
specified is not trivial. Intuitively, it may be postulated that A02 
represents the nmnber of failures/unit time which do not fail through 
a degraded state. Also it may be expected thatA 12 > A01 or A02 
since this represents the failure rate of a degraded equipment and 
represents a wearing out phase of the equipnent. 
However, the fact that the single equipment has been represented 
by a three state Markov model should not affect the overall equipnent 
failure rate and reliability as given in equation (A.V.2.7), thus 
equation (A.V.2.1.4) should reduce to this. 
Unfortunately this is impoSSible because the 3 state fonnulation 
is fundamentally a different model. For example, an analogy is two 
stirred tanks in series. No matter how the time constants are chosen 
for the tanks, the dynamic responSe will never be the same as a single 
stirred tank although the responses can be very close. By appropriate 
selection of A 01' A 02 and A 12 it is poSSible to achieve the same 
overall equipnent failure rate A 0 but the reliability functions will 
never be quite equal (except lihen A 0 = A 01 + A 02 and A 12 = - ). 
Thus the introduction of additional Markov states to represent" 
the degradation of an equipment yields a model which does not satisfy 
intuitive conceptions of single equipment reliability. 
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In the above fonnulations, ·it was assumed that the equillment 
hazard rates were constants. Although the Markov fonnulation can 
handle time varying hazard rates (118) of the type shown in Figure 
A.V.2a, the method breaks down for the hazard shown in Figure A.V.2b. 
z(t) z(t) 
t 
a b 
FIGURE A.V.2 Time dependent hazard models. 
For the model shown in Figure A.V.2b, the. hazard for t > tm is 
Thus the state proba-
bilities will be functions of t and t and the technique is no 
m 
longer directly applicable. Shooman (118) has discussed this problem 
in some detail, and suggests that in such situations the analysis 
should be perfonned using a joint density flDlction or compolDld events 
approach. The joint density function method is particularly conveni-
ent for incorporating information from a malfunction monitor into the 
analysis, whereas the use of such information with a Markov process is 
not so well defined. 
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